Nelson is venerated in England as being a legendary commander. No other admiral or captain from his era gets such praise (to my knowledge). How much was England's Napoleonic era naval superiority down to Nelson alone?

by bak3n3ko

I'm interested in whether the aura around Nelson is a bit of a myth, or whether he was really that critical to Britain's overall naval victory in the Napoleonic wars. Are there other unsung captains or admirals who don't get the praise that they should?

I'd also like suggestions on a Nelson biography to read that gives a detailed, balanced view of the man. I haven't been able to find one that's well-regarded. Thanks in advance.

jschooltiger

I've written about Nelson here a few times before, and about the British navy more generally several more times besides that.

I would say that a short answer to your question is that Nelson's example was important to the British navy during the Napoleonic period -- after all, the war dragged on for 10 more years after Nelson's great victory and his death at Trafalgar -- but that he was, though unquestionably gifted, the product of a system in which it was possible for a Norfolk parson's son to become the most celebrated admiral of his age.

I wrote here about how Nelson's tactics worked at Trafalgar, and here about his victory at the Nile. (No one ever asks about Copenhagen, for some reason.)

I'll excerpt and re-edit from those a bit down below, but I want also to make the point that Nelson's fleet succeeded in both those battles because the captains subordinate to him understood his battle plan, and had the ability to use their own initiative rather than sticking to a rigid tactical plan imposed from above. At the Nile, for example, Thomas Foley, captain of HMS Goliath, noticed that there was room between the anchored French ships and the shoal water to the west, and passed down the west side of the French line on his own initiative, without waiting for orders. That allowed the French to be doubled up and beaten in conformance to Nelson's stated wish to engage the enemy at 2:1 or 3:1 odds whenever possible. Foley and his crew were also products of a British naval tradition that hearkened back to the Armada and the Anglo-Dutch wars, but had undergone a major transformation starting in the late 1750s, spurred in part by the trial and execution of John Byng for cowardice.

Anyhow, to get to the question about Nelson's personal contribution to the RN, this answer I think does a good job of explaining some of the differences between the RN and his command style, versus the French and Spanish navies of the time. To quote from that a bit, with some light editing:

  • Nelson's crews and officers were far more experienced than the allied crews and officers, having spent most of their time at sea rather than under blockade. The officers and men had drilled endlessly and used their time on blockade or other duty to perfect sailing evolutions and, to an extent, gunnery, and they were used to working as teams. Conversely, the allied fleet was made up generally of inexperienced sailors, and morale was low.
  • Nelson's tactics assumed that a single British ship could hold its own for a period of time even under enemy fire until other ships could come to its aid. This proved to be true during the battle, as swarms of smaller British ships overpowered enormous French and Spanish first-rates (that is, ships with more than 100 guns) even after the first ship to get there had been damaged.
  • Nelson knew that his captains could be trusted to use their own initiative, while the French and Spanish would hesitate to take the initiative. In a later period of military history, we'd call this getting inside their command and control loop — while the allied captains were thinking, the British captains were doing.
  • British ships tended to fire faster than French and Spanish ships, and would, after an initial broadside or two, essentially let divisions or gunners fire at their own speeds, as quickly as guns could be reloaded, rather than relying on the entire side of the ship to reload before firing a broadside. That let them get more iron on the target more quickly, rather than having their firing cycle constrained by the slowest guns.
  • British doctrine, over the course of the Napoleonic period, had evolved to emphasize the goal of firing directly into the hulls of enemy ships, rather than firing at the rigging or masts of enemy ships. (In video games this is the difference between round-shot and chain-shot, although that oversimplifies things a bit.) This is sometimes summed up as “kill the men, kill the ship.”
  • Conversely, the French were used to firing at rigging. This reflects to an extent the different war aims of each fleet; the French were generally attempting to avoid battle (not because they were cowards — let’s be clear on this) because their fleet was often being used to escort troops or convoys for other missions. The British, on the other hand, reasoned that the enemy fleet actually functioned as its strategic center of gravity, and destroying the enemy fleet meant that the transports, grain ships, etc. could be snapped up at leisure.

I also want to quote a bit from this answer:

Nelson was not a great seaman (he was often seasick, and had questionable skills as a sailor). Nor was he modest or self-effacing; on the contrary, he actively worked to cultivate a cult of personality around himself. He could be quite trivial and often rude to people he thought didn't matter.

On the other hand, he was a superb leader of men and a decent judge of character; he seems to have made it a point to get to know his captains not only to impress upon them his goals and desires but also to take the measure of the men and to know whom he could trust and not trust. He managed some difficult campaigns with skill (particularly the siege and eventual conquest of Malta, with the aid of allies) and had an uncanny skill at what today we'd call "situational awareness," which he displayed both at St. Vincent and at Copenhagen.

He also seems to have had that spark of charisma that is hard to define no matter how many leadership seminars one attends; he could be utterly charming and laser-focused on a person in a moment, and seemed to inspire intense personal loyalty. This is an account of Arthur Wellesley meeting Nelson before Trafalgar:

"Why," said the Duke, "I am not surprised at such instances, for Lord Nelson was, in different circumstances, two quite different men, as I myself can vouch, though I only saw him once in my life, and for, perhaps, an hour.

"It was soon after I returned from India. I went to the Colonial Office in Downing Street, and there I was shown into a little waiting-room on the right hand, where I found, also waiting to see the Secretary of State, a gentleman whom, from his likeness to his pictures and the loss of an arm, I immediately recognized as Lord Nelson.

"He could not know who I was, but he entered at once into conversation with me, if I can call it conversation, for it was almost all on his side, and all about himself, and in really a style so vain and so silly as to surprise and almost disgust me. I suppose something that I happened to say may have made him guess that I was somebody, and he went out of the room for a moment, I have no doubt to ask the office-keeper who I was, for when he came back he was altogether a different man, both in manner and matter. All that I had thought a charlatan style had vanished, and he talked of the state of this country and of the aspect and probabilities of affairs on the Continent with a good sense, and a knowledge of subjects both at home and abroad that surprised me equally and more agreeably than the first part of our interview had done; in fact, he talked like an officer and a stateman.

"The Secretary of State kept us long waiting, and certainly for the last half or three quarters of an hour I don't know that I ever had a conversation that interested me more. Now, if the Secretary of State had been punctual, and admitted Lord Nelson in the first quarter of an hour, I should have had the same impression of a light and trivial character that other people have had, but luckily I saw enough to be satisfied that he was really a very superior man; but certainly a more sudden and complete metamorphosis I never saw."

I'm bumping up on the comment limit here, but I do want to drop in two other answers that I wrote about the officers (commissioned and warrant) in the RN and their promotion:

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/2b42u0/during_the_napoleonic_wars_how_young_were_naval/

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/29f3s7/how_does_the_royal_navys_organisation_command/

Hopefully that will get you started with some good information. Please let me know if you have follow up questions!

Edit: also, my flair profile has a lot more Royal Navy stuff in it: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/wiki/profiles/jschooltiger