Is it just that they didn't advance as fast as western European powers, rather than actually declined? But if that's true, why did they keep losing to Russia, which also lagged behind significantly in technology? (I don't know a ton about Russian/Ottoman conflicts, I just know the Ottomans lost to Russia in the Crimean War, attacked them in WW1, but lost a ton of men in the Caucasus and basically gave up and went to fight Britain in Mesopotamia instead.)
The declining relative power of the Ottoman Empire both a political and economic problem. As you mentioned, the Ottoman Decline Theory has been discredited for decades. In the words of one historian, "any empire that has the privilege of declining for 300 years should consider itself lucky". However, it is undeniable that the Ottoman Empire of the 19th century was a far less influential state in European and politics than the Ottoman Empire of the 17th century.
There are broadly four approaches in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire after the decline theory to explain the Ottoman Empire's changing position. The first focuses on specific events having large influence. This approach is common in Turkish historiography of the Ottoman Empire, viewing the foreign intervention in favor of the Greek revolt as particularly influential as it set the precedent for European intervention to "protect" Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and the gradual loss of territory. The second is economic, focusing on changing world systems and the disruption of the traditional trade routes in favor of sea routes, as well as on Ottoman institutions that potentially delayed agricultural and industrial improvements. The third focuses on military decline, namely the decline of cavalry, the rise of the Janissaries as a political constituency which allegedly delayed modernization, and the relatively low Ottoman tax and military expenditure rates. The fourth approach focuses instead on the decline of the Sultanate as a political institution instead of the decline of the Empire as an entity on the map: borders can be deceptive, and at various points in Ottoman history, the "Ottomans" were not in control of "their" own Empire.
I will start with economics and changing world systems as the implications are the most obvious. In 1700, the Ottoman population is estimated at little over 24 million, while the Russian is estimated at around 15 million. the 1906 Ottoman census reports a population of just over 20 million, while Russia at the same time had a population over 136 million. The declining relative power of the Ottoman Empire can be explained as a case of the "rise of the rest". The opening of ocean trade routes to the Americas and Asia increased the population and trade volumes of Western European Empires, while changing military technology which gave Russia an increasing edge over the nomads of the steppe allowed for Russian settlement of the steppe that ballooned the population of that country.
Internally, historians have criticized Ottoman economic policy for stagnating industrial and agricultural growth. Since the 15th century, the Ottomans voluntarily sold economic concessions called "capitulations" to Europeans - trade rights, ownership of profitable industries, and eventually extraterritoriality to some degree. These were not like the unequal treaties imposed on East Asian nations - rather, the Ottomans handed these responsibilities over voluntarily. This was a continuation of Byzantine policy - since a Komnenid treaty with Venice exchanging rights for naval support, the Byzantines used the vastness of their internal market to extract financial and diplomatic favors from foreigners. As a result, some of the most profitable sectors of the Ottoman economy - such as the Turkish tobacco output and most of the railways - were owned by Europeans. In the late 19th century, due to the tax benefits accorded to foreign citizens, there were over 800,000 registered foreign citizens in the Ottoman Empire, the majority of whom were Ottomans who took advantage of the system. Among Ottoman subjects, disparities were also great. Of the 700 major registered businesses in Constantinople in 1913, 690 were owned by Greeks. Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were especially capital poor, which meant little could be invested to increase agricultural and industrial output. The most profitable businesses in the Empire were largely controlled by foreigners, who had the option of re-investing in their home countries. Further, low tariffs - as low as 3% for the French, the biggest exploiters of the capitulation system - suppressed local industrial competition.
The deteriorating economic situation and the increasing power of the Empire's rivals made the state's traditional responsibilities harder to maintain, leading to spending vastly beyond the Empire's means. In 1912, around four fifths of the Ottoman budget went to servicing the Empire's debt, while most of the remainder was spent on the military, with only a fraction spent on internal development. The Ottoman Empire never stopped putting on the airs of a great power, even when it did not have the economic strength to back it up. In 1875, the Ottomans still had the third largest navy in the world, despite only being the 12th largest economy.
This behavior is explained by the Ottoman administration's near contempt for financial affairs. Traditionally, the Sultan was first and foremost a commander. The most common honorific for Sultans was "Gazi", "the warrior", a custom which continued long after Sultans stopped leading armies into battle. His advisers mainly made their careers in the military or administering justice in the provinces. The justice and harmony of the state and the military came first, economic matters were secondary and left to others. In the 15th to 18th centuries, financial affairs in the Empire were delegated in many cases to "Phanariote" Greeks, those of the former Byzantine nobility carried over to the Ottoman administration. In the late 19th century, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was established, run by the British and French, which directly taxed the Ottoman Empire and had more employees than the Ministry of Finance. The "Ottoman Bank", the Empire's central bank that handled its currency, was owned 96.3% by the British and French.
