Recovery after the war took different approaches that depended greatly on the politics and culture of the country.

Throughout Western Europe, nations benefited from the American Marshal Plan, which at times contributed over 13% of the Federal budget towards rebuilding Europe. It was rhetorically offered to the countries behind the "Iron Curtain" as well, but the Soviet Union compelled them to refuse. Less than a purely economic project, the Marshall Plan was intended to combat popular (at the time) Marxist movements in many Western European countries, especially in France, Greece, and Italy.

In Germany, the postwar political factions all drew on the support of the "losers" of political struggles in thee 1920s and 30s, as most high-ranking Nazis had been entirely shut out of politics. As a result, postwar German policies were largely a reaction against the economic policies of NSDAP, and can mostly be understood by first understanding Nazi economic policies. The Nazis created huge state corporations - such as Goering Works - to help the German economy achieve "autarky" (self-sufficiency in resources and production) and assist militarization. They rewarded huge corporations like Krupp and IG Farben for their political support in the early 30s by banning small industries and forcing small industries to consolidate into larger corporations. The postwar government of Konrad Adenauer, a longtime opponent of the NSDAP, broke up large industries, prosecuted Nazi supporters in the public and private sectors, privatized industries, defaulted on Nazi debt (the largest creditors of which were large industries and banks in the 30s and 40s), and massively deregulated the economy in favor of small producers. Germany did not even have a minimum wage law. However, the government took a guiding role, however, in the economy, guiding labor disputes. This created the German Economic Miracle for the next three decades, with growth rates usually exceeding 6% a year.

However, it is key to see this economic strategy, as well as almost all the post-war economic strategies as not only purely economic approaches, but political decisions rooted in constituencies, culture, and history. Germany achieved growth both under the Adenauer policies, and in the 30s under the centralist Nazi policies - though the latter were largely based on unsustainable massive borrowing.

In France, politicians played on a prevailing national sense of trauma and insecurity following the nations' surprise defeat and accusation during the war. Many reasoned that an inferior industrial base was at least partially responsible for Germany's upset victory, and instituted policies that would later be called "Dirigisme", a state-directed economy. Major industries were nationalized and consolidated, forming so-called "national carriers". The purpose of these national carriers was to beeline towards the creation of strong industries, but also to spread the reputation of French industries. In consolidating, French industries became large enough and consolidated enough to compete with big international names, one of many approaches the French government took towards recovering national pride. France's approach was also successful, despite being the opposite of Germany's.

The British approach under Atlee was similar to the French than the German, but for different reasons. Labour won a surprise victory over Churchill in the post war election, and promised vast improvements in working conditions - a message which resonated after years of rationing and austerity during the war. The UK created a vast social safety net, and nationalized the largest utilities and industries. The management of these companies post-nationalization, however, took a different approach than the French managements - they vastly increased pensions, working conditions, employee benefits, and wages. The UK's recovery would end up being less rapid, and less robust than either the French or the German, and it is telling that of these three countries, the UK was the only one whose ruling administrations would critique and massively overhaul their country's economic approach 3 decades after the war.

All the postwar apolitical states benefited from the competitive advantages of a "fresh start". These advantages were greatest in Germany and smallest in the UK. By creating entirely new factories - with often entirely new managements - assisted by Marshal Plan funds, Germany was able to build more modern production systems. France rebuilt its industrial base, but its old managerial and political elite were not discredited. The United Kingdom's industrial base was comparatively in tact after the war. Germany had the unique advantage of building new factories aided by American capital and making room at the top for new blood in management, explaining its greater results.

Post-war growth was not uniform. Bad economic policies could restrict it. Spain serves as the cardinal example. Despite benefiting from increased trade volumes with recovering European economies - France especially - Spain did not have the advantage of being able to rebuild its industries, nor did it have suitable economic policies. Post-war Spain was ruled by a conservative, pseudo-Fascist movement that heavily regulated the economy and stopped capital flows. It would not be until technocrats were brought into the regime that it had a recovery, far later.

In Eastern Europe, recovery was slow except in the USSR, which achieved pre-war economic production within 4 years of the wars' end, despite widespread devastation. The Soviet Union continued with its then-efficient Central Planning system. Competent civilian managers, using Fordian and Taylorist industrial management techniques, restored or built new plants. With years of experience hitting ambitious targets during the Five Year Plans, and scrambling to out-produce Germany during the war. The rest of Eastern Europe, however, had no experience with Central Planning. Communist governments took power gradually, in "salami slices", but as the economy transitioned towards increasing restriction on private enterprise, commercial flows slowed. With no experience in centrally planned industrialization, most Eastern European economies suffered.

In Asia, astounding recovery was the norm, and South Korea was the exception. In the PRC after the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, land reform was a welcome boon to the economy. Both Western and Chinese statistics at the time estimated economic increases at 10% a year. Originally, Mao's industrialization was cautious, aided by Soviet capital and supervised by Soviet experts. This lead to 8-10% industrial growth rates until the Great Leap Forward.

Perhaps surprisingly, North Korea from 1950 to the late 1970s was known as one of the world's greatest economic miracles. The Kim Il Sung regime used Soviet experts and aid to fund an industrialization campaign that was largely successful.

Japan's economic miracle in Asia is the most famous. The Americans during the occupation instituted much needed reforms to the Japanese political economy, including massive deregulation and the breaking up of family-run state enterprises. Contra popular belief, pre-World War 2 Japanese industrialization was actually quite slow - growth rates mostly matched the 3% of the United States. After the war, they shot up in some years to double digits. After the end of the occupation authority, the Japanese government weakened anti-trust laws, allowing large corporations to consolidate once again, but under new management. Just like in Germany, traditional corporate dynasties saw their monopoly on management broken, and new blood and fresh talent was promoted. Post-war Japanese corporations applied the newest in Western management practices. They fused these practices with the traditional collectivism and agricultural attention to detail of Japanese society. According to some anthropologists, the system also exploited Japan's alleged low premium on life, spurred by Shinto Buddhist conviction in reincarnation, thereby legitimizing overwork and the dedication of one's life to a corporation, though those viewpoints are controversial. Japan's economy also benefited from huge American purchases during the Korean War.

Ironically, the exception in Asian recovery was South Korea, where the corrupt Rhee Synghman administration constrained small enterprise and backed personal allies in industry that held back recovery. Until Rhee's overthrow, this climate would persist.

What are the themes of recovery? The biggest one is that there is no one correct policy as long as the priority is on growth. Political cultures bring about vastly different policies, each of which is suitable to a specific country. These policies were influenced more by local politics and cultures than by economic strategy alone.

However, each successful approach sought to remove restrictions on the flow of goods and capital, while unsuccessful approaches - like those in South Korea, Eastern Europe (sans USSR) and Spain - were littered with frivolous restrictions and blocks on capital and goods. Even in the socialist Soviet Union, China, and North Korea, growth was effective because, while the system was centralized, managers were given clear industrial targets and leeway in methods to achieve them. Because the Soviets had extensive experience in central planning and its managerial bureaucracy, state industry was the conduit through which goods could be produced and moved most efficiently. When Socialism was first imposed on formerly capitalist Eastern European countries, however, this displaced their traditional conduit. China did not have this problem, as a traditionally agrarian state.