The assumption stated in the title is incorrect, at least when it comes to European theater. Germans indeed managed to create a resistance movement although its size and activities are hardly comparable to resistance in other occupied territories during Second World War. In the following text I'll focus solely on German resistance, as I don't know much of Japanese or Italian organisations.

In July 1943, Heinrich Himmler called for the meeting with several ministers and high-ranking SS officers, where they agreed upon the plan of the sabotage and diversion actions that could have been taken when the forces occupying Poland and western parts of USSR were to retreat. This plan was named 'W-II' (or Werwolf, ger. 'werewolf'). After the successful landing of Allied forces in northern France and advancement of Allies through Italy, the plan was further expanded in September 1944 to include actions and tactics for the organised resistance in case of occupation of Germany by Allied forces. The plan itself was created mainly by Reinhard Gehlen (known for being the chief of the West German intelligence agency that was later transformed into Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) that exists today) who modeled the resistance on the Polish Land Army structures using documents captured during the pacification of Warsaw Uprising.

Between October 1944 and February 1945, roughly 1300 prospective resistance operative leaders has been selected and trained in reconneissance, sabotage and guerilla tactics in training camps located in Hannover and Altbeck but also in Breslau, Neisse and Teschen (now Wrocław, Nysa and Cieszyn in Poland), but this was way too late, as when training of the leaders (officers and NCOs) concluded in early 1945, Soviet Army has already reached the German border, breaking through the Eastern Wall (ger. Festungsfront Oder-Warthe-Bogen) on 30th January and besieging Breslau two weeks later. Such a rapid advance took Germans by surprise who were unable to form, train and equip the resistance force according to the plan. It is important however, to differentiate between 'Werwolf' and the 'German resistance'. The former was a clearly defined organisation with clear-cut structure, led by the High SS and Police Command. The former were local groups formed by ex-soldier or even civilians, acting on their own accord. Blurring of such differentiation is, in my opinion, the main cause of vastly differing of the estimated strength of Werwolf, as some historians seem to treat some or even all German partisans as the members of 'Werwolf'.

The resistance structure of Werwolf was copied from Land Army organisation with some modifications. It stressed independence of the basic cells, allowing for ability to operate should other cells were compromised. Organisation was mapped to administrative division, with basic unit of the resistance was a cell (Dorfzelle) located in or in the vicinity of a single village and 5-10 men strong, all having their own leader. Each municipality (Gemeinde) had separate command controlling several local cells and receiving ordes from the country-level command (ger. Kreis), controlling several municipalities (effectively few dozen of basic cells, what amounted to 300-500 partisans). County commands were in turn controlled by province commands (ger. Land) led by gauleiters. Given aforementioned advances of the Soviet Army, German resistance groups were unable to organise working network in the occupied Poland and limited their actions to Eastern part of Germany, predominantly in what is now Western Poland (modern Polish parts of Pomerania, Greater Poland and Lower Silesia), sabotaging transport lines and important building and assassinating members of freshly-appointed Polish administration. The heavies resistance was encountered by Poles and Soviets in Lower Silesia, mainly due to large Germans population and heavily forested, mountainous terrain in the southern part of the area, making tracking and fighting partisans difficult. Some Werwolf members, especially those speaking Polish were also infiltrating staff of important industrial facilities (Lower Silesia is a major source of copper, tungsten and rare earth metals) and subsequently conducting acts of sabotage. Such actions were orchestrated mainly by civilian organization 'Freies Deutschland' (ger. 'Free Germany') focused on separation of Lower Silesia and subsequent return of this area to Germany.

Polish authorities who took control of the territories captured after the Second World War decided to relocate German inhabitants west of new Polish-German border. Massive repatriations mobilised the partisans who enjoyed some support from local populace, but it could have not been stopped and successful counter-strikes of Polish authorities and military (often using their wartime partisan experience) gradually whittled the forces and presence of Werwolf and other resistance groups down. Nevertheless, repatriation action (relocation of Germans into Germany and repopulating captured territory with Polish citizens living in Eastern Poland that was seized by USSR (now Western Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania) was far from smooth and faced heavy resistance throughout year 1945 and 1946. It slowly diminished in 1947, but separate instances of sabotage and guerilla actioned were recorded in Lower and Upper Silesia as late as summer of1948. The last German resistance organisation, Freikorps Gross-Mossdorf, operating in the vicinity of Opole (ger. Oppeln) has been destroyed only in 1949. Curiously, some sources claim that resistance organizations remained active until mid-50's in Bavaria, although they were no longer conducting sabotage or even supporting Nazi ideology, and were focusing on conservative-nationalist political activism. It is also possible that some resistance groups could have organised by people recruited by CIC in West Berlin to conduct diversion in the Soviet area of influence, especially Poland. This might be the case of Joachim Schubart (also known as Joachim Schaak) who allegedly commanded the partisan group called 'Masurische Befreiungsorganisation' (Masurian Liberation Organisation) and was subsequently captured by Polish State Security Bureau, sentenced to death and executed in 1953. Due to scarcity of materials from that era, at least a part of which has been destroyed, historians are still not sure whether this was a real case or a provocation by State Security.

The actions of German resistance, although disruptive and somewhat dangerous for Polish populace, were very limited in comparison to resistance organisation in occupied Poland, France or Soviet Union, mainly due to small numbers, lack of actual structures and severe lack of materials and equipment. Some Polish historians argue that the efficacy of Werwolf was way lower than suspected and it has been exaggerated by communist officials to justify harsh measures used in fighting anti-communist political opponents and to present anti-communist Polish resistance groups (mainly Land Army and National Armed Forces) as Nazi supporters or at least a public enemy. Although there is some truth to these allegation, the propaganda element was nowhere as strong as in case of Soviet occupation zone, where between 1946 and 1946 over 10.000 people were arrested for alleged terrorist activities with half of them never returning, and at least several cases of Soviet war crimes being attributed to Nazi resistance by East German authorities installed by Soviets. Preventative internment of all identified self-defence and paramilitary groups (Freikorps, Volkssturm) in American and British occupation zones could also increase the perceived size of resistance movement. Perry Biddiscombe notes that Werwolf and similar resistance groups did not target military personnel, and thus were considered no threat to occupation efforts and their activities were quickly fading in Germany because of little to no support from local populace, ending in early 1947.

Summing it up, the resistance existed, yet it has been formed too late to pose any threat and decisive actions taken by authorities, compounded with diminishing support from German populace that either did not support Nazi government in the first place or simply did not see any reason to exacerbate the already staggering chaos and destruction caused by wartime activities cause it to dissolve withing few years.

Bibliography:

Biddiscombe, Perry. The Last Nazis: SS Werewolf Guerrilla Resistance in Europe 1944-1947. Tempus Publishing, 2004.

Etscheit, Georg. 'Der deutsche „Werwolf“ 1944/45'. In: Herfried Münkler (ed.): Der Partisan. Theorie, Strategie, Gestalt. Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990.

Liebold, Cornelia; Morré, Jörg; Sälter, Gerhard. Kassiber aus Bautzen: Heimliche Briefe von Gefangenen aus dem sowjetischen Speziallager 1945-1950. Stiftung Sächsische Gedenkstätte, 2004.

Primke, Robert; Szczerepa, Maciej. Werwolf – Tajne Operacje w Polsce. Technol, 2008.