The final approach on Ottoman decline focuses on nationalism and the power of the Sultan. In 1622, the first Janissary coup deposed Osman II after decades of growing concessions for the Janissaries. The Sultans did not regain their freedom of operation until Mahmud II's successful anti-Janissary plot in 1826. By this time, Ottoman armies were behind those of the West and the tax system was corrupt and abusive. Mahmud succeeded in addressing both, but he and his heirs faced crises that were long in the making. New literature led to national awakenings from the early to late 1800s. This disconnected the original multi-ethnic model of the Empire. The Ottomans were a single, specialized political unit. Most of the army officers were Turks, most merchants were Greeks, the craftsmen and artisans of Anatolia were largely Armenian, while most Orthodox Slavs worked the land. In 1827, foreign navies intervened in the ongoing Greek revolt in response to allegations of atrocity, which set a precedent for Europeans intervening to defend Christian minorities. This shifted the opinion of the Ottoman elite over time. In the early 1800s, almost no Turkish officer would call himself a "Turk", a derogatory term for an Anatolian farmer - he called himself an Ottoman. However, Turkish elites gradually realized Anatolians were the Empire's most reliable constituency, and Christian minorities, due to European policies, were a pretext for imperial expansion. In 1876, a repeat of 1827 on a larger scale occurred, as a Balkan revolt once again drew reports in Europe of atrocities. Serbia went to war, the Ottomans defeated them, and Russia intervened to defend Serbia and Christian minorities, leading to massive territorial losses. Hundreds of thousands of Turks and Muslim Slavs became refugees. The Sultan in response to this defeat shifted to Islamic fundamentalism and disbanded reform. Paranoid of a coup, he chained the navy in harbor and refused to let the army conduct exercises, for fear they were cover for a mutiny. Nevertheless, in 1908, he was deposed in a mutiny as officers grew tired of the nepotism in the Ottoman government and wished to revive their country.
Without military exercises for years, the Ottomans performed horribly in the Italo-Turkish war. In 1912, the Balkan states realized this and defeated the Ottomans in the Balkans, leading to another refugee crisis. This led to a coup by the radical Committee of Union and Progress, led by Enver Pasha, envisioning a Turkic state stretching from Anatolia to Central Asia, aligned with Germany. Seeing Christian minorities as a pretext for European expansion, the CUP during the First World War condoned large scale violence and conducted relocations of minorities. Militarily, the Ottomans were par for the course with the other non-industrialized powers of the war: Italy, Austria, and Russia, and had ups and downs. Sarakamis was a disaster bred from amateur planning, while the Ottomans later succeeded in occupying the Caucasus. Kut and Gallipoli were unmitigated successes, while Palestine left much to be desired.
In short, while Ottoman decline has been rejected, the Ottomans became relatively less powerful in the 19th century as a combination of:
An economic policy which abdicated developmental and financial responsibility to foreigners, preventing profits from being re-invested in industry and agriculture
The opening of the Eurasian steppe through new military technology to Russian settlement
The rise of Balkan nationalism and European support
Financial responsibility, leading to crisis
Conflicts between military factions and the palace, leading to restriction of military improvement
The declining relative power of the Ottoman Empire both a political and economic problem. As you mentioned, the Ottoman Decline Theory has been discredited for decade. In the words of one historian, "any empire that has the privilege of declining for 300 years should consider itself lucky". However, it is undeniable that the Ottoman Empire of the 19th century was a far less influential state in European and politics than the Ottoman Empire of the 17th century.
There are broadly four approaches in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire after the decline theory to explain the Ottoman Empire's changing position. The first focuses on specific events having large influence. This approach is common in Turkish historiography of the Ottoman Empire, viewing the foreign intervention in favor of the Greek revolt as particularly influential as it set the precedent for European intervention to "protect" Christians in the OTtoman Empire, and the gradual loss of territory. The second is economic, focusing on changing world systems and the disruption of the traditional trade routes in favor of sea routes, as well as on Ottoman institutions that potentially delayed agricultural and industrial improvements. The third focuses on military decline, namely the decline of cavalry, the rise of the Janissaries as a political constituency which allegedly delayed modernization, and the relatively low Ottoman tax and military expenditure rates. The fourth approach focuses instead on the decline of the Sultanate as a political institution instead of the decline of the Empire as an entity on the map: borders can be deceptive, and at various points in Ottoman history, the "Ottomans" were not in control of "their" own Empire.
I will start with economics and changing world systems as the implications are the most obvious. In 1700, the Ottoman population is estimated at little over 24 million, while the Russian is estimated at around 15 million. the 1906 Ottoman census reports a population of just over 20 million, while Russia at the same time had a population over 136 million. The declining relative power of the Ottoman Empire can be explained as a case of the "rise of the rest". The opening of ocean trade routes to the Americas and Asia increased the population and trade volumes of Western European Empires, while changing military technology which gave Russia an increasing edge over the nomads of the steppe allowed for Russian settlement of the steppe that ballooned the population of that country.
