From an earlier answer of mine

Was the nazi party right in it's assertion that the treaty of Versailles was the primary cause of the economic decline of Germany?

Not really. While the German economic situation after 1929 was quite dire, this was due to the Great Depression. The Treaty system no doubt contributed in some way to creating the preconditions for the Depression- the causes of the Depression are quite multifaceted- there is no direct line between the Treaty and Germany's economic woes. The Weimar economy had made a somewhat qualified recovery between 1925-29 and while the Depression halted this recovery, the German economy was not exactly one of dearth and hardship prior to the global economic downturn.

All too often, popular memory of the Third Reich conflates the hyperinflation of 1924 with the rise of the Nazis in 1930-33, which is wrong. There is also a popular view that Versailles was a Carthaginian peace in which the Treaty imposed undue and harsh levies upon a defeated Germany. This is an opinion that dates back to the 1919 with Keynes's argument that the peace terms were too severe and contrary to the wider interests of both the victors and defeated.

The Keynes model is somewhat discredited in current historiography despite its enduring popularity. Very broadly speaking, there are two contemporary historical camps about the nexus between hyperinflation and reparations. The first camp emerged in the late 1960s and challenged the Keynesian orthodoxy and argued that hyperinflation was self-sabotage on the part of the Germans to evade their responsibility for payments by undermining the system. Sally Marks in a highly influential 1969 essay, followed up by a stronger one in 1978, argued that the reparation demands were not too onerous and Germany had the resources to meet their Treaty obligations but elected not to for reasons of politics. Stephen Schuker would also likewise argued that the Germans were not acting in good faith and the French Ruhr policy was more rational than the Keynesian paradigm asserted. Marks in particular relied upon the opening of Allied archival sources which showed much of the Allied consternation over German actions.

This anti-Keynesian thesis did not go unchallenged though. In a spirited exchange in Central European History, David Felix questioned a number of the key precepts behind Marks's assertions. The German historian Peter Krüger also questioned the anti-Keynesian assumption that Germany had the ability to pay its reparations and maintain something resembling fiscal sanity. Two of the most forceful counterattacks upon the self-sabotage thesis were Niall Ferguson and Gerald Feldman. Ferguson, before he went down the dark path as a public intellectual, contended that finances in this time was a complex mishmash which included important data that Marks and the like ignored or minimized. Ferguson's first book, Paper & Iron: Hamburg Business and German Politics in the Era of Inflation, 1897-1927 painted a much more complicated picture and argued that the German fiscal system was extremely vulnerable to inflation; the complicated relationship between Reich, Lander, and localities made inflationary public borrowing the norm. Feldman eschewed Ferguson's propensity for economic figures and data and instead argued that political restraints, both foreign and domestic, hemmed in German options.

Elements of Feldman's approach are worth repeating because it taps into the the larger issue of was hyperinflation a deliberate policy. Some of the more reddit types that uncritically cite Marks fall into a trap by contending that Germany could and should have paid and ignore the potential repercussions of such a course of action. One of the legacies of the war was the the Republic would have had to deal with inflation even if the Treaty had been magnanimous. German war finance relied overwhelmingly upon loans in the expectation that they would be paid off by reparations from the defeated Entente. One of the baleful legacies of the Bismarckian Reich was that it saddled the German government with an inefficient tax system; and the level of taxation on the German public was well below the other great powers in the war. While this might seem short-sighted on the part of the German government (and it was), it is important to understand that state financing was a third rail of Kaiserreich politics. The popularly-elected Reichstag's most powerful tool against the Kaiser-appointed executive was the former's control of the budget and this habituated a generation of German politicians to avoid touching the tax system. To Weimar's credit, the central government did enact a major reform of the tax code, but such a reform took time. Therefore, deficit spending in the 1920s was necessary for the Weimar state. The fact that Weimar relied upon a narrow coalition for governance precluded more extreme options such as soaking the rich, or, as some German industrialists called for, workers donate an extra two hours of their shift without pay. The state could have cut spending to meet reparations, but such a strategy would have been politically dangerous to the extreme as the Republic was beset by insurgents on both the left and right. One of the immediate priorities for the Republic was a stabilization of the domestic economy to denude these insurgents of a mass base. This led to a curious phenomena in which inflationary policies fed exports so that German unemployment was actually somewhat better than in Allied countries in 1920-21. The problem was this was an unsustainable policy, albeit an understandable one, and Feldman notes that hyperinflation had actually begun to rear its head before the French demands of 1923. Additionally, the resurgence of political violence also created a disincentive for the Weimar government to pursue an alternative course of stabilization through cooperation with the Allies, especially after the Rhineland occupation. Allied reparation policy also played a role in this impasse. As J. P. Morgan noted at the time, the Allies were confused as "to whether they wanted a weak Germany who could not pay, or a strong Germany who could pay." The hyperinflation did not benefit any parties, and mass panic also played a role in sustaining the crisis. As the German economic historian Knut Borchard put it aptly in Perspectives on Modern German Economic History and Policy:

The end of this witches' sabbath did not come immediately. Stabilization only succeeded after the money economy reached the verge of total collapse in 1923, and no one could any longer gain advantage from the situation: not the government or the employers, and not the organized and employed workers. In November 1923, the Mark was worth only 1/10 ~12 of the old gold Mark. But the real expropriation of monetary assets lay further back, and had nothing to do with the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, which had merely further accelerated the inflationary cycle. It is surely insignificant whether one retains a thousandth of one's assets, or only a millionth millionth.

The above of course is just a brief sketch of a complicated historiography on hyperinflation produced since the 1970s. Even for those that do not agree with Marks, her essays did shatter the vulgar Keynesian paradigm of excessive Allied demands and a hyperinflationary antithesis. It has become more or less accepted in the academy that the German methods of wartime financing hid inflation and defeat made things far worse. And she did put the focus back onto the Germans and did give them agency in creating the "witches' sabbath" of 1924. But the Marks interpretation does not have a good deal of traction within Germanist circles for the reason that Feldman, et al point out, namely that the solutions to meet reparations without risking inflation were politically unreachable in the early Republic.

As for why the idea of a Carthaginian Versailles has gained traction and proved, well, that's another complicated story. Part of the answer is that the Nazis certainly did use the Treaty as a scapegoat. The campaigns of the German right (not just the NSDAP) against the Treaty certainly did raise the visibility of the Treaty system as one of the causes of the Weimar's collapse. Keynes's Carthaginian paradigm also gave the thesis "Versailles did it" a veneer of respectability. But the Carthaginian model was not just limited to Keynes and there was a not an insignificant number of British elites like Lloyd George who felt the Treaty was too harsh. Such sentiments helped to underwrite appeasement, but they also cast a long shadow after 1945.