From what i remember of The American Way of War and the US military course I took years ago there was an interesting doctrinal divide in US military thinking after the Civil War that carried on through WW1 and even into WW2. Grant's strategy of overwhelming military might applied persistently often dominated US strategic theory. Ironically tactical theory for that time came from the army's frontier experience dealing with Native Americans in the west and cross border issues with Mexicans. Out of those conflicts the army had developed a doctrine mobility and maneuver that did not entirely mesh with the strategic doctrine. It was argued that the tactical doctrine led to lighter equipment and more mobile vehicles that made application of the (Grant style) strategic doctrine of Overwhelming force in WW2 against the Germans very difficult. As for WW1, IIRC, the US was not involved long enough or in sufficient numbers to lead to too much of a doctrinal shift though there were theorists espousing Air power and Tank power before and after WW1. The lack of US numbers in WW1 in many ways forced the US to go along with French and British Doctrines.

One of Pershing's biggest struggles with the other nations' senior leadership was to keep US units from being split up and used as reinforcements for French and British Units.