Internally, historians have criticized Ottoman economic policy for stagnating industrial and agricultural growth. Since the 15th century, the Ottomans voluntarily sold economic concessions called "capitulations" to Europeans - trade rights, ownership of profitable industries, and eventually extraterritoriality to some degree. This was not like the unequal treaties imposed on East Asian nations - rather, the Ottomans handed these responsibilities over voluntarily. This was a continuation of Byzantine policy - since a Komnenid treaty with Venice exchanging rights for naval support, the Byzantines used the vastness of their internal market to extract financial and diplomatic favors from foreigners. As a result, some of the most profitable sectors of the Ottoman economy - such as the Turkish tobacco output and most of the railways - were owned by Europeans. In the late 19th century, due to the tax benefits accorded to foreign citizens, there were over 800,000 registered foreign citizens in the Ottoman Empire, the majority of whom were Ottomans who took advantage of the system. Among Ottoman subjects, disparities were also great. Of the 700 major registered businesses in Constantinople in 1913, 690 were owned by Greeks. Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were especially capital poor, which meant little could be invested to increase agricultural and industrial output. The most profitable businesses in the Empire were largely controlled by foreigners, who had the option of re-investing in their home countries. Further, low tariffs - as low as 3% for the French, the biggest exploiters of the capitulation system - suppressed local industrial competition.
The deteriorating economic situation and the increasing power of the Empire's rivals made the state's traditional responsibilities harder to maintain, leading to spending vastly beyond the Empire's means. In 1912, around four fifths of the Ottoman budget went to servicing the Empire's debt, while most of the remainder was spent on the military, with only a fraction spent on internal development. The Ottoman Empire never stopped putting on the airs of a great power, even when it did not have the economic strength to back it up. In 1875, the Ottomans still had the third largest navy in the world, despite only being the 12th largest economy.
This behavior is explained by the Ottoman administration near contempt for financial affairs. Traditionally, the Sultan was first and foremost a commander. The most common honorific for Sultans was "Gazi", "the warrior", a custom which continued long after Sultans stopped leading armies into battle. His advisers mainly made their careers in the military or administering justice in the provinces. The justice and harmony of the state and the military came first, economic matters were secondary and left to others. In the 15th century to 18th century, financial affairs in the Empire were delegated in many cases to "Phanariote" Greeks, those of the former Byzantine nobility carried over to the Ottoman administration. In the late 19th century, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was established, run by the British and French, which directly taxed the Ottoman Empire and had more employees than the Ministry of Finance. The "Ottoman Bank", the Empire's central bank that handled its currency, was owned 96.3% by the British and French.
The final approach on Ottoman decline focuses on nationalism and the power of the Sultan. In 1622, the first Janissary coup deposed Osman II after decades of growing concessions for the Janissaries. The Sultans did not regain their freedom of operation until Mahmud II's successful anti-Janissary plot in 1826. By this time, Ottoman armies were behind those of the West and the tax system was corrupt and abusive. Mahmud succeeded in addressing both, but he and his heirs faced crises that were long in the making. New literature led to national awakenings from the early to late 1800s. This disconnected the original multi-ethnic model of the Empire. The Ottomans were a single, specialized political unit. Most of the army officers were Turks, most merchants were Greeks, the craftsmen and artisans of Anatolia were largely Armenian, while most Orthodox Slavs worked the land. In 1827, foreign navies intervened in the ongoing Greek revolt in response to allegations of atrocity, which set a precedent for Europeans intervening to defend Christian minorities. This shifted the opinion of the Ottoman elite over time. In the early 1800s, almost no Turkish officer would call himself a "Turk", a derogatory term for an Anatolian farmer - he called himself an Ottoman. However, Turkish elites gradually realized Anatolians were the Empire's most reliable constituency, and Christian minorities, due to European policies, were a pretext for imperial expansion. In 1876, a repeat of 1827 on a larger scale occurred, as a Balkan revolt once again drew reports in Europe of atrocities. Serbia went to war, the Ottomans defeated them, and Russia intervened to defend Serbia and Christian minorities, leading to massive territorial losses. Hundreds of thousands of Turks and Muslim Slavs became refugees. The Sultan in response to this defeat shifted to Islamic fundamentalism and disbanded reform. Paranoid of a coup, he chained the navy in harbor and refused to let the army conduct exercises, for fear they were cover for a mutiny. Nevertheless, in 1908, he was deposed in a mutiny as officers grew tired of the nepotism in the Ottoman government and wished to revive their country.
