The relationship between the Royal Navy and the British Empire was a broad one, though generally positive. The RN was a significant parts of attempts by the British government to create a coherent Imperial identity. The Navy made concerted efforts to ensure that it was regarded well by the Empire, and the citizens of the Empire (especially the Dominions) took it to their hearts. The RN was an almost uniquely British institution, with little participation from the colonies. However, during the 1900s, the Dominions started to play a larger role, with New Zealand and Malaya funding warships for the RN, while Australia set up its own navy; Canada took both paths, but in a half-hearted manner. Why this change? It can partly be explained by burgeoning nationalism within the Dominions, but other factors are also responsible. A strategic turn away towards Europe, a desire by the RN to increase its forces without having to get approval from the treasury, and the high burden of spending on Imperial defence all played their part.

From the middle of the 19th Century, Britain’s colonies had been allowed to maintain small naval forces for their own protection. These were minimal forces, for fisheries protection and coastal defence. For everything else, they relied on the RN. The Navy encouraged closeness between the Empire and itself. This was partly a way to ensure cooperation in wartime, but was also important as a way to bring the Empire together as a single entity. The RN fitted neatly into the foundation myths of many of the colonies, especially the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand – these had been formed by fleets of settlers and had a strong maritime connection. A strong connection was encouraged in a variety of ways.

The RN had forces stationed across the Empire. Ships from these stations would frequently visit outlying ports and cities. Other forces would make cruises, sailing from the UK and visiting colonies round the world. These visits were a significant PR tool for the Navy. Port visits drew thousands of visitors to see the ships; when HMS Nelson was stationed in Melbourne in 1885, she drew 3000 visitors in a single day. Hood’s visit to the same city just under forty years later drew ten times as many people. These visits not only showed the Empire the strength and power of the navy, they let the RN’s crews form bonds with the population of the Empire. Visiting squadrons became a major part of a city’s social and sporting life. Seamen and officers were invited to parties, dinners and other social events held by civilians ashore. In return, sailors put on concerts, theatrical performances and parades. Sporting events were set up between locals and sailors, with sports ranging from football cricket and sailing, to shooting and tug-of-war. These bonds led to a considerable depth of feeling for sailors and the Navy within colonial society; even despite the rowdiness of sailors ashore. Reporting on an 1897 case where a sailor was accused of assaulting a policeman, the Sydney Truth stated that “the treatment of this ‘common’ sailor by a Sydney policeman … is a gross insult to the Service at large.” - though attacks on civilians were less easily overlooked.

At a higher level, closeness between the RN and the Empire was encouraged by the Admiralty using every tool at its disposal. Ships were given names that associated them with Britain’s colonies; the King Edward VII class arguably most explicitly so. At the launch of Hindustan, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selborne, would explain the names of this class:

The idea of the class was to group round the 'Sovereign' the component parts of the Empire.

To this end, the names represented a tour of the empire, from New Zealand and the Commonwealth of Australia, through Africa to the Dominion of Canada before returning home with Hibernia and Britannia. Colonies were encouraged to identify with the ships named for them. Colonial representatives were asked to launch them; once they were commissioned, these representatives made frequent, well-publicised visits. The attention to detail even went down to the choice of beverage used to christen the ships; from 1901, only ‘colonial wine’ was used for christening British ships – the first ship christened under this new regime was Good Hope, which had a bottle of South African wine smashed across her bows. Naval reviews were well-publicised. These gave colonial subjects a chance to see the ships named for their homelands in action; and also impressed upon them the might of the fleet. From 1909, the RN began staging reviews for the benefit solely of the Imperial press and politicians, with no parliamentary or royal inspection nor any training purpose. These reviews were well-received in the press and across the Empire. All together, these policies, both at home and in the colonies, created what was almost a ‘naval cult’, with the fleet well understood as shield of the Empire as a whole. But given this, why the pivot towards greater naval independence and involvement for the colonies in the 1900s? To explain this, we need to take a deeper look at naval policy and politics in three of the components of the Empire: Australia, Canada, and Britain herself.

From 1900, Britain began to become more supportive of colonial naval development. One key reason for this was monetary. While the Empire contributed significant sums of money to military matters, Britain shouldered the vast majority of the naval budget, with only token contributions from the Dominions to support their local squadrons. Britain’s African and Caribbean colonies paid nothing into the naval budget. This may not have been a sustainable approach; many historians, such as Paul Kennedy or Patrick O’Brien, have argued that this was a form of ‘imperial overstretch’, with Britain stifling its economy to meet the defensive needs of the Empire. At the 1902 Colonial Conference, Joseph Chamberlain called upon the Dominions for help with the cost of the Empire:

We do require your assistance in the administration of the vast empire which is yours as well as ours. The weary Titan staggers under the too vast orb of its fate. We have borne the burden for many years. We think it is time that our children should assist us.

