Short answer: no.
Long answer:
Britain's industry had been pretty dependent on US cotton as well as consumers even since colonial times. For example, cotton from the South would be shipped to Britain, turned into a shirt, shipped back to the US, and bought by an American consumer. Additionally, the US was quite literally Britain's breadbasket, with tons of grain being shipped to the island each year.
In the interest of their economy, Britain did not want to see the South burned to the ground as would eventually happen. Following the Trent Affair (the US Navy kidnapped two Confederate ambassadors from a British ship) British businessmen sent blockade runners to give the CSA weapons and to bring back cotton and tobacco. Furthermore, the British government planned to send the Confederacy several ironclad ships to break the Union blockade. They were convinced not to send more than they already had by the US Ambassador to England, Charles Francis Adams Sr. (Fun fact, he is John Adams' grandson). His argument rested solely on US exports to Britain. If they continued to support the CSA, they would stop recieving grain from the United States. This would have caused a major famine in Britain and put them in even worse economic shape than they were already in.
My sources
Niels Eichhorn, "The Intervention Crisis of 1862: A British Diplomatic Dilemma?" American Nineteenth Century History (2014) 287-310.
https://www.nps.gov/adam/learn/historyculture/charles-francis-adams-1807-1886.htm
Search function can provide plenty of answers, but the answer is no, although Britain and France came reasonably close in late 1862.
The Confederate victory at Second Bull Run in August 1862 and Lee's offensive in Maryland the following month led many Europeans to believe that a Union victory was improbable. And England's "cotton famine" was starting to bite around this time too; 3/4 of British cotton-mill workers were either unemployed or part-time workers. William Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, worried that the cotton shortage would lead to riots and viewed a British-negotiated peace as a necessity.
British PM Lord Palmerston wrote to his foreign secretary, Lord Russell, on September 14th, 1862 that the Union "got a very complete smashing" at Bull Run, "and it seems not altogether unlikely that still greater disasters await them, and that even Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates. If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider whether...England and France might not address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation?" Lord Russell wrote back on September 17th that "we ought ourselves to recognise the Southern States as an independent State." Napoleon III of France also favored diplomatic recognition, but was unwilling to act without British support.
September 17th was the very day the Union repulsed the Army of Northern Virginia at Antietam. Five days later, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, making the abolition of slavery an official Union war aim. Unwilling to side against a power now openly fighting for abolition, British hopes for intervention dimmed. The British cabinet debated a proposed mediation offer (supported by Russell and Gladstone) on October 28th, but voted it down. Napoleon III also weighed in at this point with a pro-Southern mediation effort that the British also rejected.
So no recognition, but a Southern victory at Antietam might very well have tipped the scales in favor of intervention in London and Paris.
Source:
Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era by James McPherson