Why is France infamous for surrendering too fast when Denmark surrendered after two hours after the Germans invaded?

I actually had an answer of mine last week on a similar question:

A good part of the reason is that, with all due respect to the Danes, France was a great power in 1940 and Denmark was not. The raw numbers speak for themselves. The Danes could muster an army of around 15000 in 1940 and had an air force of around fifty semi-obsolescent aircraft. The Danish Royal Army's equipment was also largely obsolete; there were no tanks of any note and its artillery component was quite anemic. In contrast, France maintained a little under a hundred divisions in metropolitan France of around 3000000 men under arms. The French Armée de l'Air consisted of over a thousand aircraft, a number of them were quite modern. The French also had some 3000 tanks, some of whom like Somua S35 were generally superior to their German counterparts. There were problems with the French deployment, command structure, and equipment that that Battle of France exposed in 1940, but France was nonetheless a very formidable power in 1940. Denmark was not. The Danes lacked any real geographic barriers against a German invasion. The understrength Danish Army could resist the German invasion, but there was no question that it could not hold one off. France, by contrast, had not only resisted a German invasion in the last war, but it also had invested considerably in armaments in the interwar period.

This is not to say that the war left Denmark unscathed. One of the peculiar facets of Denmark's war experience was that the Germans adapted a flexible approach to the Danes that meant occupation was not as brutal as Western Europe. Istvan Deak's recent study of the legacy of occupation has noted that Denmark was arguably more useful as an occupied country to the Germans than its Axis allies and satellite states as those necessitated periodic interventions to prop up their German-aligned leaders. Denmark provided a good deal of agricultural products to the Reich, but the food requisitions did not lead to mass hunger in Denmark as it did in Western Europe. There was resistance to the German occupation, but Denmark had a relatively "good" war (good in the most qualified meaning of the word) compared to other states conquered by Germany in 1940.

The defeat of France itself was a major shock around the world and one that was quite unexpected. Although the French did fight hard in 1940, the "strange defeat," as Marcel Bloch termed it, created an impression that France did not put up much of a fight in 1940. The war and occupation were national traumas for France and the postwar period saw simultaneous and contradictory attempts to both punish collaborators and sweep the past under the rug. France was a declining great power, but it was still a polity to be reckoned with in the postwar period. France was an important member of NATO's early years and was one of the charter countries for Western Europe's economic and political unification. The at times tense relationship between France and the US in the Cold War helped sustain the narrative of a cowardly French defeatism that underlay French pride and bluster.

So the image of the French as "cheese-eating surrender monkeys," as Groundskeeper Willie put it, has political relevance in the US and to a lesser extent, the UK. There is a political utility to decry 1940 as reflective of some sort of innate French weakness when French leaders like De Gaulle or Chirac set themselves against American policies. In the zero-sum game that more than a few nationalists play, French defeat in 1940 illustrates a weakness of the French national character. Denmark's wartime actions just do not register as useful for the present. No one really expected Denmark to survive a German onslaught and Denmark itself did not cast much political weight in global affairs after 1945 as France.