It's always been said that Otto Von Bismarck engineered conflicts in Europe all for the purpose of unifying the German states. Was this really his intended goal and the driving force of his policies, or was this just a fortunate turn of events that he later exploited?

by ShelteredTortoise
Abrytan

The answer as ever in history is a bit of both. Bismarck took advantage of the situation in Europe with regards to rising German nationalism to secure Prussian and later German dominance of central Europe. However, if a lesser statesman had been at the head of Prussia, it's likely that matters would have gone otherwise.

In order to understand the situation Bismarck found himself in, it's necessary to roll back the clock to 1815, and the fight against Napoleon. While those who spoke German had always been seen to have a common bond, with the German (Saxon) philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte declaring that 'those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself' in 1808, most Germans felt more of an affinity to their individual principalities than to the idea of a 'german nation'. Indeed, there were and are significant difference in dialect between German regions. Fichte also asserted that 'the German is a branch of the Teutonic race', a vague definition that didn't clarify anthing.

Perhaps the first step towards German unity was during the Napoleonic wars, where the various German states came together to fight against the French. Most significantly, Prussia gained significant amounts of territory at the Congress of Vienna, including the coal and iron rich Rhineland. The roughly 300 principalities which had existed after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire were amalgamated into 39, which formed the German Confederation, under the leadership of Austria. While the Congress of Vienna was intended to preserve the pre-Napoleonic/Revolutionary order, with Austria acting as a counterweight to Nationalism and Liberalism in central Europe, they were not particularly effective in containing either German or Italian nationalism. Crucially in 1834, a Prussian led customs union (Zollverein) was created, which (voluntarily) excluded Austria. This increased the interdependence of the German states and increased Austrian exclusion, although it is important to note that at this point many German states felt no real affinity to Prussia.

Moving forward, perhaps the most significant event in the history of German nationalism before 1871 were the 1848 revolutions. Inspired by the revolution in France which had forced the French King to flee to England, there were mass demonstrations and uprisings across Europe. In Bavaria, Ludwig I was forced to abdicate in favour of his son and other monarchs were forced to agree to Liberal reforms. A parliament met in Frankfurt, composed of delegates from the German states, and proclaimed a unified German state. The parliament began to write a constitution, but were soon divided over issues such as the nature of the monarchy, centralisation and the inclusion of Austria. The last issue was the most controversial, with some favouring the creation of a Kleindeutschland excluding Austria, and some favouring the creation of a Großdeutschland. Eventually the parliament narrowly passed a draft of the constitution, by 290 votes to 248, but it was not recognised by the larger German states such as Prussia, Austria or Saxony. Frederick-Wilhelm of Prussia was offered the crown but refused to accept it, privately calling it a 'crown from the gutter'. Eventually troops controlled by the monarchs regained control of the various states, and the first effort to create a unified German state failed. Many liberals fled to the USA and it seemed that the dream of a German state was dead for now. Prussia attempted to create a similar union in 1850 but were forced to back down by Austria, further souring relations.

However, waiting in the wings was a German politician by the name of Otto von Bismarck. While Bismarck hadn't played a major role in the revolutions of 1848, he had been a staunch supporter of the monarchy and reactionary forces. In 1851, he was appointed to the Diet of the German Confederation in Frankfurt. It was here that his opinions regarding the unification of Germany were formed. Bismarck had been opposed to the creation of a unified German state initially, believing that it would cause Prussia to lose her independence. However, his experiences in the Diet caused him to realise that the status quo would mean Prussia was forever assigned to the second rank behind Austria. He remarked that he was greatly opposed to 'binding our spruce and seaworthy frigate to the wormy old warship of Austria'.

In 1859, Bismarck was sent to Russia as ambassador, and three years later to France. This allowed him to become familiar with the personalities who he would later be opposed by, and to gain valuable foreign policy experience. He was recalled to Prussia in 1862 by the new King Wilhelm, and made Minister-President.

