My Grandfather served with the Rhodesian SAS in Malaya from 1951-53. He described the men as being "trigger-happy illiterate hicks who's sole qualification for life was that they could kill the coloureds without loosing sleep over it." Was his description of the SAS truthful in their tour?

War, Policy, and Politics

“War is a mere continuation of policy by other means. We see, therefore, that war is not merely apolitical act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.” (Carl von Clausewitz) This single sentiment has been an inescapable element of how Westerners talk about strategy for centuries. Military strategy is a product of policy, policy is a product of politics, and politics is a product of society. Rhodesia’s counter-insurgency strategy reflected the policies of the Rhodesian government which itself reflected Rhodesian society; highly segregated and proudly colonial.

Rhodesia was colonized by Cecil Rhodes and his British South Africa Company (BASC) after Rhodes and the BSAC were granted exclusive mining rights in 1889. Colonial rule in Rhodesia would see the creation of a racially segregated and economically stratified system which concentrated economic and political power in the hands of a white minority. The so called “settler rule” created a deeply conservative and fiercely independent spirit within the Rhodesian white ruling class, but also a special sense of patriotism and kinship to Britain owed in no small part to Rhodesia’s status since 1923 as a self-governing colony and the shared experience of wartime service in both World Wars.

With the end of WW II, the issue of decolonization became unavoidable, however “Rhodesian politics became polarized between white Rhodesians who wanted minority ‘independence on record and black Zimbabwean nationalists who wanted rapid majority rule from the British Government.” (Evans 2007) The inescapable truth for Rhodesia’s white minority was full independence from Great Britain would only be possible with the liberalization of society and movement toward black majority rule. The unsettling of the old colonial order coupled with a rise in ethnic violence in the wake of European decolonization alarmed the Rhodesian white ruling class who felt “Everything that most of us who grew up in the last 50 years have learned to regard as sacrosanct... [British] courage, kinship, flag, Crown and the characteristic of not betraying one’s friends [has been cast aside by modern Britain] (Evans 2007) The growing schism between Rhodesia and Britain came to a head in 1965 with the Unilateral Declaration of Independence which also saw the rise of Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front party. The Rhodesian Front saw the rapid social changes in African as symptoms of perfidious external communist influence in the face of British imperial retreat. The RF staked its legitimacy and the legitimacy of its policies on the notion that Rhodesia was standing up for traditional Western-values against the specter of international communism. This thinly veiled attempt to shield to their oppressive and racist polices under a veneer of anti-communist resistance drew some foreign volunteers to the ranks of the Rhodesian Defense Forces, but little international sympathy. Independence also brought with it economic sanctions at the behest of Britain and legitimized by the United Nations. These sanctions left Rhodesia economically and diplomatically isolated

Unit Origins

The lineage of the Rhodesian SAS can be traced to the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) and the Malayan Scouts. Mike Calvert; a British officer, sought to form an SAS regiment for service in Malaya composed of men from throughout the British Empire. The Rhodesian contingent was formed from one hundred volunteers (out of an applicant pool of one thousand) who were recruited to form C Squadron Malayan Scouts. Formed in 1950 and officially stood up in 1951 under the command of Lt. Peter Walls the unit was landed at Kuala Lumpur in March before being transferred to Singapore for parachute training. The unit would spend nearly three years in Malaya before returning home in 1953 after taking only three killed in action. The experience of C Squadron in Malaya served as an introductory lesson for Rhodesia in counter-insurgency tactics. The primary mission of Mike Calvert and his Malayan Scouts were to conduct long ranging missions deep into the jungle to find and destroy Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) camps. The primary means of infiltration was to conduct long and arduous foot patrols deep into the jungle with only the slight prospect of resupply by helicopter. Although the Malayan Scouts did experiment with and use static-line para drops, even conducting drops into the dense jungle canopy. Small unit patrolling and the use of ambushes were found to be the most effective means of killing MRLA combatants. However, you can’t kill your way out of an insurgency and newfound tactical success had to be matched with a shift in strategy. Beginning in 1950 under the direction of General Harold Briggs the strategy was meant to separate the insurgents from the infrastructure (the civilian population) they depended on to survive through the use of protected villages. These protected villages were defensible, easy to monitor, and used local militias for security. The object was to win over the hearts and minds of the civilian population. Evidently this population-centric model of counterinsurgency did not leave much of an impression on the Rhodesians who in their own counter-insurgency campaign used protected-villages as a means to clear civilian areas, concentrate the population, and use the now empty spaces as a free-fire-zone. This bastardization of the fortified village program did not have the intended effect and left the civilian population more vulnerable to the insurgents. The unit was disbanded upon its return to Rhodesia in 1953.

In November 1959 the Rhodesian government took the first steps in the process of reforming the unit. The first step being the formation of the Parachute Evaluation Detachment (PED) under the supervision of the Royal Air Force and Squadron Leader E. Minter. The PED was sent to Britain for parachute training with six veteran members of the PED then sent for SAS training. This cadre formed the nucleus around which the unit would coalesce with recruits as young as seventeen and eighteen and training similar to most other special operations unit. C Squadron (Rhodesia) Special Air Service was officially stood up in August 1962. In training special emphasis was placed on endurance and field craft. These were so called "hard men" recruited for a physically and mentally demanding job and had to be creative, adaptable, and a possess the ability to think on their feet. The sensitive nature of SAS missions required men who were perceived as reliable, in racially segregated Rhodesia this meant white soldiers. Throughout the unit's history it remained all-white even into the 1970s when the Rhodesian Defense Forces became increasingly composed of black soldiers.