Part 1: Doctrinal impact of the Battle of the Frontiers:

In 1914, when the war broke out, the backbone of the French Army was still the “Régiment d’Infanterie de Ligne” (shortened as RI) inherited from the Second Empire. Each regiment was composed of 3 Infantry Battalions of 1000 men (4 for the Chasseurs), themselves divided in 4 Infantry Companies and 3 machine gun sections.

The first hostilities of the Great War between France & Germany quickly revealed the flaws of the New School ideas but also prefigured the drastic mutations that the French Army would soon be forced to undergo: The 14th of August 1914, near the Village of Plaine, repeated bayonet frontal assaults from the 13ème DI were shattered by German artillery and machine gun positions hidden in the heights of Donon. The same day, two batteries of 75mm guns disregarded the rules established by the RMA (Artillery Training Instructions) and chose instead to orchestrate a joint-action with the Infantry combining a fixation barrage with outflanking maneuvers, forcing a German withdrawal.

On the strategic and operational levels however, the New School precepts of systematic assault, aim for central breakthrough and primacy of speed over surprise or caution failed utterly: A good example can be seen with the 4th Army of General Langle de Cary, which was ordered to attack the flanks of the IVth German Army led by the Duke of Württemberg through the Ardennes on the 21th of August. Having sacrificed adequate reconnaissance and rearguard coverage to maximize speed, the 11th, 12th and 17th French Army Corps were fixated and beaten back by the lone German 18th Army Corps despite their numerical advantage.

“The same day [22th of August] on different terrains, at different hours, all of the French divisions made the same mistakes: lack of communication, disdain for long range reconnaissance, disregard for rearguard defense, absence of lateral liaisons and a reckless reliance on infantry attacks unsupported by artillery against a foe willing to fight on the defensive.” – Emile Wanty, the Art of War.

As such, from August to December 1914, the French Army as whole was forced to adapt & evolve almost as spectacularly as the 13th DI. After the bloody August of the Bataille des Frontières came the reversal of the Marne in September and then the race to the sea of December where the last of the great German offensives before 1916 would be checked by the French.

If anything, the doctrinal emphasize on quantity and morale of the New School did provide the French Armies with soldiers, who although on average older and less tactically educated than their German counterparts, were capable of withstanding and fighting on despite terrible losses, grueling retreats and the looming perspective of a national disaster.

Ultimately, more than 40% of French large units commanders (162 Officers) were relieved of their command for incompetence or insufficiency during this period. For French military historian Pierre Rocolle, this “Hécatombe des Généraux” was a consequence of the numerous politically driven nominations that happened during the Dreyfus Affair, as well as age, since many of the high-ranked officers sacked by Joffre had never attended the ESG (French Academy of War, created in 1876).

But despite those setbacks, fortunately for the French Army, the GQG (Supreme Headquarter) was swift and efficient in processing the battle reports precisely and diligently written by field officers, no matter the situation. Between the 16th and 24th of August 1914, 2 weeks after the beginning of hostilities, the GQG thus issued its first corrective notes at the attention of all Army Group leaders:

• Conquered territories must be manned and defended with artillery, to prevent counter-attacks.
• The enemy must first be engaged with skirmishers and artillery before launching the assault.
• The infantry must wait for artillery support, do not let the troops needlessly expose themselves.
• Generals must remain aware of the direction of battle at any given time.
• The infantry must use terrain to its advantage during both the attack and defense.
• Attacks will be all the less lethal the more carefully prepared they are.

However, it would be naïve to believe that such orders could be received and applied immediately, especially since, by this point, skepticism towards written rules had become widespread.

“It was too late to benefit from those observations. The gruesome work of adaptation had to be done in the midst of battle, to be completed only in a near future that we had to preserve.” – Commander Larchet, 10th Corps.

Although they would eventually yield good results, it would not be before late August to early September, during the Battles of the Trouée des Charmes* and Grand-Couronné* that the harsh lessons of the Bataille des Frontières would be assimilated as a whole by the French Army. The 3rd September, new instructions were issued advocating the construction of trenches, with a light forward line, a deep second line and observation towers as well as the need to dissimulate one’s reserve from artillery fire. It thus took half-a-month for the French military leadership, dominated by infantry-minded Saint-Cyriens to finally concede that “le feu tue” –firepower kills. The era of bayonet warfare and morale-centric shock & awe was over.

This assimilation process would remain a work-in-progress during 1915 however, as the French leadership struggled to undo the damage done by pre-war military education. On the 23rd of January 1915, General Fayolle wrote:

“I’m having a lot of difficulties trying to organize the construction of trenches by the troops… My men are more interested in dying than working…”

To make the learning process even more difficult, the officers and soldiers most enamored with the concept of Attaque à Outrance would, in their frustration, often adopt a counter-productive stance of stubborn defiance to the last man or refusal to let go of terrain ill-suited for defense. The most remarkable, perhaps even embarrassing, example of such mindset would be General Duchêne, whose refusal to apply the defense-in-depth doctrine advocated by Pétain’s “Directive N°4”, issued the 22nd of December 1917* during the German offensive in the Aisne the 27th of May 1918 nearly led to the collapse of the French 6th Army. This near-defeat would prove to be one of the biggest setbacks suffered by the French Army during the War.

By the 6th of December 1915, Fayolle would further still remark:

“Why is it so difficult for me to convey my ideas and enforce their practical application? […] The truth is that nobody was prepared for this war of positions. Quite the contrary, we all had the greatest disdain for fortifications and entrenching works. Our whole education has to be reworked and such a task cannot be accomplished in one day. War cannot be improvised.”

---

Battle of the Trouée des Charmes (24th-26th of August 1914) and Grand-Couronné (4th-13th of September 1914):

Defensive battles led by the 2nd Army of French General Castelnau against the offensive of the German VIth Army led by Kronprinz Rupprecht of Bavaria in Lorraine following the initial victory of German forces during the Battle of Morhange. Those confrontations saw General Castelnau learn from his initial setbacks and order the defensive organization of the battlefield and careful preparation of both defensive & offensive artillery barrages. German Chief of Staff Moltke’s hopes of an easy breakthrough to open the flanks of the French 4th Army were dashed as the Bavarians were beaten back with heavy casualties in both instances. The “Miracle of the Marne” would doubtfully have been possible without Castelnau’s tactical readjustments and the success of the 2nd Army gave the necessary credence needed by the advocates of firepower and safety over speed to enforce tactical reforms within the French Army.

Pétain’s 4th Directive (22th of December 1917):

• The conditions of battle on the western front are temporarily modified by the Russian surrender; a new orientation must be assessed in the management of our operations.
• The Entente will recover numerical superiority in fighting strength only when American forces become capable of fielding large units. Until then, we must adopt a bracing stance and prepare ourselves to reassume, as soon as possible, a great offensive that shall bring us final victory.
• In the event of a large scale enemy offensive, Armies and Army Groups commanders are expected to fight according to the following guidelines: Hold the first lines only with the necessary amount of defenses required to slow down the enemy while preparing the second and lateral lines. Ensure the integrity of the second and lateral lines at all time. Coordinate fire and counter-attack within the enemy’s area of penetration with the lateral lines. The Commander in Chief’s reserves can be committed to reinforce an attacked army or launch a decisive counter-attack if the situation and terrain are deemed favorable.
• Our High-Command must seek to lessen our first line casualties, or if these have fallen, the amount of efforts required to retake them through adequate preparation of the ground and coordination with every lines so that initiative and aggressiveness remain on our side even in defensive operations.

---

Source: La Chair & l'Acier, Michel Goya.