Monarchism within the context of Weimar's right wing such as the DNVP has a rather slippery definition. While there were genuine monarchists who wanted a restoration of the Hohenzollerns, most self-proclaimed monarchists during Weimar had a more selective definition of monarchism. This monarchism was less about monarchy and more about defining a fundamental opposition to the Republic. Weimar's monarchists were not so much champions of monarchical rule, but a rather motley assortment of illiberal politics that denied the legitimacy of the November Revolution.

The DNVP was a case in point of this highly selective and halfhearted monarchism. A number of DNVP chief did have some contact with the exiled Kaiser and the Crown Prince Wilhelm also maintained contacts with the German right after he returned to Germany. Yet the DNVP never openly called for a specific restoration of a Hohenzollern candidate, whether a Wilhelm II or III. The chief slogan of the DNVP with regards to past German rulers was "Back to Bismarck," not the Iron Chancellor's regal master Wilhelm I. This use of Bismarck as a historical figurehead permeated the materials produced in the DNVP press and the Stahlhelm. Much of the restorationist rhetoric of the DNVP was focused on attacking the Republic's alleged decadence, weak executive powers, and its vulnerabilities to external powers. A monarchical government was a flight away from this situation and this was the main focus of the DNVP monarchist rhetoric.

One of the leading intellectuals of the DNVP, Walther Lambach, pointed out that the DNVP's monarchism was hollow rhetoric in a widely-read article "Monarchismus" in the Politische Wochenschrift. Lambach contended that the hazy and ill-defined promise of a restored Hohenzollern state was a liability for the DNVP. Instead, the DNVP and the German people had a symbolic monarch in the form of the Reichspräsident Paul von Hindenburg. The Field Marshal was everything the Wilhelm II was not: a stolid national symbol of authority all Germans could unite behind. For all the self-proclaimed monarchism of the German right, there was remarkably little love for the Kaiser's wartime actions. This was in strong contrast to the mythologizing of von Hindenburg's military victories. There was more openly-declared love in the DNVP for the old imperial flag than there was for the imperial house in the Reichstag and the DNVP press.

Lambach's career in the DNVP suffered because of "Monarchismus" especially since his article called for working within the Republic's system to restructure it along more authoritarian lines. Such an acceptance of the Republic's right to exist was something anathema to the increasingly radical base of the DNVP, especially as Alfred Hugenberg became one of the chief power brokers of the party. Having the temerity to point out the inconsistencies of the party's platform was not something that would endear Lambach to the wider DNVP establishment. The DNVP under Hugenberg's leadership tended to place monarchism further in its political background as it became more doctrinaire in its rejection of the Republic, antisemitic, and a champion of German big business interests. This incompatible melange of policies weakened the electoral base of the DNVP while its declining presence within the Reichstag was still strong enough to weaken the Republic in during the twin political crises of the Young Plan and the Depression.

One of the sad postscripts for Weimar monarchism was Chancellor Heinrich Brüning's brief toying with a restoration in late 1931. Brüning was no friend of the Hohenzollerns, but a monarchy was a way to stave off an insurgent Hitler. Tellingly, the Chancellor's first choice for a new monarch was not a Hohenzollern, but von Hindenburg. What scuttled Brüning's half-baked plans for a new monarchy was that von Hindenburg had decided to stand for reelection in 1932. He had suggested to the aged Field Marshal in November 1931 that instead of a presidential election, the government should hold a referendum that von Hindenburg be declared a lifetime regent of the German state. Von Hindenburg had little interest in becoming an ersatz monarch and refused Brüning's offer. The Chancellor was thus stuck with the Hohenzollerns, most of whose leading candidates were either engaged with the DNVP or factions within the NSDAP. Yet the Hohenzollerns' game of political footsie with the Nazis bore no fruit during the Third Reich. The NSDAP had even less use for monarchism than the DNVP and while Hitler courted some former royals, such overtures were always very limited. The NSDAP's propagandists had the sense to recognize that monarchism was one of the weaker planks of the German right and longing for a monarch had more to do with the desire for a strong executive leader who could act in the present rather than a dynasty rooted in the German past.

Sources

Hanson, Stephen E. Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany and Post-Soviet Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Hertzman, Lewis. DNVP Right-Wing Opposition in the Weimar Republic, 1918-1924. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969.

Patch, Jr, William L. "Heinrich Brüning's Recollections of Monarchism: The Birth of a Red Herring." The Journal of Modern History 70, no. 2 (1998): 340-370.

Peukert, Detlev. The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity. New York: Hill and Wang, 2008.