The causes of the many mutinies and coups in the Congo was only partially related to conscription. For the Congo at this time, Conscription had been a way of life. The Force Publique had conscripted men since 1880, and regularly and consistently had done so since, especially during the World Wars, when Force Publique soldiers were incorporated into Entente and Allied forces for the various African campaigns (especially German Southwest Africa and the Cameroon campaigns in the First World War, and the East Africa campaign against Italian colonial holdings in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea in the Second World War). Instead, the issues were primarily matters of race (24,000 Black soldiers were commanded by 1,100 White officers), tribalism (politics at the national level was largely dominated by tribally organized political parties), universally poor conditions and pay, as well as unreasonable expectations for change at the time of independence.

Let's tackle the matter of conscription first. During the colonial era, conscription to the Force Publique did exist. Mwelwa Musambachime writes in his article on Military Violence against Civilians: "In 1885, recruitment of the Congolese into the Force Publique began. At first it was voluntary, but due to the low pay being offered...only one-third of what was paid to government and railroad employees - few volunteers offered themselves. To augment the number of volunteers, the government resorted to conscription." These conscripts were often chosen by the chiefs ruled over by the Belgians, and "slaves, impoverished people, prisoners, criminals, the chronically ill, and mentally disturbed of the community were sent." This continued all the way through the takeover of the Congo by Belgium from Leopold. Even in 1954, according to a report found in Mushambachime: "many recruits from urban centers were assigned to the army because of their undesirable traits. The Territorial administration often recruited them in the Force [Publique] rather than send them back to the villages." Conscription in that same manner continued through the first years of the Congo's existence. Little changed in the methods and nature of the Force Publique even as it became the Armée Nationale Congolaise. It was the reality of the Congo, but it was not a defining reason that the reason for the mutinies. There were other, better, reasons to protest than simply not wanting to be there, especially when discipline broke down and desertion was a relatively easy option if one didn't want to remain.

Race was perhaps the biggest issue after independence in the Force Publique. Just days after independence, soldiers at Camp Hardy mutinied against their Belgian officers when the commander of the FP, Émile Janssens stated for the soldiers: "As I have always told you, order and discipline will be maintained as they have always been. Independence brings changes to politicians and to civilians. But for you, nothing will be changed...none of your new masters can change the structure of an army which, throughout its history, has been the most organized, the most victorious in Africa. The politicians have lied to you." These words, understandably absolutely infuriated the men and they mutinied as soon as word got back to the ranks after the meeting. Janssens words were ill-advised, but spoke to a certain truth of the matter. Prior to his statement, nothing was supposed to change with the Force Publique. Lumumba had understood that the nation simply did not have the capacity in terms of trained officers to run the military. Experienced men, white men, Belgian officers, would be required for the foreseeable future to ensure that the Congolese armed forces had any value to them. With the fervor of independence running through them, the soldiers had expected almost at once to be rid of their white officers, many of whom looked down on their Congolese men as mere savages, barely restrained by their Western discipline. And while corporal punishment from the chicote - a hide whip carried by officers and used for even the most minor of infractions- had continued all the way up until 1955 and had since been put aside, the attitudes that had come with that casual brutality remained into these early days of the independence period.

After Janssen's ill-chosen words, Lumumba had no choice in the matter. He was pressured by the soldiers, simply in order to keep even a semblance of order in the army, to abide by their several demands. Firstly, the Force Publique needed a new name. It was forthwith the Armée Nationale Congolaise - the ANC. Secondly, black officers had to be in charge. Thus, General Janssens was immediately relieved as commander-in-chief of the ANC and Victor Lundula, a Sergeant Major in the Force Publique was immediately elevated to General and put in charge, along with Joseph-Desire Mobutu, a sergeant, was made the Chief-of-Staff despite having been Lumumba's preference as Commander-in-Chief, on 9 July. Further, all Belgian officers were relieved of their posts, to be replaced by black NCOs promoted en masse to officer rank with no real training or preparation (there were only 23 officer candidates in the whole of the Congo prior to independence; and they wouldn't graduate from the Royal Military Academy until 1963). And of course, the army demanded better conditions and better pay - especially in light of a government decree by Lumumba that all government wages be increased significantly over the Belgian-era. These things they were promised, and in some cases they were made good on, but rarely in full, due to the constant financial difficulties of the Congo in this period, as it was beholden to Belgian banks for loans and had no exports to speak of except for metals, gems, and rare earths, which were very quickly taken off the table with Katangan secession on 12 July.

Tellingly, betraying the foolishness of the decisions made by Lumumba to purge the entire white officer corps from the ANC, by autumn 1960, largely due to decisions by Mobutu as chief-of-staff, who functionally was in a more political position than his nominal superior Lundula, the Belgians again were advising the Congolese military. Most notably through the presence of Louis Marlière, Mobutu's predecessor - the previous Chief-of-Staff in the Force Publique. Other foreigners were also integral to the functioning of the ANC in this period, including the Moroccan general Ben Hammou Kettani, who was in charge through the autumn of 1960 of much of the UN military operation.

Tribalism was another huge aspect of the strife within the Force Publique at independence. According to the report put out by Sandra Meditz and Tim Merril in 1994, prior to Belgian control, "ethnic distinctions among the inhabitants of the Congo area had always been fluid: the concept of who was or was not a member of a specific ethnic group had never been as rigid as Europeans believed." However, the colonial government "acted as if rigid distinctions did exist" and used them to divide and set the various tribes and regions against each other during the colonial period. "The European emphasis on ethnic identity helped reinforce the concept of such an identity among the Congolese." This enforced identity, codified in identity cards and government policies that favored certain ethnic groups over others, fomented a certain friction amongst Congolese society. According to Meditz and Merril, this was accentuated with the growing urbanization of the Congolese population. As immigrants flocked to the cities, they "came into contact on the one hand with other individuals with whom they shared language, culture, and history and on the other with quite different peoples. To promote their culture and to offer mutual support, these people formed ethnically based associations, the benefits of which they communicated to family and friends who had remained behind in rural areas." These communities, associations, these cultural support groups, became the basis in 1958 with certain political liberalizations of the creation of the tribally-affiliated political parties that dominated the Congo's political scene after independence. With ethnic identity being such a huge aspect of social life, it seeped into the military as well, with tribal favoritism elevating some groups over others, often in tune with who was in power at the Presidential and Prime Ministerial levels. This tribal power-struggle wasn't confined to just the political, it seeped over into the military as well. As the Congo fractured, units consisting of soldiers from various tribes often agitated as a means of support for their tribal brothers. In some cases units even defected wholesale, including very senior leaders, especially after the Lumumbist split after the imprisonment of Patrice Lumumba in November 1960.