This may well be construed as strong support for the concept of ‘imperial overstretch’. However, more recent historians, such as Gordon Martel, have convincingly challenged this viewpoint, arguing that the resources of the Empire greatly extended Britain’s ability to wage war. They point to changes in Britain’s strategic situation to explain the shift.

Before 1902, Britain faced major naval threats around the globe, as its most important enemies were France and Russia. Both of these had access to widely spread naval bases, and strong fleets to place in them. In 1902, Britain would sign an alliance with Japan, securing Britain’s vulnerable flank in the Pacific, and allowing the RN to move ships to Europe. The 1904 Entente Cordiale would remove France as a threat, and established Germany as the main threat to Britain’s interests. Unlike France, Germany had only a small force in the Pacific, and few other colonies; almost the entirety of its naval force was in the North Sea. Finally, the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War brought with it the destruction of the Russian fleet, totally securing the Pacific for Britain and her allies. The Admiralty’s focus shifted; there was now no longer any need to maintain large forces at a considerable distance from the homeland. Instead they had to be concentrated in the North Sea to counter the German threat. Allowing the colonial nations to build up their own naval power would allow for greater concentration of force in this key theatre.

Furthermore, the build-up of dreadnoughts in the North Sea was expensive. A dreadnought cost millions of pounds, money the treasury was loath to spend. The Liberal Party government of the time, especially under Asquith from 1909, was torn between two competing factions, one pro-navy, and one pro-austerity. The latter, led by David Lloyd George, sought to impose restrictions on the spiralling naval budget, though they were frequently unsuccessful. Establishing colonial navies was a way to avoid these political and economic issues. In 1909, the German ship-building program led to a naval crisis in Britain, with the two factions in government disagreeing on how to respond. The pro-navy faction wanted eight new dreadnoughts (using the rallying cry ‘We want eight and we won’t wait’), its opponents four or six. Things would ultimately be decided in favour of the naval faction – however, when the contributions of Australia and New Zealand are included, the RN received ten new dreadnoughts. Trying to get ten new capital ships under the old system might well have brought down the government. With colonial support, it became possible. While these ships were nominally under colonial command, it was generally understood that in times of war, they would be placed under the control of the Royal Navy.

The British Admiralty and Royal Navy wasn't particularly concerned with pacific defence during the 1900s, as the major threat to the Empire was coming from the freshly-unified Germany. They didn't much see the need for large expenditure in this distant part of the world with such a threat on their own doorstep, but they maintained control of the situation; both as a part of the Imperial Government with all the primacy and powers of disallowance that entailed, and the acceptance of their recommendations by the local governments as the largest and most powerful navy yet put to sea.

I can talk a bit about the development of the Royal Australian Navy from a local perspective, with help from the Navy's website and the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918's Navy volume.

After Federation in 1901, the new Commonwealth Government took over responsibility for the minor vessels that the Australian Colonies had purchased in the later half of the 19th century and an 1887 agreement for the manning and organisation of the Royal Navy's Australian Squadron, as well as contributions to the cost of manning and maintaining its vessels.

This agreement was unsatisfactory to the British Admiralty in general and the Commander of the Australian Station in particular who found the limitations imposed by the 1887 agreement impacted on their ability to use the Australia Squadron as they wanted. Feeling that the Australians had 'hired' the Royal Navy for their own defence, the British developed the following formula for revisiting the agreement with the new Commonwealth Government:

I. Naval defence cannot be a matter of merely local interest. II. Naval defence consists mainly of a general offensive, designed to destroy the enemy ships wherever they may be. III. Since “the seas are one,” this offensive must he under a single control; therefore there must be a single Imperial Navy.

The Australian governments also found the agreement unsatisfactory. Feeling that they had taken on responsibility for funding the defence of Australian waters, there was some discontent that the Royal Navy's vessels of the Australian Squadron had been sent to China during the Boxer Rebellion which was seen as a more commercial venture than one of imperial defence.

So the agreement was revisited in 1902. The auxiliary vessels maintained by the new Commonwealth and the New Zealand governments would be absorbed into the Australian Squadron, under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, Australia Station. The Australian Squadron was to be based in Australian ports, maintained at an agreed strength, and only to be used within the territory of the Australia, China, and East Indies Stations. Four training facilities would be established in Australia and New Zealand (under RN or RN Reserve officers) and eight cadetships were allocated to Australians annually (two to New Zealanders.) Finally, the cost of the agreement was to be allocated as follows 9% to NZ, 41% to Australia and 50% to the Admiralty.