Without military exercises for years, the Ottomans performed horribly in the Italo-Turkish war. In 1912, the Balkan states realized this and defeated the Ottomans in the Balkans, leading to another refugee crisis. This led to a coup by the radical Committee of Union and Progress, led by Enver Pasha, envisioning a Turkic state stretching from Anatolia to Central Asia, aligned with Germany. Seeing Christian minorities as a pretext for European expansion, the CUP during the First World War condoned large scale violence and conducted relocations of minorities. Militarily, the Ottomans were par for the course with the other non-industrialized powers of the war: Italy, Austria, and Russia, and had ups and downs. Sarakamis was a disaster bred from amateur planning, while the Ottomans later succeeded in occupying the Caucasus. Kut and Gallipoli were unmitigated successes, while Palestine left much to be desired.
In short, while Ottoman decline has been rejected, the Ottomans became relatively less powerful in the 19th century as a combination of:
An economic policy which abdicated developmental and financial responsibility to foreigners, preventing profits from being re-invested in industry and agriculture
The opening of the Eurasian steppe through new military technology to Russian settlement
The rise of Balkan nationalism and European support
Financial responsibility, leading to crisis
Conflicts between military factions and the palace, leading to restriction of military improvement
The declining relative power of the Ottoman Empire both a political and economic problem. As you mentioned, the Ottoman Decline Theory has been discredited for decade. In the words of one historian, "any empire that has the privilege of declining for 300 years should consider itself lucky". However, it is undeniable that the Ottoman Empire of the 19th century was a far less influential state in European and politics than the Ottoman Empire of the 17th century.
There are broadly four approaches in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire after the decline theory to explain the Ottoman Empire's changing position. The first focuses on specific events having large influence. This approach is common in Turkish historiography of the Ottoman Empire, viewing the foreign intervention in favor of the Greek revolt as particularly influential as it set the precedent for European intervention to "protect" Christians in the OTtoman Empire, and the gradual loss of territory. The second is economic, focusing on changing world systems and the disruption of the traditional trade routes in favor of sea routes, as well as on Ottoman institutions that potentially delayed agricultural and industrial improvements. The third focuses on military decline, namely the decline of cavalry, the rise of the Janissaries as a political constituency which allegedly delayed modernization, and the relatively low Ottoman tax and military expenditure rates. The fourth approach focuses instead on the decline of the Sultanate as a political institution instead of the decline of the Empire as an entity on the map: borders can be deceptive, and at various points in Ottoman history, the "Ottomans" were not in control of "their" own Empire.
I will start with economics and changing world systems as the implications are the most obvious. In 1700, the Ottoman population is estimated at little over 24 million, while the Russian is estimated at around 15 million. the 1906 Ottoman census reports a population of just over 20 million, while Russia at the same time had a population over 136 million. The declining relative power of the Ottoman Empire can be explained as a case of the "rise of the rest". The opening of ocean trade routes to the Americas and Asia increased the population and trade volumes of Western European Empires, while changing military technology which gave Russia an increasing edge over the nomads of the steppe allowed for Russian settlement of the steppe that ballooned the population of that country.
Internally, historians have criticized Ottoman economic policy for stagnating industrial and agricultural growth. Since the 15th century, the Ottomans voluntarily sold economic concessions called "capitulations" to Europeans - trade rights, ownership of profitable industries, and eventually extraterritoriality to some degree. This was not like the unequal treaties imposed on East Asian nations - rather, the Ottomans handed these responsibilities over voluntarily. This was a continuation of Byzantine policy - since a Komnenid treaty with Venice exchanging rights for naval support, the Byzantines used the vastness of their internal market to extract financial and diplomatic favors from foreigners. As a result, some of the most profitable sectors of the Ottoman economy - such as the Turkish tobacco output and most of the railways - were owned by Europeans. In the late 19th century, due to the tax benefits accorded to foreign citizens, there were over 800,000 registered foreign citizens in the Ottoman Empire, the majority of whom were Ottomans who took advantage of the system. Among Ottoman subjects, disparities were also great. Of the 700 major registered businesses in Constantinople in 1913, 690 were owned by Greeks. Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were especially capital poor, which meant little could be invested to increase agricultural and industrial output. The most profitable businesses in the Empire were largely controlled by foreigners, who had the option of re-investing in their home countries. Further, low tariffs - as low as 3% for the French, the biggest exploiters of the capitulation system - suppressed local industrial competition.
The deteriorating economic situation and the increasing power of the Empire's rivals made the state's traditional responsibilities harder to maintain, leading to spending vastly beyond the Empire's means. In 1912, around four fifths of the Ottoman budget went to servicing the Empire's debt, while most of the remainder was spent on the military, with only a fraction spent on internal development. The Ottoman Empire never stopped putting on the airs of a great power, even when it did not have the economic strength to back it up. In 1875, the Ottomans still had the third largest navy in the world, despite only being the 12th largest economy.
