I have commented previously several times on U.S. Army manpower quality and the distribution of that quality here, here, here, here, here, and here (not an exhaustive list).

In general, the Army Ground Forces, divisions in particular, got screwed when it came to receiving an equal distribution of the manpower entering the Army. Efforts were made beginning in late 1943 to improve the psychological and physical classification system of the Army, but it came too late to affect the majority of it, as acquisition of manpower and activation of new units slowed down considerably after mid-1943.

The Army General Classification Test was designed to be a measure of "a compound of native endowments with the effects of schooling and social experience, amounting to "intelligence" in the popular and practical sense in which it was useful to the Army." Problems in three categories tested the soldier's grasp of vocabulary and its meaning, mathematical problems, and relationships between objects in space. It was designed around a normal curve, with an average score being 100. Class I and II was from where officer candidates would be drawn (a score above 110 was required for admission to officer candidate school), while the best noncommissioned officers could be expected to also come from Class I and II, and some from Class III.

I	II	III	IV	V
7%	24%	38%	24%	7%

Grade	Score	Description
I	130+	Very superior
II	110+	Superior
III	90-109	Average
IV	60-89 (70-89 before July 1942)	Inferior
V	59 and below (69 and below before July 1942)	Very inferior

Before February 1942, when the Army Air Forces was allowed to to siphon off large numbers of the most intelligent and mechanically apt men, all the ground combat arms received a fair cross-section of the national manpower;

During the six months preceding 1 March 1942 men inducted into the Army (white only) were distributed by AGCT score as follows:

Class	I	II	III	IV and V	Total
Percent	7.6	29.2	32.7	30.5	100.0
Distribution to the ground arms was:
Armored	7.6	28.8	33.3	30.3	100.0
Cavalry	7.5	28.5	31.4	32.6	100.0
Field Artillery	6.8	27.5	32.3	33.4	100.0
Infantry	7.3	28.4	32.5	31.8	100.0
Coast Artillery	6.8	27.3	32.6	33.3	100.0

Distribution for all white men inducted in the six months following March 1942 was:

--	I	II	III	IV and V	Total
National average (white only)	7.0	27.4	32.4	33.2	100.0

But the first eleven infantry divisions (white only) activated by the Army Ground Forces (from March to July 1942 inclusive) received men distributed as follows:

--	I	II	III	IV and V	Total
Eleven divisions	5.3	24.3	33.1	37.3	100.0

For the first five divisions activated in September 1942 distributions fell to:

--	I	II	III	IV and V	Total
Five divisions	3.8	23.0	31.2	42.0	100.0

The same situation prevailed throughout 1943. Figures for all white men assigned by reception centers in that year showed that all the combat arms stood below all the services and that divisions stood at the bottom of the entire list.

This was thanks in part to War Department manpower policy;

The War Department desired that all arms and services receive an adequate proportion of the more intelligent men from whom officers might be developed. Instructions to reception centers read:

“Mental ability will be distributed proportionately to all replacement training centers and units after occupational specialists required by installation or unit of assignment have been supplied, except when specifically directed to the contrary by the War Department. Particular attention will be given to the necessity of sending to the various arms and services all men who appear to have the proper qualifications for officer candidates in the respective arms and services.”

But the "after" clause in the first sentence, by which men with established vocations went largely into the services, and the "except" clause, by which men of high mental ability went in disproportionate numbers to the Air Forces, meant that however evenly the reception centers distributed the remaining mental ability the combat ground arms would obtain less than their share of the total. The percentage of enlisted men "who appeared to have the proper qualifications for officer candidates" was in fact lower in the combat ground arms than in the rest of the Army.

The premature allocation of intelligent, mechanically apt men to the Army Air Forces and men with established civilian trades to the Army Service Forces meant that the men not having a civilian job which corresponded to a military occupation or bereft of all employment, "unless lack of established occupation was due to youth," were left until last and sent to the combat arms, which had high percentages of men assigned military occupations which had no civilian equivalents. They "were not likely to be the most desirable human material." A survey of 12,000 men from replacement training centers and units of the ground combat arms at Fort George G. Meade, MD, in November 1943 found that they were below the Army average in height, weight, AGCT score, and level of education.

Attempts in late 1943 to improve the quality of manpower being assigned to the ground combat arms included the suggestion of "combat pay" and the title of "Fighter" in the Infantry, as well as the assignment of no men under 5 feet, 6 inches tall (later 5 feet, 9 inches tall) to the Infantry. These efforts proved unsuccessful. In November 1943, the Expert Infantryman Badge and Combat Infantryman Badge, which awarded excellence in infantry training and in actual ground combat with the enemy, were introduced. In March 1944 reception centers were ordered to assign the physically strongest men regardless of civilian occupation to the Infantry, coinciding with the widespread introduction of the PULHES physical profile system which more accurately measured each man's physical and mental qualities to fit him into the military occupation that was most suitable. Extra monthly pay for men who had received the EIB and CIB was approved by legislation in June 1944.

The Army's preferred pool of manpower, first men from the ages of 18 to 37, and then men from the ages of 18 to 25, particularly those 21 and under, became severely depleted by the end of 1944. The quality of manpower also experienced a steady decline as standards for service were reduced.

The last 9 infantry divisions to be sent to the European Theater are evidence of War Department “band aids” on its manpower policy; stripping divisions at home for overseas replacements sometimes multiple times; refilling them with new inductees, in 1944 almost all newly 18 years old or as old or older than 26 years of age, many of the older men having one or multiple children; infusions of tank destroyer, coast artillery, antiaircraft, Army Air Forces, and Army Specialized Training Program personnel converted to infantry; bolstering them with men who volunteered (read: ne’er-do-wells who had sometimes seen service with 6 or more divisions, and who were "urged" by their commanders) for transfer to the infantry from other branches.

All the divisions turned out by the Army Ground Forces had a year or more in training, but, in the case of the youngest...the...organizations were hardly more than frames - and loose ones at that - in which successive installments of infantrymen were processed for service overseas as individual replacements. And when finally they were sent overseas, these divisions, far from being groups of individuals welded by a year's...training into...teams, were...crazy-quilt conglomerations hastily assembled from sundry sources, given a smattering of training and loaded on transports....

Div.	EM in Regts since Jan 44	EM from IRTCs during past 30 days	EM from ASTP or AAF with approx 5 mo inf tng in div	EM of other arms, principally AAA with approx 4 mos inf tng
69th	25%	25%	25%	25%
76th	20%	30%	15%	35%
65th	20%	20%	30%	30%
63rd	40%	20%	15%	25%
70th	25%	35%	15%	25%
42nd	25%	20%	20%	40%
89th	23%	17%	20%	40%
65th	30%	20%	10%	40%
71st	25%	20%	15%	40%

Major General Emil F. Reinhardt lamented the situation of his 65th Infantry Division in early November 1944;

The Division that I gave basic training to is no longer here....The last time I checked up on personnel turnover, this Division had furnished over 10,000 men for other duties and had sent out enough officers to fill one and one-half divisions....Personnel turnover prevented the making of a team out of this Division. Our situation is comparable to that of a football coach who has to turn over his team to other institutions a few weeks before the playing season starts. He wires for replacements. He gets two players from one college, three from another, and so on down the line. The pickings are so bad at this late date that he gets a miscellany of misfits and culls. He has to put backfield men in the line and linemen in the backfield. He can't be expected to make a team under such circumstances.