Mosaic did not dispute the claim. The claim was disputed by Martin Kramer, a well-known historian of Israel, who works at the Shalem College (Israeli school) and Washington Institute (US think-tank focusing on the Middle East), and which Mosaic pointed to.

When it comes to credentials alone, Max Fisher pales in comparison to Martin Kramer. But that's not how we judge the accuracy.

Hertzberg, of course, wrote that he heard Ben-Gurion say this in a speech. But he wrote that the speech was in 1967, and he was writing in 1987. That alone makes the quote difficult to trust, given that it is uncorroborated, that Hertzberg had a history of being quite critical of the Israeli policies regarding the conquered territories. However, Hertzberg was a serious historian and scholar in many ways, and therefore his recollection is not so easily dismissed.

Kramer spoke to the Ben-Gurion archives, and confirmed that nowhere in the transcript of the relevant speech is the statement Hertzberg attributed to Ben-Gurion. The issue is, Kramer admits the transcript is incomplete. He does make a valid point in that he notes that if Ben-Gurion had said what was attributed to him, it would've definitely been printed somewhere. A titan of Israeli politics and history making such a call immediately in 1967 would have been some serious news. But even so, we still can't dismiss it.

Kramer does a lot of legwork on what Ben-Gurion said on other occasions, however, pointing out that Ben-Gurion never appeared to believe this, and in 1967 his statements on what to do were quite different from what Hertzberg claimed was said in that speech. So something so incongruous from his position in every other speech, 20 years after the statement, and not reported anywhere, seems rather hard to believe.

I can add some to Kramer's account, which would be a good way for us to examine Ben-Gurion's emotions, as well as the rest. For example, he wrote to an old friend, Yosef Weitz, following the war, describing it this way:

But last week I was filled with joy – even that is not the right word to describe the height of exhilaration that pervaded my whole being because of the IDF’s dazzling swift victory. I felt a similar emotional experience only [one other time in my life] on the first night of my arrival in Petah Tikva when I heard the wail of jackals and braying of donkeys and sensed that I had returned to our nation’s rejuvenating homeland and I was no longer in the Diaspora’s exile.

For Ben-Gurion, the joy he felt at the success of the pre-emptive strike was greater even than the joy he felt upon the UN vote's success in 1947; he notes that then, he was focused only on how to defeat the enemies of Jewish statehood, despite the jubilation and dancing in the streets he saw.

Of course, the war was not over. But Ben-Gurion's elation continued.

Following the war, we can add to what Kramer highlighted as well. Kramer, for example, doesn't mention that Ben-Gurion did write in his diaries of some apprehensions about keeping the territories with their populations, writing for example:

We cannot forget that there are approximately one million Arabs in the West Bank. The last thing we need is to add them to the Arab [population] of Israel. There are also about two hundred thousand refugees in the Gaza Strip and it will not be easy to get rid of them. However, we will [solve] these problems after we successfully conclude our victory on all fronts.

As you can see, he was quite confident that it would be all right, that solutions would be found to the demographic questions, but he also was aware of the difficulty of such a situation. Jerusalem was particularly his focus, and Hertzberg's quote doesn't dispute that, but Ben-Gurion seemed to be fine with the idea of keeping much of the conquered territory, provided a demographic solution was found. His diaries continued to discuss this, saying:

I do not know if the war is over, but we might lose politically what our army has won for our people. I’m worried about Eban’s activity in the UN. He must be brought back. I fear the government’s indecisiveness in securing our military gains in Jerusalem, Hebron and the West Bank. Rafi members in favor of reuniting [with Mapai] as a means of remedying the situation must speak with Mapai members and find out whether they are prepared to help us ensure that the government secures the army’s achievements.

In short, he was concerned about losing territory in the West Bank, especially Hebron, and Jerusalem of course. Another diary entry:

We must not budge from Jerusalem. We have to establish a large Jewish presence inside [East Jerusalem] as quickly as possible. We also have to build a Jewish settlement in Hebron. We must not hand back the West Bank to Hussein even though annexing it to Israel means an addition of million Arabs. This is a grave danger. There is also the problem of the refugees in the Gaza Strip.

So again, he was quite concerned about solidifying Israeli control of the territories, not immediately getting rid of them. However, again, he was conscious of the demographic problems.

So it's likely Hertzberg, and by extension Max Fisher, are telling a story that misleads people on what Ben-Gurion said. To be honest, the fact that this claim still exists is really frustrating to those who are familiar with Ben-Gurion's position on the 1967 war and what followed.

But you may be asking, what was his solution to the demographic issue? Sure, he wanted to encourage Jewish settlements in the conquered areas, and refused to give the territories back to Jordan or Egypt, but what did he want to do? Well for one, he obviously called for more Jewish immigration, to buffer the demographic balance. But beyond that, consider the meeting Ben-Gurion wrote about in his diary on June 11, 1967, the end of the war. Meeting with Moshe Dayan, Shimon Peres, and Yosef Almogi, Dayan suggested transferring Gazan refugees to Jordan, giving the West Bank autonomy, and keeping Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion responded by saying roughly he found this idea agreeable, but with some modifications. He said he saw it as difficult to transfer the refugees, and believed that the Sinai could be returned in exchange for a promise of free navigation through the Straits of Tiran. Gaza, presumably, would remain in Israel's hands.

And he did clearly, 7 months after the war at a gathering with the Hebrew University's Board of Governors, state that he wished the government would hurry up and settle more of the Golan and West Bank, as well as Jerusalem. Zaki Shalom's Ben-Gurion's Political Struggles, 1963-67 provides a good overview of all of this in Chapter 8.

It's clear that while he encouraged settlement, he considered only the Golan, Gaza, and Jerusalem as unimpeachably Israeli, and was willing to return the rest for peace. Did he ever suggest returning "all" the territories, outside of Hertzberg's sole quote that is uncorroborated and came 20 years late into print? No.

So who has the right of it? Probably Kramer, in this case. Though Fisher would be right if he, instead of relying on Hertzberg, pointed out that Ben-Gurion was prepared to give up most of the West Bank for the sake of peace, though not Gaza by most accounts, not the Golan, and not Jerusalem of course. Fisher's piece is in that sense wrong as far as I'm concerned, and could've made a similar political point with far more historical backing by relying on what Kramer wrote rather than on Hertzberg's recollection.