I'm watching the Netflix documentary on the Battle of Chosin right now.
And it raises so many questions.
First a very specific one:
Regimental Combat Team 31 eventually started their retreat to the main encampment with a convoy of 500 wounded. They expected to find a tank detachment along the way but didn't. Eventually the entire taskforce scattered and ran partly because they had their hopes set on finding their tanks there.
Was this taskforce of over 2000 men just forgotten? The US had overwhelming air superiority and at some point a general even choppered in. So how could they not have known there weren't tanks waiting for them? Was there no leadership? No communication?
The Netflix documentary pretty much stops the army side of the story as 300 able bodied men walk into the camp.. It isn't stated that firmly but it's obvious the men just ran and/or mutinied which I completely understand if they were told nothing of the situation. Did they even know if Hagaru was still there?
Second question:
Why was there no effort made to support them from Hagaru? They were just a few miles from a base filled with 1000s of American soldiers. There were choppers and air-planes flying overhead. All of this seems to take place within like 5 miles of each other. I feel if the Hagaru contingent secured the high ground to their North East (something they'd be smart to do anyways) they'd be halfway the convoy. Surely small groups of men could have reached the convoy and tanks could have advanced up the road.
Third Question:
At the start of the battle an airfield is being constructed. Wasn't this ever fully accomplished? Couldn't helicopters land? They were flying 200 combat sorties a day but had no helicopters to evacuate the wounded from outside hagaru? Surely combat engineers can get a basic airfield up in a week? They say they airlifted out 4500 wounded but that doesn't seem that many from a fully completed airport. Considering this took place over more than a week that's 500 a day with air-planes that could carry 25. That's 20 flights a day. They say they flew 2 hours to Japan so each plane could go twice. Were there really only 10 planes ferrying people? Those same planes could also have flown in 5000 reinforcements from Japan.
The documentary really tells individual stories very well but I'm left wondering what the heck went wrong over there.
Which leads to my Fourth question:
The Chinese and North Korean troops were dependent on the same bad roads the Allies were. Now I get that for a few days they could just carry their food and ammunition but that battle lasted days. That seems like perfect defensive terrain. How come the Allied lines didn't stabilize after a little while? They survived a surprise attack with overwhelming numbers. Surely once they got their act together it must have been easier and easier to hold selected high grounds?
A surprise attack by the Chinese with little to no supplies seems like an all or nothing gambit. And they didn't get all. At the end of it they must have been stranded in the mountains without artillery or tanks and no air support.
I feel like 10.000 concentrated marines supported by an airfield sitting on a road had a much stronger strategic position than the unsupported supposedly starving Chinese soldiers that were invading North Korea on foot in the winter. After the casualty shipments stopped those 20 plane flights a day could ferry in 10 tons of supplies a day versus the Chinese zero. And it's said that there were also constant supply para drops.
And this corps was tying up like a 100 thousand Chinese troops! The Chinese already had 30k casualties in their own surprise attack, at the start of their own campaign (when they should really in the strongest position) and were by the account of the documentary "scattered and unable to mount an offense".
Then they start about how it's minus 50. And the Chinese are there in sneakers and without winter clothing or tents or vehicles!
So the question is: Why not remain there and fight it out? It sounds like the marines were in a better position to isolate and wipe out the Chinese forces than vice versa. At like day 9 and 75% through the documentary I'm like the Americans have won this.
And a very general fifth question:
I started reading into this and read that the US army was literally raiding parade grounds/museums/old battlegrounds for tanks.
Surely the US most have been in the early stages of the cold war? If they couldn't field armoured divisions in Korea how could they ever have hoped to defend Western Europe from the Soviets?
And wasn't the build up of the US army intensifying even through 1945? How come that 5 years after they were so horrifically reduced that I'm reading the navy couldn't even blockade North Korea and that they couldn't arm and supply their forces on the ground? Did they stand down the military to such a degree that they were actually destroying weapons/ammo/tanks? Didn't they have thousands of combat vets from the first world war to rely on? I get not having a standing army but the Korean War had been going on for half a year by then. Didn't they just mothball the weapons/planes/tanks of the 2nd world war? Surely in 5 years there hadn't been that big a technological push that those were worthless.
So, lots of questions, it just left me very very puzzled. Thanks for reading :)
Okay, so let me start off by saying this is not my area of expertice and I hope some other historian with greater knowledge of the korea war can jump in and correct me or elaborate if I missed something. That said, I'll try to answer your questions in turn.
Was this taskforce of over 2000 men just forgotten? The US had overwhelming air superiority and at some point a general even choppered in. So how could they not have known there weren't tanks waiting for them? Was there no leadership? No communication?
