Week 35

 

There is a natural tendency to streamline history. To look for a convincing evolution pattern, one that can provide us with a solid explanation. In creating narratives we feel the need to smooth out contrast, to remove contradictions, to take out of the pictures those pieces that don't fit, to avoid wasting time on what likely amounts to the white noise of history.

In the hands of a proper historian this is often a sound and convenient practice. We can't and we shouldn't argue for the need to keep everything in – unless we want every historical discussion to begin with: “It's complicated; how many years you have?”

But this process also creates a dangerous pitfall: that we end up looking at history in a way that is too far removed from the way we look at our contemporary world. We would not assume the political line of one Government to carefully represent the average feeling of the population. We would not take the majority view, or that of the more vocal minority as an identifier of one Nation's feeling. Rather we would fight over the different views; we would contend first and foremost that major differences exist between parties, between groups, between people; but also that our personal take on many matters is not that of the Government, nor that of the Nation.

Eventually we would likely agree that arguing over politics is neither very convenient nor very fruitful and move on with our days – or stick with someone we agree with. Meanwhile history would happen, unbeknownst to us.

Nowhere is the disconnect between our reality of conflict and confusion and the streamlined version of history as apparent as with the “mutilated victory” myth. The idea that Italy had been deprived of its rightful prize for the victorious Great War – originally a “marching song” of the Nationalists and conservative groups, of the press controlled by the great steel and arms industry; then in the Fascist Regime narrative, proof of the inadequacy of the liberal system to make worth the sacrifice of the Italian people – appears often to take the place of an outright explanation for the rise of Fascism. It played a part, no doubt, and its resounding echo served as a reminder of the growing influence of those groups that advocated for a prosecution of the war climate into peace times. But how much it mattered to the rise of Fascism, how much it influenced the men who joined their local Fasci in 1920-21, or those who voted for Mussolini, or the intellectuals, functionaries and politicians who left an open door for the new man in town; that's far from an obvious and immediate conclusion.

In a way, the idea that chaos brings people to seek order, that disillusionment leads them to “something else”, that anger and social resentment make them more susceptible to manipulation, becomes less clear cut once we remember that the people are just us.

 

By the end of the third week of June, the Austrian offensive, that had begun on the 15^th , had substantially failed. The Italian volunteer, war correspondent and more or less official attaché to the propaganda office, Ugo Ojetti could write back to Luigi Albertini – the senator and liberal-conservative Chief Editor and major shareholder of the Corriere della Sera - with a much positive update from the front.

 

June 22^nd 1918

In these days of resurgent hope I need to tell you how helpful our efforts have been. I can't tell you everything […] It's a matter of fact that the enemy troops have fought fiercely. But even the most reluctant of Czechs [the Czechs had a reputation for being the more inclined towards desertion, especially after their independentist leader E. Benes had had found an agreement with the Allied Nations and were at the time allowed to fight in their own legion on the Italian front] can't desert in the midst of open fight, when the other side is welcoming you with fire, bombs and steel sooner than asking your place of birth, religion and political thoughts. […] Anyways:

1. We had news of the day and exact time of the offensive in advance, and General Badoglio [in fact the Vice Chief of Staff, but Ojetti often credits him as he was his closest contact] has been able to prevent the enemy artillery with a hellish destruction and counter-fire shot that left the enemy quarters in disarray, slaughtered their troops and distempered their batteries;

2. For fear of national disorders, the German and Hungarian officers had to move ahead of the troops, for the first time since we have been at war: thus we have made butcher-work of [low rank] officers, that will be hard to replace;

3. We have increased the will to surrender among many [enemy] troops... turning in as soon as they found themselves surrounded; and it's enough to take notice of the numbers of prisoners, never before so high for attacking men;

4. Many of those, as soon as taken in, have immediately provided precious intelligence;

5. Troops for the most part Hungarians like these (yet with many Polish and Yugoslav) aren't easy to replace and the upcoming months will be less hard; as soon as they start over, and they will for sure;

6. Will the Germans agree to send here twelve or fifteen divisions, after such a slaughter and such a defeat, knowing well the situation of the Austro-Hungarian Army? As for their state, we can take some credit for it. And we'll keep going.

As of today, we have sent somewhere close to seventeen million leaflets and newspapers: that's since May 16^th . General Badoglio has provided me with all means required. He trusts in our efforts just as much as we do, even if he only looks at the immediate military perspective, and not the long term political one.

P.S. […] If you happen to meet the Prime Minister, who has likely held his masterful speech for the Senate today, remind him of our job. I am sure he has not lost his confidence but he is besieged by chronic discouraged that expected the A.H. Army to disbanded in a month thanks to my leaflets... Worst of them, Thaon de Revel [the Admiral Paolo Thaon de Revel, later elevated to Admiral of the Fleet, was the Head of the Italian navy and descendant from an influential and conservative family which held positions in the Piedmontese administration and military since the XVIII Century] with his Dalmatian obsession, who refuses to let our leaflets be thrown from his planes and balloons unless... approved by Sonnino.

 

Three days later Albertini received somewhat more concerning news from Switzerland, where his correspondent Giuseppe Antonio Borgese – a pupil of Benedetto Croce and interventionist like many others in Albertini's “group” - was keeping in touch with the various European souls of the newborn movement of the nationalities. Borgese had been one of the inspiring forces of the Congress of Rome [held in April 8-10 and usually referred to as “of the oppressed nationalities”] as well as a member of the Italian-Yugoslav Committee formed in March 1918 as a precondition to the informal “Torre-Trumbic agreement”.