I feel this is one of those things which can be answered definitively. Often we are taught to deal with matters of history as you have phrased it - to what extent. In this affair, the extent to which Mao can be blamed for the disaster of the GLF is entirely, and that is coming from a historian and political scientist (me) who tends to favour the CCP and Mao over the KMT and Chiang during the Republican period. Mao was responsible for the GLF famine - or as Kent Deng and others tend to phrase it, the Great Leap Backward or the Great Leap Famine - owing to one core aspect which infiltrated all aspects of governance in the early PRC: Mao's personal rule.

Personal rule is a phenomenon which we tend to associate more with Africa, a neopatrimonial system whereby state resources are used to fund clientelist networks. Personal rule is an aspect of this, where personal power and influence overpowers the institutional barriers which as supposed to prevent such a catastrophe. Even in the contemporary PRC's Party-State, those barriers were supposed to exist. The party was supposed to be on top of the state, but the functioning of government was supposed to be delegated to technocratic officials - namely, in Mao's era, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, as well as the likes of Deng Xiaoping. Mao tended to oversee matters of the masses, namely political campaigns to guarantee the relevance and continuity of comminist ideology. He was not supposed to bring this or himself into government, but after the war with the KMT was over he soon found himself becoming sidelined. The more expert wing of the leadership oversaw a succesful first five year plan (1953-57). The GLF was an attempt by Mao to reassert himself and his ideas in the second five year plan.

Mao's position as Chairman and his extensive patronage network throughout the party and state allowed him to maneuver into a position which gave him the authority to do this. He infused this economic plan with social revolution and pushed a much more basic economic basis to it. Mao's biggest problem, and perhaps what limited his potential for greatness, was his lack of understanding. Mao was an intelligent man who understood very well how humans worked. However, he was not an economic theorist and he was arrogant in his ability to manipulate the masses. Further, he himself admitted that he could not comprehend the complex economic programmes put forward by other CCP leaders (such as the aforementioned). The GLF embodies the failure of his ideas of voluntarism and the power of the will of the masses, and Mao's limited grasp on economics.

When the GLF began, Mao placed an emphasis on social and economic revolution rather than development, and favoured quantity over quality. His failure in understanding the limits of man and the realities of the economy led his to establish expectations for officials to follow his thought. Subnational officials were encouraged to divert human resources to industry over agriculture (despite China's history of low agricultural productivity leading to famine, such as during the Qing where one famine killed up to 70% of the population of Shanxi, according to witnesses). Yang et al (2014) found that Mao's personal network of officials were the most radical in pursuing his policies during the GLF, denying the culpability of the nomenklatura system itself and blaming the radicalism at the subnational level on officials links to Mao directly (he gave them their jobs, they owed him).

During the early years of the GLF, agricultural yields were high which encouraged further diversion of labour and less emphasis on agricultural development. Mao was banking on yields remaining high and on foreign support to fill the gaps, but didn't quite understand how any of it really worked. When yields began to fall (and weather conditions didn't help), officials (particularly the aforementioned radicals) tended to misrepresent figures to save their asses from Mao's rage. This was a steep and slippery slope, which led to the disasters of the GLF. Blaming external forces or people uncommitted to the revolution are deflection from Mao's personal failures stemming from his personal rule. Mao was more like 70% wrong than anything.

Kenneth Lieberthal's book 'Governing China: From Revolution through Reform' would be a good place to start if you want to read more about this. I had earlier recommended a book which criticised Mao, though as highlighted below by u/lordtiandao there are issues with that resource. In its place, I offer two less controversial analyses of Mao: Cheek, T. (ed.), 'A Critical Introduction to Mao' (Cambridge, 2010), and Meisner, M., 'Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic' (New York, 1999).

I hope that answered your question well enough - I'm slightly restricted at the moment without access to my PC.

The essential link I'm trying to portray is Mao's personal power and network (influence over party officials) led China down an inadvisable and reckless path (led by a man who admitted he didn't understand complex economics, and thus did not know what he was doing). False reporting occured, placing minor blame on these officials, but that is somewhat understandable given the way Mao tended to react toward failure. Mao was entirely, and solely, responsible for the disaster of the GLF.

Of course, one can criticise the Party membership and leadership for following Mao. That would be a mistake, however, and would ignore the sheer glow of Mao's personal power. It is not an exaggeration to say that many worshipped him. The GLF and Cultural Revolution did not even lead to his removal from power.