No, it was definitely not forgotten. However, there was a strong inter-branch hostility between the commander of the marines on the west side of the lake (Major General Smith) and the commander of the Infantry on the east side of the lake, Major General Almond. This certainly didn't help the situation but added to this I feel many of your questions fail to take into account that the UN forces, Marine or otherwise, in the area were under near constant attack from an encircling force in numerous positions under atrocious conditions. While RCT-31/Task Force Faith was not forgotten there were not a great many units able to assist it. I don't know of they knew about the rescue attempt from the 31st Tank Company or not but it doesn't really matter, 31st Tank Company never got further than the south side of hill 1221 before their attack stalled and they were ordered to withdraw with the rest of the forces at Hudong-ni before RCT-31 ever reached the north side of 1221.
Why was there no effort made to support them from Hagaru? They were just a few miles from a base filled with 1000s of American soldiers. There were choppers and air-planes flying overhead. All of this seems to take place within like 5 miles of each other. I feel if the Hagaru contingent secured the high ground to their North East (something they'd be smart to do anyways) they'd be halfway the convoy. Surely small groups of men could have reached the convoy and tanks could have advanced up the road.
I'm not sure if you're refering to the troops at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-r or Kot'o-ri. In either case, the troops at Yudam-ri were cut off and attempting to open the road back to Hagaru-ri through Toktong pass, while they did eventually manage this and retreated to Hagaru-ri that wasn't until Dec. 3 or 4th when RCT-31 had already been destroyed. While Task Force Drysdale did reach Hagaru-ri on Nov 29th only about 300 of the original 921 men were in fighting shape and these were desperately needed for reinforce the garrison at Hagaru-ri which had almost been over-run the day before by the 58th PVA Division. My point is that a relief effort for RCT-31 could only realistically have come from Hagaru-ri by way of Hudong-ri but by the time RCT-31 needed it there were no troops available for such an attempt in Hagaru-ri. While the decision to withdraw from Hudong-ri has been much debated in retrospect I have never seen any record of anyone objecting to the decision at the time which leads me to believe that the troops in Hagaru-ri needed the reinforcements and that the troops in Hudong-ri felt that withdrawal, especially after the failed assault on 1221, was a sound tactical decision.
Wasn't this ever fully accomplished? Couldn't helicopters land? They were flying 260 sorties a day but had no helicopters to evacuate the wounded from outside hagaru? Surely combat engineers can get a basic airfield up in a week? They say they airlifted out 4500 wounded but that doesn't seem that many from a fully completed airport. Considering this took place over more than a week that's 500 a day with air-planes that could carry 25. That's 20 flights a day. They say they flew 2 hours to Japan so each plane could go twice. Were there really only 10 planes ferrying people? Those same planes could also have flown in 5000 reinforcements from Japan.
The airfield was opened on Dec 1st. I don't know enough about the logistical capabilities involved in the battle to accurately answer your other questions.
How come the Allied lines didn't stabilize after a little while? They survived a surprise attack with overwhelming numbers. Surely once they got their act together it must have been easier and easier to hold selected high grounds?
They did stabilize, after the initial surprise attack many elements were cut off. Hudong-ri, Hagaru-ri, Yudam-ri, Toktong pass and Kot'o-ri were all cut off from each other and while the situation did eventually stabilize there was still only a single road and an improvised airfield supplying the whole operation. Added to which, even if they had stabilized and held their ground the 8th Army most certainly was not. The TaeBaek mountains may have separated the two theaters during the battle of Chosin reservoir but they are not entirely impassable. Had the Chiniese forces in the west reached Pyongyang before the X Corps could evacuate it would have been entirely possible to cross the Taebaek mountains to Wusan and encricle X-corps in the Chosin basin by taking Hungnam from the south. TL;DR - The overall strategic situation made anything but a retreat a significant risk of having all of X Corps surrounded.
And a very general fifth question
I recommend you make a separate post about this, perhaps something along the lines of "Which reductions were made to the US army in the transitional period between WW2 and the Cold War" or some such? It's a HUGE topic.
Why were they taking prisoners? I'm not asking why not shoot them, that seems obvious, but why not give them back to the Chinese?
There were no prisoner exchanges that I'm aware of during the battle of Chosin, they were merely following the ROG, a prisoner is your responsibility until he can be exchanged or released. You can't just send prisoners out into no-mans land, that'd be a war crime.
I drew most of this from The War for Korea by Allan Milett.
O and another question that's maybe not that relevant to the Battle of Chosin itself but was raised by this documentary:
Why were they taking prisoners? I'm not asking why not shoot them, that seems obvious, but why not give them back to the Chinese?
Was there no tactical, local, exchange of prisoners?
And even if there weren't, wouldn't unilaterally returning Chinese prisoners to the Chinese be better than having to feed and clothe them and having them march with you?