This behavior is explained by the Ottoman administration near contempt for financial affairs. Traditionally, the Sultan was first and foremost a commander. The most common honorific for Sultans was "Gazi", "the warrior", a custom which continued long after Sultans stopped leading armies into battle. His advisers mainly made their careers in the military or administering justice in the provinces. The justice and harmony of the state and the military came first, economic matters were secondary and left to others. In the 15th century to 18th century, financial affairs in the Empire were delegated in many cases to "Phanariote" Greeks, those of the former Byzantine nobility carried over to the Ottoman administration. In the late 19th century, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was established, run by the British and French, which directly taxed the Ottoman Empire and had more employees than the Ministry of Finance. The "Ottoman Bank", the Empire's central bank that handled its currency, was owned 96.3% by the British and French.
The final approach on Ottoman decline focuses on nationalism and the power of the Sultan. In 1622, the first Janissary coup deposed Osman II after decades of growing concessions for the Janissaries. The Sultans did not regain their freedom of operation until Mahmud II's successful anti-Janissary plot in 1826. By this time, Ottoman armies were behind those of the West and the tax system was corrupt and abusive. Mahmud succeeded in addressing both, but he and his heirs faced crises that were long in the making. New literature led to national awakenings from the early to late 1800s. This disconnected the original multi-ethnic model of the Empire. The Ottomans were a single, specialized political unit. Most of the army officers were Turks, most merchants were Greeks, the craftsmen and artisans of Anatolia were largely Armenian, while most Orthodox Slavs worked the land. In 1827, foreign navies intervened in the ongoing Greek revolt in response to allegations of atrocity, which set a precedent for Europeans intervening to defend Christian minorities. This shifted the opinion of the Ottoman elite over time. In the early 1800s, almost no Turkish officer would call himself a "Turk", a derogatory term for an Anatolian farmer - he called himself an Ottoman. However, Turkish elites gradually realized Anatolians were the Empire's most reliable constituency, and Christian minorities, due to European policies, were a pretext for imperial expansion. In 1876, a repeat of 1827 on a larger scale occurred, as a Balkan revolt once again drew reports in Europe of atrocities. Serbia went to war, the Ottomans defeated them, and Russia intervened to defend Serbia and Christian minorities, leading to massive territorial losses. Hundreds of thousands of Turks and Muslim Slavs became refugees. The Sultan in response to this defeat shifted to Islamic fundamentalism and disbanded reform. Paranoid of a coup, he chained the navy in harbor and refused to let the army conduct exercises, for fear they were cover for a mutiny. Nevertheless, in 1908, he was deposed in a mutiny as officers grew tired of the nepotism in the Ottoman government and wished to revive their country.
Without military exercises for years, the Ottomans performed horribly in the Italo-Turkish war. In 1912, the Balkan states realized this and defeated the Ottomans in the Balkans, leading to another refugee crisis. This led to a coup by the radical Committee of Union and Progress, led by Enver Pasha, envisioning a Turkic state stretching from Anatolia to Central Asia, aligned with Germany. Seeing Christian minorities as a pretext for European expansion, the CUP during the First World War condoned large scale violence and conducted relocations of minorities. Militarily, the Ottomans were par for the course with the other non-industrialized powers of the war: Italy, Austria, and Russia, and had ups and downs. Sarakamis was a disaster bred from amateur planning, while the Ottomans later succeeded in occupying the Caucasus. Kut and Gallipoli were unmitigated successes, while Palestine left much to be desired.
In short, while Ottoman decline has been rejected, the Ottomans became relatively less powerful in the 19th century as a combination of:
An economic policy which abdicated developmental and financial responsibility to foreigners, preventing profits from being re-invested in industry and agriculture
The opening of the Eurasian steppe through new military technology to Russian settlement
The rise of Balkan nationalism and European support
Financial responsibility, leading to crisis
Conflicts between military factions and the palace, leading to restriction of military improvement
The declining relative power of the Ottoman Empire both a political and economic problem. As you mentioned, the Ottoman Decline Theory has been discredited for decade. In the words of one historian, "any empire that has the privilege of declining for 300 years should consider itself lucky". However, it is undeniable that the Ottoman Empire of the 19th century was a far less influential state in European and politics than the Ottoman Empire of the 17th century.
There are broadly four approaches in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire after the decline theory to explain the Ottoman Empire's changing position. The first focuses on specific events having large influence. This approach is common in Turkish historiography of the Ottoman Empire, viewing the foreign intervention in favor of the Greek revolt as particularly influential as it set the precedent for European intervention to "protect" Christians in the OTtoman Empire, and the gradual loss of territory. The second is economic, focusing on changing world systems and the disruption of the traditional trade routes in favor of sea routes, as well as on Ottoman institutions that potentially delayed agricultural and industrial improvements. The third focuses on military decline, namely the decline of cavalry, the rise of the Janissaries as a political constituency which allegedly delayed modernization, and the relatively low Ottoman tax and military expenditure rates. The fourth approach focuses instead on the decline of the Sultanate as a political institution instead of the decline of the Empire as an entity on the map: borders can be deceptive, and at various points in Ottoman history, the "Ottomans" were not in control of "their" own Empire.