This was regarded by those who had objected to the use of the Australia Squadron overseas as even worse than the 1887 agreement. When the agreement came to parliament for approval, the Leader of the Opposition, George Reid was... less than impressed, saying:

In the 1887 agreement ... we have clearly brought out the idea, first of an Imperial squadron in the ordinary sense, such as they have on the China, or East Indian, or Northern Pacific stations, and then an Australian squadron ... to be an additional defence for the purpose of protecting the trade in Australian waters. The agreement of 1887 ... sets out a partnership in Australian defence, whereas the Bill under discussion sets out a partner- ship in Imperial defence. ... I altogether repudiate the attempt which is obviously being made to change the position and relationship of the Commonwealth to the Imperial Government in matters of Imperial policy. Australia’s contribution is infinitely less than we should like to make it, but I cannot shut my eyes to the mode which has been adopted of initiating this increased contribution.

The agreement was confirmed, but naval defence took a back seat for a few years as the new country turned its attention to other matters (for example, the Prime Minister resigning to take up an appointment as one of the first three High Court Justices.)

In 1905, Captain William Creswell, the Director of Commonwealth Naval Forces, had approximately 1,000 men under his authority, a couple of hundred cadets, and the ships Cerberus (launched 1869,) and Protector (1884;) the gunboats Gayundah and Paluma (both 1884) and torpedo boats Countess of Hopetoun (1891,) Childers (1883), Nepean & Lonsdale (both 1884,) and Mosquito (1885). Describing the formerly Victorian torpedo boats as: the closest thing to a modern defence we have, he proposed spending around two million pounds on a new squadron of three 3,000 ton cruisers, sixteen 550 ton destroyers, five 1st-class torpedo boats and eight 2nd-class torpedo boats. The government sent him to England for research purposes and he later presented a slightly expanded proposal which was in due course sent to London and the Committee of Imperial Defence.

The response of the Committee for Imperial Defence was received poorly. Describing the idea of a raid on Australia as of "secondary importance" (which, on an imperial scale was true,) it went on to say that Creswell's proposal lacked strategic justification, and that if the situation deteriorated in the future, the Admiralty would provide them. According to the Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, this was interpreted as a deliberate snub, "You are wrong to want [destroyers] now, and even should you be right, you cannot be trusted to do anything"

In line with the wishes of the Imperial Government, nothing was done. Although some money was set aside for shipbuilding, the parliament made sure that any decision on what to do with those funds would have to be approved by them - not the government.

In 1908, the United State Fleet made its tour around the world, again inspiring Australia to make another crack. Prime Minister Andrew Fisher was reported in The Times on March 31 1909 as saying:

the building of four Ocean destroyers and sixteen “River” class destroyers, besides those already ordered, within three years. All these are to be built in Australia. ... This flotilla is to take over the responsibility of coastal defence, and will relieve the Admiralty of the cost of the present squadron. Furthermore, if an Imperial fleet visits the Pacific, Australia will in a comparatively short time offer to furnish all the torpedo craft, scouts, and despatch-boats. The scheme further provides for a vessel suitable for policing the western Pacific Islands and for assisting the High Commissioner, and contemplates the efficient defence, with guns and forts of the latest patterns, of all ports useful for naval bases, thus making Australia a great self-defended naval base for the Empire in the Pacific.

Fisher sent the Imperial Government a detailed proposal, including a guarantee that in the event of war, the Australian Fleet would be placed under the orders of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty - ships would even carry sealed orders to this effect so that should they meet a British vessel underway to find war had been declared, the Australian captain would place himself under the orders of the senior Royal Navy officer present.

At this time, the naval arms race with Germany was beginning to heat up. The New Zealand government offered to buy the Royal Navy a battleship, and the Canadians brought up the idea of their own local squadron. A new conference was thereby scheduled to consider the defence of the Empire.

The 1909 conference decided to create a Pacific Fleet, which would be made up of three fleet units - the minimum fleet unit being one armoured cruiser, three unarmoured cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines (as well as the necessary support craft.) One of these would be provided by Australia, the other two by the Royal Navy's China and East Indies Stations - with HMS New Zealand becoming the flagship of the East Indies fleet unit. Three things were stressed in these discussions: the Australian vessels were to be manned by Australian Officers and Ratings as far as possible - the remainder being lent from the Royal Navy, during peacetime the vessels would be exclusively controlled by the Commonwealth (although regulations and standards much be effectively the same as the Royal Navy,) and that the whole fleet would train together as well as separately.

So the ships were constructed, and the support facilities created. British Officers were sent out to give recommendations and Australian Officers went to the UK to learn.

In 1911, the first ships were ready. King George granted the Commonwealth Naval Forces the new title of Royal Australian Navy. The 1909 agreement was confirmed again, setting out the exact conditions for the new fleet, delineating the extent of the Australia Station, and agreeing that seniority would be based on date of commission rather than what Navy an officer was a part of - for Australian vessels were to fly the British White Ensign from their stern and the Australian flag from the bow, making them British naval vessels in the eyes of the world.