The major aim of Prussia from this point onwards was to exclude Austria from influencing the other German states as much as possible, and to bring these states closer to Prussia. Bismarck found the perfect opportunity in the context of a dispute over the administration of Holstein, taken from Denmark in 1864. You can read an answer I wrote about the Schleswig-Holstein question and the background of the war here. The war against Austria and her South German allies lasted just six weeks, with the Prussians winning a decisive victory at the Battle of Königgrätz. The old German Confederation was disbanded, and Austria was officially excluded from German affairs. Prussia also absorbed Hanover and Schleswig Holstein, further increasing her power in relation to the other German states.

Following the war, Prussia created the North German Confederation, which unified the states of North Germany into one federal state under the leadership of the King of Prussia. The constitution was similar to the one adopted in 1871, with universal suffrage and a bicameral system. There was free movement between the states and a common passport. Those southern German states which hadn't joined the confederation were persuaded to join a new customs union.

In what was perhaps Bismarck's masterstroke, true unification would not come until 1871 and the end of the Franco-Prussian war. While the foundations of the war weren't sparked by Bismarck, its outbreak most definitely was. The crisis was initiated by the decision of Spain to offer the throne to Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. The French feared that Leopold, a member of the Hohenzollern dynasty, the same as that of Wilhelm I, would conclude an alliance with Prussia, thus encircling France. The French ambassador met with Wilhelm and asked him to ensure that a Hohenzollern was not made candidate again. Wilhelm politely refused and the matter seemed settled. Bismarck, however, scented an opportunity to heat up tensions. He released a highly edited version of the report that he recieved, called the Ems Telegram. Incensed, the French declared war. The ensuing war was relatively brief, and Prussia was joined by the South German states not members of the NGF. Prussia annexed Alsace-Lorraine and the state of Germany was finally formed in 1871.

As we can see, while Bismarck was a major reason for the unification of Germany, he was not the sole one. Events before his rise to power sowed the seeds of unification, and the rise of German nationalism had begun long before he was born. However, he was able to successfully exploit this nationalism to serve his own ends. In 1870 for example, the release of the Ems Telegram was carefully crafted to inflame tensions with France and make them seem like the aggressor. Had Bismarck simply declared war on France, then the southern German states would not have joined the war, and Germany would not have been created. In one of his most famous speeches, Bismarck declared that 'it is not by speeches and majority resolutions that the great questions of the time are decided – that was the big mistake of 1848 and 1849 – but by iron and blood.' This is often taken to indicate that he was more than willing to initiate wars to serve Prussia's interests. Indeed, we must remember that Bismarck was primarily a Prussian nationalist. Otto Pflanze remarked that Bismarck's 'aim was not to unify the German cultural nation, but to expand the Prussian state within the limits of the European balance of power'. He only supported unification when it became clear that it would serve Prussian interests and allow Prussia to become a first rate power. He opposed a unification which would cause Prussia to lose her independence. The 1871 constitution gives Prussia significant political power; it was the only state with enough Bundesrat deputies to single handedly veto legislation. Karina Urbach perhaps best sums up this dichotomy when she describes Bismarck as a man who 'claimed to be a believer in the monarchical system and toppled German princes when they were in his way. He defined himself as a Prussian and claimed to put Germany above everything else.'

In conclusion, Bismarck did engineer conflicts to allow Prussia to gain hegemony, but the conditions which allowed him to do so were shaped by forces beyond his control.

Further reading and sources:

For a short overview of Bismarck's life, see the Encylopaedia Britannica.

A. J. P. Taylor, Bismarck: the man and the statesman (1955) - A good read, but criticised for being superficial and making factual errors.

Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the development of Germany. The period of unification, 1815–1871 (1963)

Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (2007)

Vollker Ulrich, Bismarck (2015)

Jonathon Steinberg, Bismarck: A Life (2012)