I will start with economics and changing world systems as the implications are the most obvious. In 1700, the Ottoman population is estimated at little over 24 million, while the Russian is estimated at around 15 million. the 1906 Ottoman census reports a population of just over 20 million, while Russia at the same time had a population over 136 million. The declining relative power of the Ottoman Empire can be explained as a case of the "rise of the rest". The opening of ocean trade routes to the Americas and Asia increased the population and trade volumes of Western European Empires, while changing military technology which gave Russia an increasing edge over the nomads of the steppe allowed for Russian settlement of the steppe that ballooned the population of that country.
Internally, historians have criticized Ottoman economic policy for stagnating industrial and agricultural growth. Since the 15th century, the Ottomans voluntarily sold economic concessions called "capitulations" to Europeans - trade rights, ownership of profitable industries, and eventually extraterritoriality to some degree. This was not like the unequal treaties imposed on East Asian nations - rather, the Ottomans handed these responsibilities over voluntarily. This was a continuation of Byzantine policy - since a Komnenid treaty with Venice exchanging rights for naval support, the Byzantines used the vastness of their internal market to extract financial and diplomatic favors from foreigners. As a result, some of the most profitable sectors of the Ottoman economy - such as the Turkish tobacco output and most of the railways - were owned by Europeans. In the late 19th century, due to the tax benefits accorded to foreign citizens, there were over 800,000 registered foreign citizens in the Ottoman Empire, the majority of whom were Ottomans who took advantage of the system. Among Ottoman subjects, disparities were also great. Of the 700 major registered businesses in Constantinople in 1913, 690 were owned by Greeks. Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were especially capital poor, which meant little could be invested to increase agricultural and industrial output. The most profitable businesses in the Empire were largely controlled by foreigners, who had the option of re-investing in their home countries. Further, low tariffs - as low as 3% for the French, the biggest exploiters of the capitulation system - suppressed local industrial competition.
The deteriorating economic situation and the increasing power of the Empire's rivals made the state's traditional responsibilities harder to maintain, leading to spending vastly beyond the Empire's means. In 1912, around four fifths of the Ottoman budget went to servicing the Empire's debt, while most of the remainder was spent on the military, with only a fraction spent on internal development. The Ottoman Empire never stopped putting on the airs of a great power, even when it did not have the economic strength to back it up. In 1875, the Ottomans still had the third largest navy in the world, despite only being the 12th largest economy.
This behavior is explained by the Ottoman administration near contempt for financial affairs. Traditionally, the Sultan was first and foremost a commander. The most common honorific for Sultans was "Gazi", "the warrior", a custom which continued long after Sultans stopped leading armies into battle. His advisers mainly made their careers in the military or administering justice in the provinces. The justice and harmony of the state and the military came first, economic matters were secondary and left to others. In the 15th century to 18th century, financial affairs in the Empire were delegated in many cases to "Phanariote" Greeks, those of the former Byzantine nobility carried over to the Ottoman administration. In the late 19th century, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was established, run by the British and French, which directly taxed the Ottoman Empire and had more employees than the Ministry of Finance. The "Ottoman Bank", the Empire's central bank that handled its currency, was owned 96.3% by the British and French.
The final approach on Ottoman decline focuses on nationalism and the power of the Sultan. In 1622, the first Janissary coup deposed Osman II after decades of growing concessions for the Janissaries. The Sultans did not regain their freedom of operation until Mahmud II's successful anti-Janissary plot in 1826. By this time, Ottoman armies were behind those of the West and the tax system was corrupt and abusive. Mahmud succeeded in addressing both, but he and his heirs faced crises that were long in the making. New literature led to national awakenings from the early to late 1800s. This disconnected the original multi-ethnic model of the Empire. The Ottomans were a single, specialized political unit. Most of the army officers were Turks, most merchants were Greeks, the craftsmen and artisans of Anatolia were largely Armenian, while most Orthodox Slavs worked the land. In 1827, foreign navies intervened in the ongoing Greek revolt in response to allegations of atrocity, which set a precedent for Europeans intervening to defend Christian minorities. This shifted the opinion of the Ottoman elite over time. In the early 1800s, almost no Turkish officer would call himself a "Turk", a derogatory term for an Anatolian farmer - he called himself an Ottoman. However, Turkish elites gradually realized Anatolians were the Empire's most reliable constituency, and Christian minorities, due to European policies, were a pretext for imperial expansion. In 1876, a repeat of 1827 on a larger scale occurred, as a Balkan revolt once again drew reports in Europe of atrocities. Serbia went to war, the Ottomans defeated them, and Russia intervened to defend Serbia and Christian minorities, leading to massive territorial losses. Hundreds of thousands of Turks and Muslim Slavs became refugees. The Sultan in response to this defeat shifted to Islamic fundamentalism and disbanded reform. Paranoid of a coup, he chained the navy in harbor and refused to let the army conduct exercises, for fear they were cover for a mutiny. Nevertheless, in 1908, he was deposed in a mutiny as officers grew tired of the nepotism in the Ottoman government and wished to revive their country.
