Thursday Reading and Research is intended as an academic free-for-all, for the discussion of all issues historical, or tangentially so. Suggested topics include, but are by no means limited to:
New developments or discoveries in the field
Recent book releases, old book reviews, reading recommendations, or just talking about what you're reading now
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Regular participants in the Thursday threads should just keep doing what they've been doing; newcomers should take notice that this thread is meant for open discussion only of matters historical discussion, not just anything you like -- we'll have a thread on Friday for that, as usual.
I've read a article/chapter on The Long War of 1593-1606 between Habsburgs and Ottomans called Ibrahim Pecevi on war: a note on the European 'military revolution
It examines an Ottoman account of war, and through it the weapons differences between the two parties, and how this fits into the overall discussion on The Military Revolution debate which was said to be occurring at the time. I recommend the read, but I will highlight some points I took from it
it is very important to mention the article is mostly based on a single account (Pecevi's) and discusses few selected battles and sieges in it. This obviously raises concerns of how much we should take from such a thing. But overall the narrations seems inline with other sources. Alternate (brief) account of battle of Mezőkeresztes can be found here, no. 524 for comparison
there seems to had existed an advantage in number and quality of firearm weapons and tactics on the Habsburg side, and this was recognized by both parties at the time. This is corroborated by some other sources and seems to be so far accepted, even though it's hard to quantify it
this 'advantage' of firearms while perceived, doesn't seem to have actually made a difference, neither in filed battles (battle of Mezőkeresztes ) or sieges (Kanisza,Esztergom) or for the overall outcome of the war. That is, it didn't really allow Habsburg side many gains/victories during the war. We can't really tell if it prevented a more serious loss though. The war was a complicated mess, and so far I have found this account here insightful for the general (political more then military) overview of how it progressed
the author claims the Habsburg firearms pike-and-shot tactics were relatively effective defensively but still not mature enough to deliver proper offensive punch. I don't really know what to think about all this as I am not familiar enough with neither side's tactics and strengths.
In the conclusion author claims that by Pecevi's narration, we can conclude that for Habsburgs Military Revolution was real and then proposes that if true, it had to happen between 1570 and 1590.Now this is something I can expand on, even though I am not sure if the Revolution thesis is real, and I wouldn't dare to infer that what follows confirms the above proposed.
But I can say that from year 1578 there was a recorded serious effort by Habsburgs to modernize and reorganize the military in the borderlands. For Croatian-Slavonian frontier this effort culminated with conference on Bruck on Mur where many policies of strategy and finances were settled. Among other things (like creation of Karlovac fortress) it was ordered to procure new 2000-4000 arqeubuses and muskets (for a contingent of roughly 7-8 thousand soldiers employed on the Croatian-Slavonian frontier). Inventories made in preparation for the conference listed only 955 firearms of which many were broken, so the 2000+ new firearms is a massive improvement. Chronic logistic and finance problems make us unsure if the order was completely fulfilled, but it is an indication there was an overall policy which would fit the above narrative of increased firearm focus on the Austrians. How the Ottomans fit in here, I do not know
I recently re-read William Wilson's article "On Herder, Folklore, and Romantic Nationalism" and Terry Gunnell's "Daisies Rise to Become Oaks: The Politics of Early Folktale Collection in Northern Europe" (which I previously read early last semester while researching for my thesis) in order to answer a question I was asked on the subject and was struck once again by how interesting, thoughtful, and thorough they were.
Both discuss the intersection of romantic nationalism and fairy tale/folk tale collection, specifically the rise of romantic nationalism and the linkage of fairy tales and folklore as the “authentic expression of a country’s people”. They also talk quite a bit about the nationalistic impulses that influenced different fairy tale collectors (such as the Brothers Grimm in Germany and Asbjørnsen and Moe in Norway). They're quite interesting reads!
