I can only really shine light onto Alexander for you, I don't feel like I could confidently comment on any other leader
Alexander used the Satraps of the Persian empire, but he also weakened them in a way. An example is Lydia in 334 BC, where he divided the Satrap between the citadel, the responsibility for the “assessment and payment of tribute” and the remainder of the province ^1. If we think about this, this meant that it would be hard to create any type of resistance as the lack of money, and a citadel still loyal to Alexander would be a great risk. However, as noted this was in 334 BC, by the time he had conquered Persia and moved onto I believe Bactria (Correct me if I am wrong) he had seemingly stopped doing this. Now, personally I will say I believe he was loved and had the support of the Persian nobility, which meant he didn't feel the need. However, Satibarzanes shows otherwise, having only assigned "40 mounted javelin-men" to watch over the satrapy. Even Tarn, who most consider to be one of Alexander's largest admirers said that "he had evidently no idea of the feeling in Aria" ^2. It is understandable that he kept the Satrap system, while conquering such a huge empire Alexander could not possible afford to reform the administering of his empire, the upheaval of the satrap system could also cause unrest. Having said this though, Alexander wasn't completely out of touch with the people he was conquering, for example, it is said Alexander granted Sardis upon capturing in 334 BC “the right to their ancient Lydian institutions and autonomous states” ^3. But, once again the date is of note as it was earlier in the Asiatic campaign, and by 330 BC attempts at effectively administering his empire was lacking, possibly as he was too engulfed in his military affairs. Tarn as mentioned was an admirer of Alexander (Frank Holt describes him as part of the old-orthodoxy), but even he criticised Alexander for is lacking administration, so do Peter Brunt and Ian Worthington (Who is part of the new-orthodoxy). We can further see this was the case, as upon his return from India and his arrival at Susa he had to deal with many Companions and Persian nobles for abusing their positions of power ^4. A notable example would be Harpalus. This topic of administrating his empire is a great area of debate about whether Alexander deserves the epithet "Great", and it is hard to contemplate it. I shall copy and paste some paragraphs which I believe should be thought about:

“Alexander did not follow a strategy of conquest, consolidation and long-term administration, but was constantly on the move. As a result, and especially as he moved further east, territories behind him constantly revolted almost as soon as he left. This does not show foresight in making and keeping an empire. He misjudged the native peoples as he moved across Afghanistan and into modern Pakistan, thinking that defeated in battle meant conquered.” - Ian Worthington, “How ‘Great’ was Alexander, Volume 13 (page 51)” Ancient History Bulletin

It should be taken into account that Ian Worthington is great criticiser of Alexander, with him being called a part of the new-orthodoxy by Holt:

“The danger now… is that the new orthodoxy – a reprehensible Alexander beset by paranoia, megalomania, alcoholism, and violence – may gather deleterious momentum of its own.” 'Alexander the Great Today: in the interests of historical accuracy?' Ancient History Bulletin 13.3 (1999) (Page 111)’

Peter Brunt:

“A prudent ruler, governed by rational calculations, would clearly not have embarked on such an enterprise. Large tracts of the Old Persian Empire were still not pacified… Greece was smouldering with discontent; even the loyalty of Macedon and its vice-regent, Antiper, who did not comply with Alexander’s summons to his court in 324, could not be counted on. To secure the gains he had already made, Alexander needed decades of patient organizing work. It was not enough to remove or punish (as he did) officials whom he suspected of infidelity or oppression. But there is no sign that he had any taste for the humdrum routine of administration.” ‘Alexander the Great: Ancient and Modern Perspectives, Joseph Roisman (Page 87)’

So, it is hard to say that Alexander effectively managed his empire, I mean this is the main way historians attempt to discredit his greatness, as a King is not just a general he is also an administrator something Phillip II understood far more then his son Alexander III. But, as Robin Lane Fox says “No man ever went as far as Alexander on those terms again" ^5
I don't have to time to touch on your other questions right now, but if I get the time to sit down and find examples I will, I could try and explain without reading into the topics, but I doubt it would be hugely accurate it has been a while since I last read the in-depth into those topics
Also sorry if it doesn't flow hugely well or reads iffy in some places, I haven't really proof read it and my dyslexia can be quite bothersome sometimes

