Replaced Fredendall with Patton. First and foremost, Fredendall was a poor commander. Patton's initial assesment was that Fredendall just had bad luck, someone was going to be in command and learn the following lessons the hard way. He later revised this opinion, thinking Fredendall was simply stuck in his ways and bordered on incompetent.
Directive to maintain forward command posts much closer to the actual battle to improve communication speed. Fredendall had built a massive fortified command structure over 50 miles from the front lines. He camped out there, rarely visiting the front-lines or trusting the feedback of his commanders who were at the front. Eisenhower later pushed back, sending a memo "even generals must assume personal risk in combat".
Commanders given more latitude to engage or break off without approval of headquarters (copying something the British were doing effectively, but often held the Russians back during the same era). Fredenhall had maintained a very top-down command structure that limited response time. He also frequently ignored his field commander's feedback.
Keep units massed for support where possible as opposed to holding a spread line or dotted outposts. Artillery was widely regarded as Americans best asset at the time. We had more artillery on the field, and it was of better quality, with solid leadership, compared to German or Italian units. Artillery was always held reasonably safely behind the lines, grouped together for mutual defense. Yet soldiers were spread out, holding a long battle line and dotted defensive outposts. Would make sense to spread the artillery to support the troops where they are, or group the troops closer to their support units. The latter was the safest choice and was a suggested revision.
More on-call air and artillery support. The belief was that we would trade small tactical opportunities (by not being at every defensive outpost or point along a battle line at all times) in exchange for actually being massed and CAPABLE of a major opportunistic and safer en-masse counter attack at any time.
All of this developed throughout the war (including lessons learned elsewhere) to represent a major rethinking of American military doctrine. Keep troops en masse, well-supplied, SAFE, but ready to be opportunistic on a large scale. Be prepared with overwhelming support, ready to do it's job at a moment's notice. Empower unit and brigade commanders in the field to show initiative - trust lower-level leaders to make good decisions.
This is an excellent book on the topic and the primary source I was thinking of in repeating.
I’ll just list some of the most obvious ones, as the entire campaign in North Africa from November 1942 to May 1943 was a learning experience for American forces.
1.) The armored division was reorganized
The U.S. armored division as it appeared in the campaigns in North Africa in late 1942 and 1943 was an overly large (14,620 men) and poorly balanced organization. Tanks are vulnerable without infantry protection and vice versa. The “heavy” armored division had eighteen companies of tanks but only nine companies of armored infantry, a 2 : 1 ratio. After the campaigns in North Africa, it was realized that the amount of infantry given to the division in relation to the amount of tanks it had (232 medium and 158 light) was insufficient. In September 1943, the armored divisions still stateside (the 4th through 20th) were reorganized under a new “light” table of organization and equipment, shedding their regimental structure and six companies of tanks. The division now had 168 medium tanks and 77 light tanks, and total strength was reduced to 10,937 men. The tank-infantry ratio was reduced to 3 : 2. Armored division commanders, even with the reduction, were consistently screaming for more infantry to work with their tanks; armored infantry, as they were more mobile, suffered from high rates of combat exhaustion.
The “excess” tank battalions generated by the breakup of 26 armored regiments became various types of other units, chiefly separate tank battalions, or were inactivated and had their personnel spread around to other units. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Armored Divisions were exempt from this sweeping reorganization as they were already overseas. Before D-Day, the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions shuffled the companies in their armored regiments so instead of having one three-company light battalion and two three-company medium battalions per regiment, they had three like battalions, each with two medium companies and one light company. The 1st Armored Division converted to the new light structure while resting after liberating Rome in July 1944. Separate tank battalions were also reorganized as well; the idea of having two separate types of three-company battalions (medium and light) went by the wayside and a new, four-company (three medium and one light) battalion structure was introduced.
2.) Elements of the infantry division were reorganized
The “triangular” infantry division structure first adopted by the Regular Army in 1939-1940 and the National Guard and Organized Reserve in 1942-1943 saw only minor overall changes after North Africa, nothing approaching the changes seen in the armored divisions. New tables of organization and equipment was issued for the infantry division on 1 March 1943 and 15 July 1943. They superseded the table of organization and equipment of 1 April 1942. The only major externally visible change was a reduction in overall strength from 15,514 men (15,423 taking into account subordinate unit changes through October 1942), to 13,412 men, and then up to 14,253 men. The organization of the subordinate units remained substantially the same.
