I guess your first question is “what do you mean by blitzkrieg?” Unlike deep battle theory, blitzkrieg is not a doctrine, so that is your first major difference. In his book “The Blitzkrieg Legend”, Col. Dr, Karl-Heinz Frieser spends the entire first chapter discussing this, and I brought it up in discussion with the director of the Panzermuseum today.

Bewegungskrieg was the doctrinal thought generally applied by the Germans at the beginning of WW2. Maneuver warfare. The theory had been around for years, arguably, the Germans had been following it since 1870. Emphasis on avoiding slugging it out, and on enveloping and turning movements. It is to be noted that nobody was more surprised by the speed of the fall of France than the Germans. Maneuver is one thing, speed (blitz) another. At the tactical level, yes, the Germans tried as much as possible to combine arms, but that wasn’t exactly a doctrinal revolution. Several countries had figured it out. However, British observers saw how fast the Germans moved, didn’t realize it was a bit of a fluke, and thought it a doctrine, they called it the blitzkrieg.

The other possibility of the definition of a concept of “blitzkrieg” is at the grand strategy level. It is true that Germany would have preferred a short, fast conflict, due to the comparative resources. However, that is not to say that they relied upon it. They were expecting closer to WW1 than what actually happened in France.

This differed from Deep Battle because the latter is an integration of all arms at all levels, including the operational level, which was a concept that most Armies had not yet figured out. Once the Panzer divisions had broken through the Meuse line and started marauding, they were marauding on their own. Great personal initiative on the part of their commanders, but not part of the grand plan. Indeed, some units were out of contact for hours. Further, they generally left their artillery behind, and even outran much of their air support capability. Soviet Deep Battle theory emphasized that the combined arms theory was applied throughout a unit’s time as the main effort, even, maybe even especially, once the main line had been penetrated.