The book, “War to Be Won” by Murray and Millett, tackles this problem a slight bit. You are right that the Germans relied heavily on the blitzkrieg, and it was with this blitzkrieg that the German Army would envelop the enemy. The blitz could be analyzed three times, once in Poland, in West Europe, and in East Europe. Poland and West Europe had different long-term logistical planning because the fight was won within mere weeks.

However, in Eastern Europe, fighting the Soviet Union proved to be a long and burdensome front that was, basically logistically infeasible. The distances between objectives in Eastern Europe were always very large compared to Poland and West Europe. They hoped to create railroads, but by the time the German Army reached a stalemate and needed constant logistical attention, it was winter and construction was incredibly slow.

Murray and Millett state constantly that the German High Command really thought that the war with the Soviets would last mere weeks, and saw no need to create vital, long-term logistical support. Once the Russians trenched in their cities and gathered millions of soldiers in reinforcements to counterattack, the Germans’ lack of long-term logistical planning showed.

To concisely answer your question, in previous fronts, long-term logistical support was unnecessary, as the Germans didn’t see a need for it or that any long-term logistical support became unused. The Germans, thinking that a similar outcome would happen against the Soviets, saw no need to prepare advanced logistics. One can argue that this is a factor that led to the Soviets gaining the upper hand in the Eastern Front.