i understand this is quite hard to awnser because all together they all had certain Jurisdictions

I think there is some confusion here between the civilian government of Germany (ie Hitler's dictatorship) and the NSDAP, the ruling political party of Germany under Hitler's dictatorship. The dividing line between the party and the military was in practice often quite fuzzy and permeable.

Membership within the NSDAP was not compulsory within the Third Reich. Aryan Germans with no obvious political skeletons could join the party and a good many did after Hitler's ascent to the Chancellery in 1933. Now there was a certain disdain among the pre-33 NSDAP about these "Märzveilchen" (March Violets- meaning an opportunist joining in season), but there a good many of these late-comers carved out a niche within the dictatorship. The military initially held the position that it was an apolitical institution and in the thirties all NSDAP members had to resign from the party as a precondition of service. But this restriction was waived or ignored as the military expanded and rendered the apolitical nature of the Wehrmacht fictive. While the old guard senior generals may have huffed about the NSDAP's rough manners many of their subordinates were more attuned to the ideals of the NSDAP. There were multiple examples of NSDAP members serving within the armed forces during the war.

There are a number of factors that make it difficult to give a firm projection of the numbers. Destruction of documentation of membership and other personal files during the war certainly has made this process difficult. The regional nature of German recruitment where individual units from the same geographic area (Wehrkreis) makes it difficult to extrapolate a general picture as NSDAP membership could vary widely from region. NSDAP membership also fluctuated somewhat during the war because the crisis in German manpower forced the Wehrmacht to draw from younger cohorts. Accelerated officer training programs of younger troops, many of whom came of age after 1933 and were thus more socialized to National Socialism. Studies of extant cadet school members mid- and late- war show that many of them held leadership positions within the Hitler Youth and SA. The various branches of of the Wehrmacht also quite different and attracted individuals from different parts of society and had different age cohorts. Hitler reportedly quipped that he possessed a reactionary army, a monarchist navy, and a National Socialist Luftwaffe.

In general though, the officer corps' NSDAP membership hovered at around 30%. This is not surprising given that the officer corps recruited largely from the middle class and this was a sector of society which the Third Reich had made a great deal of inroads in recruitment. An important aspect of an officer's career were also officer assessments for "National Socialist convictions" in which a qualifying officer would judge the officer's commitment to the state's ideology.

Apart from membership within the party, there were other avenues of NSDAP socialization that influenced officers, and, by extension, the Wehrmacht as a whole. When the war turned against Germany, the military instituted Nationalsozialistischer Führungsoffizier (NSFO) to inculcate ideological mentality among the troops. The various organizations like the Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps (NSKK) and Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps (NSFK) (N.S. Motor and Flying Corps, respectively) were popular youth paramilitary organizations in the 1930s. These groups had a strong ideological component to them in addition to providing German youth opportunities to indulge in operating modern machinery like cars and gliders. The Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) was a compulsory youth labor service that grew out of Weimar organizations and aside from building bunkers, the RAD had a strong component of ideologically charged socialization; RAD members were to be Aryan and there was a pedagogical component to the RAD to prepare German youth for military service. This meant that a large percentage of German youth had gone through some level of National Socialist organization, some voluntary, others compulsory by the outbreak of the war. This is apparent in the NCO's level of commitment to the regime and the NSDAP leadership style. Despite being of different social background than the officers, NCOs typically had a similar degree of commitment to the regime. These multiple levels of socialization and indoctrination helped forge an ideological component to the Wehrmacht that the postwar myth of the clean Wehrmacht tried to erase.

The proponents of the clean Wehrmacht myth accentuated the tensions between the military and the dictatorship through various memoirs and popular histories in the postwar period. This friction certainly did exist and Heer officers were the bedrock of the 20 July Plot. However, the relationship between the military and the dictatorship only really soured when the war turned against Germany. Hitler did give the military much of what it wanted in the 1930s: an end to the Versailles Treaty; flagrant rearmament and massive military budgets; an end to the Republic and its left-wing enablers; and territorial revision with the East. This was a Faustian bargain for the service chiefs as rearmament exceeded the wildest dreams of the Weimar-era Reichswehr. Some of the more canny (or duplicitous) members of the armed forces establishment did make contingency plans to depose Hitler during the Sudeten crisis. But this conspiracy was predicated on external events giving these officers a pretext to intervene in the civilian government. While it is unknown if the conspiracy could have pulled this feat off, its opposition to Hitler did not really come from some secret longing among officers for the Republic. Much like the later 20 July plotters, the political ideals of the officers in the 1938 circle were a mishmash of German traditional conservatism and some far-right thinking.

The fact that Oster conspiracy folded up pretty quickly after the Munich Pact underscores the relative weakness of the loose-knit opposition of some German military chiefs vis-a-vis the dictatorship. Putting the noxious elements of the NS state aside, civilian control of the military remained intact during the Third Reich and it was never in real danger of an outright military coup. One of the salient aspects of internal SD reports of the post 20 July military was there were a great many soldiers who expressed revulsion that German officers would try to kill Hitler. Allied interrogations of POWs revealed that the 20 July plotters were not popular within the military and a good many prominent veterans would continue to label Stauffenberg and company as traitors well into the postwar period. While there were more than a few German soldiers that resented the NSDAP and its leader, they were not a majority.

Sources

Bartov, Omer. Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

_."Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich." The Journal of Modern History (1991): 44-60.

Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. Germany and the Second World War, Volume V/II: Organization and Mobilization in the German Sphere of Power, Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources 1942-1944/5 Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.

_.Germany and the Second World War, Volume IX/I Politicization, Disintegration, and the Struggle for Survival. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.