Without military exercises for years, the Ottomans performed horribly in the Italo-Turkish war. In 1912, the Balkan states realized this and defeated the Ottomans in the Balkans, leading to another refugee crisis. This led to a coup by the radical Committee of Union and Progress, led by Enver Pasha, envisioning a Turkic state stretching from Anatolia to Central Asia, aligned with Germany. Seeing Christian minorities as a pretext for European expansion, the CUP during the First World War condoned large scale violence and conducted relocations of minorities. Militarily, the Ottomans were par for the course with the other non-industrialized powers of the war: Italy, Austria, and Russia, and had ups and downs. Sarakamis was a disaster bred from amateur planning, while the Ottomans later succeeded in occupying the Caucasus. Kut and Gallipoli were unmitigated successes, while Palestine left much to be desired.
In short, while Ottoman decline has been rejected, the Ottomans became relatively less powerful in the 19th century as a combination of:
An economic policy which abdicated developmental and financial responsibility to foreigners, preventing profits from being re-invested in industry and agriculture
The opening of the Eurasian steppe through new military technology to Russian settlement
The rise of Balkan nationalism and European support
Financial responsibility, leading to crisis
Conflicts between military factions and the palace, leading to restriction of military improvement
The declining relative power of the Ottoman Empire both a political and economic problem. As you mentioned, the Ottoman Decline Theory has been discredited for decade. In the words of one historian, "any empire that has the privilege of declining for 300 years should consider itself lucky". However, it is undeniable that the Ottoman Empire of the 19th century was a far less influential state in European and politics than the Ottoman Empire of the 17th century.
There are broadly four approaches in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire after the decline theory to explain the Ottoman Empire's changing position. The first focuses on specific events having large influence. This approach is common in Turkish historiography of the Ottoman Empire, viewing the foreign intervention in favor of the Greek revolt as particularly influential as it set the precedent for European intervention to "protect" Christians in the OTtoman Empire, and the gradual loss of territory. The second is economic, focusing on changing world systems and the disruption of the traditional trade routes in favor of sea routes, as well as on Ottoman institutions that potentially delayed agricultural and industrial improvements. The third focuses on military decline, namely the decline of cavalry, the rise of the Janissaries as a political constituency which allegedly delayed modernization, and the relatively low Ottoman tax and military expenditure rates. The fourth approach focuses instead on the decline of the Sultanate as a political institution instead of the decline of the Empire as an entity on the map: borders can be deceptive, and at various points in Ottoman history, the "Ottomans" were not in control of "their" own Empire.
I will start with economics and changing world systems as the implications are the most obvious. In 1700, the Ottoman population is estimated at little over 24 million, while the Russian is estimated at around 15 million. the 1906 Ottoman census reports a population of just over 20 million, while Russia at the same time had a population over 136 million. The declining relative power of the Ottoman Empire can be explained as a case of the "rise of the rest". The opening of ocean trade routes to the Americas and Asia increased the population and trade volumes of Western European Empires, while changing military technology which gave Russia an increasing edge over the nomads of the steppe allowed for Russian settlement of the steppe that ballooned the population of that country.
Internally, historians have criticized Ottoman economic policy for stagnating industrial and agricultural growth. Since the 15th century, the Ottomans voluntarily sold economic concessions called "capitulations" to Europeans - trade rights, ownership of profitable industries, and eventually extraterritoriality to some degree. This was not like the unequal treaties imposed on East Asian nations - rather, the Ottomans handed these responsibilities over voluntarily. This was a continuation of Byzantine policy - since a Komnenid treaty with Venice exchanging rights for naval support, the Byzantines used the vastness of their internal market to extract financial and diplomatic favors from foreigners. As a result, some of the most profitable sectors of the Ottoman economy - such as the Turkish tobacco output and most of the railways - were owned by Europeans. In the late 19th century, due to the tax benefits accorded to foreign citizens, there were over 800,000 registered foreign citizens in the Ottoman Empire, the majority of whom were Ottomans who took advantage of the system. Among Ottoman subjects, disparities were also great. Of the 700 major registered businesses in Constantinople in 1913, 690 were owned by Greeks. Muslims in the Ottoman Empire were especially capital poor, which meant little could be invested to increase agricultural and industrial output. The most profitable businesses in the Empire were largely controlled by foreigners, who had the option of re-investing in their home countries. Further, low tariffs - as low as 3% for the French, the biggest exploiters of the capitulation system - suppressed local industrial competition.