1 March 1943
| Unit | Officers-warrant officers-enlisted men |
|---|---|
| Division headquarters | 33-8-1 |
| Division headquarters company | 3-0-158 |
| Infantry regiment | 141-6-2,491 |
| Infantry regiment | 141-6-2,491 |
| Infantry regiment | 141-6-2,491 |
| Division artillery | 134-9-1,861 |
| Medical battalion | 37-2-430 |
| Engineer combat battalion | 29-3-632 |
| Cavalry reconnaissance troop, mechanized | 6-0-147 |
| Quartermaster company | 9-0-143 |
| Ordnance light maintenance company | 9-1-137 |
| Signal company | 7-4-215 |
| Military police platoon | 3-0-70 |
| Band | 0-2-56 |
The T/O&E of 15 July 1943 incorporated only minor organizational changes in the division. The most visible addition was a headquarters, special troops, to provide a point of reference for the staffs of the division headquarters company, the quartermaster company, the ordnance light maintenance company, the signal company, the military police platoon, and the band.
15 July 1943
| Unit | Officers-warrant officers-enlisted men |
|---|---|
| Division headquarters | 38-8-0 |
| Infantry regiment | 139-5-2,974 |
| Infantry regiment | 139-5-2,974 |
| Infantry regiment | 139-5-2,974 |
| Division artillery | 138-9-2,072 |
| Medical battalion | 35-2-429 |
| Engineer combat battalion | 29-3-632 |
| Cavalry reconnaissance troop, mechanized | 6-0-149 |
| Headquarters, special troops | 2-0-7 |
| Medical detachment, special troops | 3-0-13 |
| Division headquarters company | 4-0-209 |
| Quartermaster company | 10-0-183 |
| Ordnance light maintenance company | 9-1-137 |
| Signal company | 7-4-215 |
| Military police platoon | 3-0-70 |
| Band | 0-2-56 |
| Chaplain | 1-0-0 |
3.) Certain pieces of stopgap or old equipment were abandoned as purpose-built or new equipment became available, with corresponding changes in units
Replacement of the remaining M1917 and M1918 howitzers (American versions of the World War I-era French Canon de 155 C modèle 1917 Schneider) with the American-designed and built 155 mm howitzer M1.
Replacement of the T19 and T30 105 mm and 75 mm howitzer motor carriages in armored divisions and infantry divisions. Each armored regiment had 12 T30s, three in each battalion headquarters and three in the regimental reconnaissance platoon. The cannon companies of the infantry regiments each had four T30s and two T19s. In the armored division, the M7 105 mm self-propelled howitzer took over the role of the T19 and the T30 was retired, while in the infantry division, the cannon companies of the infantry regiments became towed units, receiving the new M3 105 mm light howitzer.
Retirement of the M3 75 mm gun motor carriage and M6 37 mm gun motor carriage in favor of the M10 in tank destroyer battalions. The original “mixed” tank destroyer battalion of June 1942, with three companies, each company having two platoons of M6 37 mm gun motor carriages and one platoon of M3 75 mm gun motor carriages, was abandoned almost immediately after operations in North Africa began in November 1942. The three tank destroyer companies were entirely equipped with M3s, and later M10s as they became available. The initial tank destroyer battalion T/O&E, with its excess of “security” troops and organic antiaircraft guns, was superseded in January 1943.
The initial deployment of the M1 bazooka was kind of an adventure
In November 1942 General Marshall informed General McNair that “bazookas” were issued at the last minute to troops in Task Force A without anybody knowing how to use them or even what they were for.
Sources:
Gabel, Christopher R. Seek, Strike, and Destroy: American Tank Destroyer Doctrine During World War II. Fort Leavenworth: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1985.
Sayen, John U.S. Army Infantry Divisions 1942-43. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006.
Wiley, Bell I. The Army Ground Forces: Preparation of Units for Overseas Movement, Study No. 21. Washington: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946.
Zaloga, Steven J. M3 Infantry Half-Track 1940–1973. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1994.
Zaloga, Steven J. U.S. Armored Units in the North African and Italian Campaigns 1942-45. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2006.
Zaloga, Steven J. U.S. Tank and Tank Destroyer Battalions in the ETO 1944-45. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005.