^1 Arrian: Alexander The Great, The anabasis and the Indica a new translation by Martin Hammond’ [1.17.4-7] (Page 24-25)
^2 Alexander the Great’ by W.W Tarn (Page 61)
^3 Arrian: Alexander The Great, The anabasis and the Indica a new translation by Martin Hammond’ [1.17.4-7] (Page 24-25)
^4 The History of Alexander, by Quintus Curtius Rufus, translated by John Yardley [4.4.17] (Page 238)
^5 Page 498 ‘Alexander The Great: folio edition’ Robin Lane Fox

Empires before modern communications were basically coalitions and alliances more than they were governments. Alexander himself had never traveled to most of the settlements in his empire, but inherited the Persian system of government, which involved a central authority presiding over a large number of appointed local rulers known as Satraps. These Satraps made their own decisions in matters of immense consequence - for example, the Satrap of Sardis in the Westernmost reach of Persia during the Peloponnesian war basically dictated foreign policy towards Greece, and alternated between supporting Athens and Sparta. Authority flowed both ways in these states - it was not a question of an emperor like Cyrus or Alexander dominating over his servants, but a two-way interplay where local rulers associated with the emperor because they wanted to increase their own power, and their servants served them for much the same reason. To make this concept more understandable, it might be useful to equate it to the idea of "managing up" in a workplace, where employees hitch themselves to a "rising star" in a corporation. Satraps would be able to render critical services to candidates succeeding to the imperial throne, and expected promotions for supporting the right side. Similarly, successful and loyal administration could lead to favorable promotions, marriages, and assignments.

Upon conquering Persia, Alexander seized the capitals and the royal treasury, but never saw the vast majority of his domain. Instead, it simply gave him submission by virtue of this mechanism of voluntary association. There were three options for Persian nobles after the fall of Persepolis: submission, independence, and loyalty. Loyalty was a declaration of war against the new regime, and would result in invasion. Independence would most likely result in the same. Therefore, they made submission and would attempt to play court politics. Alexander seemed acutely aware of this, as he adopted Persian customs and advisers in his court, to the great ire of his Macedonian army. This led to plots, conspiracies, and mutinies against him, but Alexander knew that to govern an empire required dangling the carrot of opportunity to officials from all regions.

This echoed his previous experience governing Greece. Upon conquering Greece under Philip and reconquering it under Alexander, the Macedonians strove to build a coalition of Greek city states that would support them. A centerpiece of Macedonian foreign policy was the invasion of Persia - which would remove the maritime threat that Persia proved to Greece, and liberate the Greeks of the Aegean from Persian rule. This, Philip and Alexander concluded, would cement the loyalty of Greece by fulfilling a proto-nationalist ambition. All these experiencces demonstrate the voluntary nature of state formation.

The role of the ruler in this setup was to be the facilitator of the ambitions of his subordinates. This meant redistributing lands among them, conquering lands to redistribute, or purging political opponents, at which point their lands would be given to the loyal. In any case, the ruler's role was to make room at the top, one way or another. Alexander utilized all three of these during his rule. When he was mobilizing to invade Persia, he gave off much of the Macedonian royal estate to key noblemen in exchange for their military commitment to assist him. He appointed Greek and Macedonian Satraps during his conquests. Finally, after his conquests had finished, his late rule was marked by a series of purges against some of his oldest supporters. Supposedly, each of these followed plots against him, but how credible those allegations were is questionable.

Miia Uusitalo wrote an excellent analysis of pre-industrial state formation, targeting the new states of the early modern period: Poland-Lithuania and the Spanish Empire, and analyzing these patterns. He concluded that, contra the popular image of conquest and dictatorship, that pre-industrial empires were democratic to a degree for the elite. Central governments in vast states were generally conciliatory towards local elites and wanted to compromise with them in disputes, just like politicians sit down and negotiate with unions and interest groups today. It was unecessary therefore for a conqueror or an empire to deploy forces to every far reach of its realm - instead, all that needed to be done was to strike a deal with local authorities, and to convince them that there was opportunity to be had by association with the central government.

Sanchez, Manel. The Second after the King and Achaemenid Bactria on Classical Sources

Hyland, John. Pharnabazos, Cyrus’ Rebellion, and the Spartan War of 399

Fuller, JFC. Alexander the Great.

Anson, Edward. Antigonus, the Satrap of Phrygia.

Uusitalo, Miia. Early modern state formation in the margins? A review of early modern popular politics and limited royal power in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Spanish colonial empire