The deteriorating economic situation and the increasing power of the Empire's rivals made the state's traditional responsibilities harder to maintain, leading to spending vastly beyond the Empire's means. In 1912, around four fifths of the Ottoman budget went to servicing the Empire's debt, while most of the remainder was spent on the military, with only a fraction spent on internal development. The Ottoman Empire never stopped putting on the airs of a great power, even when it did not have the economic strength to back it up. In 1875, the Ottomans still had the third largest navy in the world, despite only being the 12th largest economy.
This behavior is explained by the Ottoman administration near contempt for financial affairs. Traditionally, the Sultan was first and foremost a commander. The most common honorific for Sultans was "Gazi", "the warrior", a custom which continued long after Sultans stopped leading armies into battle. His advisers mainly made their careers in the military or administering justice in the provinces. The justice and harmony of the state and the military came first, economic matters were secondary and left to others. In the 15th century to 18th century, financial affairs in the Empire were delegated in many cases to "Phanariote" Greeks, those of the former Byzantine nobility carried over to the Ottoman administration. In the late 19th century, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was established, run by the British and French, which directly taxed the Ottoman Empire and had more employees than the Ministry of Finance. The "Ottoman Bank", the Empire's central bank that handled its currency, was owned 96.3% by the British and French.
The final approach on Ottoman decline focuses on nationalism and the power of the Sultan. In 1622, the first Janissary coup deposed Osman II after decades of growing concessions for the Janissaries. The Sultans did not regain their freedom of operation until Mahmud II's successful anti-Janissary plot in 1826. By this time, Ottoman armies were behind those of the West and the tax system was corrupt and abusive. Mahmud succeeded in addressing both, but he and his heirs faced crises that were long in the making. New literature led to national awakenings from the early to late 1800s. This disconnected the original multi-ethnic model of the Empire. The Ottomans were a single, specialized political unit. Most of the army officers were Turks, most merchants were Greeks, the craftsmen and artisans of Anatolia were largely Armenian, while most Orthodox Slavs worked the land. In 1827, foreign navies intervened in the ongoing Greek revolt in response to allegations of atrocity, which set a precedent for Europeans intervening to defend Christian minorities. This shifted the opinion of the Ottoman elite over time. In the early 1800s, almost no Turkish officer would call himself a "Turk", a derogatory term for an Anatolian farmer - he called himself an Ottoman. However, Turkish elites gradually realized Anatolians were the Empire's most reliable constituency, and Christian minorities, due to European policies, were a pretext for imperial expansion. In 1876, a repeat of 1827 on a larger scale occurred, as a Balkan revolt once again drew reports in Europe of atrocities. Serbia went to war, the Ottomans defeated them, and Russia intervened to defend Serbia and Christian minorities, leading to massive territorial losses. Hundreds of thousands of Turks and Muslim Slavs became refugees. The Sultan in response to this defeat shifted to Islamic fundamentalism and disbanded reform. Paranoid of a coup, he chained the navy in harbor and refused to let the army conduct exercises, for fear they were cover for a mutiny. Nevertheless, in 1908, he was deposed in a mutiny as officers grew tired of the nepotism in the Ottoman government and wished to revive their country.
Without military exercises for years, the Ottomans performed horribly in the Italo-Turkish war. In 1912, the Balkan states realized this and defeated the Ottomans in the Balkans, leading to another refugee crisis. This led to a coup by the radical Committee of Union and Progress, led by Enver Pasha, envisioning a Turkic state stretching from Anatolia to Central Asia, aligned with Germany. Seeing Christian minorities as a pretext for European expansion, the CUP during the First World War condoned large scale violence and conducted relocations of minorities. Militarily, the Ottomans were par for the course with the other non-industrialized powers of the war: Italy, Austria, and Russia, and had ups and downs. Sarakamis was a disaster bred from amateur planning, while the Ottomans later succeeded in occupying the Caucasus. Kut and Gallipoli were unmitigated successes, while Palestine left much to be desired.
In short, while Ottoman decline has been rejected, the Ottomans became relatively less powerful in the 19th century as a combination of:
An economic policy which abdicated developmental and financial responsibility to foreigners, preventing profits from being re-invested in industry and agriculture
The opening of the Eurasian steppe through new military technology to Russian settlement
The rise of Balkan nationalism and European support
Financial responsibility, leading to crisis
Conflicts between military factions and the palace, leading to restriction of military improvement