The Vietnam conflict was one of the most complex wars in the modern era because it was fought under the umbrella of the Cold War between the Communist Bloc and the Western Democracies. The nuclear umbrella deterrent, and the US military establishment's desire to localize and contain communist revolutionary movements without directly provoking the Soviet Union or (to a lesser extent) the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), meant that the US was unable to directly confront North Vietnam on her soil.

Vietnam had been partitioned along the 17th parallel following the French withdrawal, and prior to American involvement in a multilateral agreement of which the US was one of the prime signatories. It was thought that South Vietnam - with its more pro French, pro West, Catholic sentiment - would resist communist insurrection, and that the North would respect the partition. Neither proved true. Originally, the US sent advisors to help equip and train the South's fighting forces to deter the - at the time - low level guerilla campaigns being undertakes by the Viet Cong (an ostensibly independent South Vietnamese "liberation" organization). Over time the American military presence was increased as it became clear that the fatally corrupt South Vietnamese government and military establishment held very little real sway in the thoroughly neglected Southern countryside.

The commitment of American ground combat forces to the fight on behalf of such a corrupt regime marked a major turning point of the conflict. Now American soldiers would attempt to fight a conventional war against an indigenous liberation movement which cleverly cast the fight as that against the foreign invader propping up a deeply corrupt and unpopular government, and which enjoyed local support as well as material and organizational support for North Vietnam and the wider Communist Bloc. It proved a simple and effective narrative that steadily eroded popular support of the Southern government.

The political constraints under which the conflict labored (nuclear deterrence, the Cold War, the nominal sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam, etc.) effectively prohibited the US from directly winning the war. The strategy was to outlast the North with a battle of attrition in which America's overwhelming technological advantage should prove decisive. In the meantime, it was hoped that political programs to win the hearts and minds of the populace of the countryside, and to rectify some of the more glaring instances of corruption in South Vietnam would create a stability and liberty that the communists couldn't counter with their narrative and propaganda.

None of these were effective in the end. Despite billions of dollars in aid, streams of American blood and all the goodwill in the world, the South Vietnamese government remained rife with corruption, the countryside became less pacified the longer the war continued, and the American public turned against the effort of a brutal, televised conflict with neither clear aims nor an any credible end in sight. A succession of major escalations of both American combat troop numbers, and communist offensives (which, despite their repeated tactical failures proved huge strategic successes in that they further galvanized American public opposition to the war) belied the optimistic statements of pentagon staffers that the enemy were nearing the breaking point. In reality, the American military and state department had concluded in secret that the war was unwinnable by 1965 (not long after the beginning of American involvement), but must be continued in order to maintain credibility on the international stage.

Eventually, the inevitable happened: for political reasons, the direct involvement of American combat troops was ended despite a lack of victory. American treasure, supplies and equipment continued to poor into the country in a vain attempt to buy a victory paid with Vietnamese blood rather than American. Air Force strikes continued unabated to keep the North at the table in Paris where tentative peace negotiations were not taken particularly seriously by either side. In the face of repeated offensives by the VC, with ever more brazen NVA support and participation, the weak Southern government began to crumble. Without American combat forces, the South's Army was unable to seriously present a unified defense against a capable and battle hardened enemy as what popular support the South's government had enjoyed evaporated.

Although American participation in combat operations had nominally ceased nearly 2 years prior to the final offensive in 1975, there remained a sizeable presence in the country. When it became clear the VC and the NVA were going to triumph, the final evacuation began. The ignominious retreat by helicopter shuttle from the American Embassy in Saigon with as many otherwise doomed collaborators as could be ferried off to a waiting carrier group in the South China Sea was broadcast across the world. As American military choppers which had so dominated the Vietnamese Sky's for nearly a decade where unceremoniously pushed over the side to make way for the flood of refugees, it appeared as nothing more than a humiliating defeat.

Hopefully this brief summation can help the reader form a conclusion as to whether a black and white binary explanation of the conflict as a "defeat" versus a "victory" - to which the American public of the 20th century was accustomed - is more or less appropriate than a version of gray in which it is agreed that our military intervention in a civil war resulted in our ally's unconditional and total defeat despite our best efforts.