An examination of the strategy put forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCOS) on US entry to the war proves rather revelatory of the prevailing mindset of many senior US commanders. The Arcadia conference, held in early 1942 following the US's entry in December 1941, saw the US and UK dedicate themselves to the 'Germany first' concept, thus aiming the bulk of Allied efforts towards victory in the European theatre, rather than the Pacific. However the Allies had considerable trouble in deciding the strategy they wished to pursue, and it is the strategic vision promoted by the JCOS, particularly championed by General Marshall, that provides insight into the American attitude towards defeating the Germans. Marshall favoured Operation Sledgehammer, a mid/late-1942 offensive against North-West Europe, much in the same vein as the later Operation Overlord, followed by a drive on Berlin. Such a direct approach, which sought to aim Allied might squarely at the heart of the Axis, shows considerable confidence, or perhaps bravado, on behalf of the JCOS. General Alan Brooke, the head of the British Imperial General Staff, considered Sledgehammer so foolhardy that he condemned the operation as suicidal, saying 'it could only result in the worst of disasters', particularly as it would be launched with a relatively modest numbers of troops against a well-defended coastline of the still-powerful Third Reich. Although eventually persuaded to back down, Marshall continued to push for Roundup (a 1943 edition of Sledgehammer, nixed due to logistical concerns), before being overruled by President Roosevelt in favour of a more peripheral strategy, as championed by the British, beginning with Operation Torch, the Tunisian Campaign, and thence Husky, Italy, and Normandy.

In this manner, I would argue that given the manner in which they approached Allied grand strategy there was almost no doubt in the minds of the JCOS that the US, especially combined with the efforts of the other Allied powers, had sufficient might that they would certainly overwhelm the Axis, and that it was simply a matter of mobilisation and securing a foothold to launch a victorious campaign.

Recommended texts:

Matthew Jones, Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44 (London: Macmillan, 1996)

Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries, 1939-1945, ed. by Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001)

Major-General I.S.O. Playfair and Brigadier C.J.C. Molony, History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol.IV: The Destruction of the Axis Forces in Africa (London: HMSO, 1966)

Maurice Matloff and Edwin Snell, United States Army in World War II: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953)

Sainsbury, Keith, Churchill and Roosevelt at War: The War They Fought and the Peace They Hoped to Make (New York: New York University Press, 1994)