I'll try to answer about the Ottoman Empire, sorry if it doesn't satisfy you. However it's quite general and delving more into it also meaning delving into diplomatic relationships between Imperial Japan and the Ottoman Empire, which i can say a lot of it by describing each phases individually, but that's not the main point of your question...
The relationship and subsequently view of the Japanese to the Ottomans generally can be divided into four phases: one is the early contacts between the 1870s to the 1880s. As the newly established Meiji Japan wanted to get rid of the unequal treaties signed by the Tokugawa government, this phase reflects Japanese lack of great power status and how it views itself as a pupil of the world finding knowledge and solution to it's problems. The Japanese approach to the Ottoman state was cautious, curious, and consisted mainly of gift exchanges and proclamations of friendship without much self-assurance in the ability to offer more than that to a fellow Asian country while at the same time viewed the Ottomans as an inferior Asian country and tried to establish treaties to their own benefit.
The second phase was initiated by the Ertuğrul diplomatic mission from the Ottomans and it's tragic end. The rescue of the Ertuğrul was the first time the the Japanese shows its new power to the Ottomans, and the latter was undoubtedly impressed. For the Japanese, the Ottomans were often a more trustworthy partner than Europeans or Russians, and they had withhold in both Europe and Asia. Repeated declaration of friendship by the Japanese with the Ottoman Empire may have uttered to conceal their strategic motives, but the Ottomans still weren't fooled by this.
The third is after the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05. Japan has obtained great power status and inspired pan-Asian sentiment amongst non-Europeans. They were by now a colonial and imperial military power to be reckoned with and that encouraged Ottoman interest in diplomacy just as it generated European unease. Japan’s sponsoring of a conference of religions in Tokyo in 1906 fueled Muslim optimism for Japanese conversion to Islam (yes, that was a thing) just as it triggered further animosity and distrust on the part of the West. However at the end still no official treaties signed and pan-Asian sentiment were only limited to local populace and some higher-ups
The final phase is initiated by the Young Turk revolution in 1908. The Young Turks, viewing themselves as ruling oligarchy in charge of a constitutional state, the Young Turk leadership remained unwilling to sacrifice the interests and integrity of the Empire in order to gain an alliance with Japan. For Japan, the Ottoman Empire were now perceived as one of several regions of Asia to be investigated for strategic purposes and now perceiving themselves in a position of superiority, Japan insisted upon conditions for an alliance that were unreasonable. Both sides remained uncompromising in their demands as no treaty was ever signed. But both sides continued to demonstrate rituals of “diplomatic civility”, gifts, medals, and other niceties were exchanged between the two powers as a show of their status as modern states deserving of Great Power recognition. After 1910, the Japanese seem to have lost interest altogether in forging an official treaty with the Ottoman Empire, probably due to their increasing involvement in their own colonial endeavors in the Far East.
For example, an overview of the first phase. One of the purposes of the Japanese Iwakura mission of 1871-73 was to create a temporary legal code concerning court cases between foreign and local citizens and the interpreter of the Iwakura Mission Fukuchi Gen-ichirō hoped to create one based on the Ottoman mixed court system. Apparently in Constantinople he was denied access to Ottoman laws and so he analyzed the Egyptian one instead. In the aftermath, Fukuchi submitted a detailed report of Ottoman and Egypt and their court system, of which he suggested the foreign ministry to adopt similar system with a few revisions. In 1876, the Japanese foreign minister Terashima Munenori and Prime Minister Sanjo Sanetomi started considering the benefits of establishing diplomatic ties with the Ottomans,
...from whom we can learn much, since they, as a non-Christian, non-Western nation who resemble the Japanese, have diplomatic ties with the Europeans
Munenori sent a letter to the Japanese ambassador to Britain Ueno instructing him to discreetly approach the Ottoman ambassador to London about the enactment of an "agreement of friendship" between the two countries. A year after the Japanese-Ottoman naval exercise in 1878, the Japanese sent another mission to Persia and the Ottoman Empire under Yoshida Masaharu to investigate opening trade relations. However, a memo from Japanese foreign minister made it clear that this is not only a trade investigation (as Yoshida was instructed not to conclude any trade agreements), but primarily to investigate power politics and rivalries between the British and the Russians that were often played in the Ottoman Empire and Persia. The Yoshida Mission in fact spent a lot of time inspecting the Persian and Ottoman border areas with Russia in anticipation of a future conflict with Russia over control of the Korean Peninsula. Yoshida had an audience with Sultan Abdülhamid II in March 1881, in which he was instructed not to to extend more than Japan’s gratitude for Ottoman cordiality shown to the Japanese naval officers during the exercise. Letters of gratitude were exchanged between Asım Pasha and Japanese minister of foreign affairs Inoue Kaoru. The exchange was merely expression of aspirations and nothing conclusive, but the Sultan’s hospitality and Ottoman officials' attitude convinced the Japanese of their need to pursue 'friendly' relationship. Yoshida then submitted his report to Japanese envoy in St. Petersburg Yanagihara Yoshimitsu, who ini turn interviewed Ottoman ambassador there Şakir Pasha. The interview clearly demonstrated Japanese interest on how the Ottomans extended their capitulatory privileges. Later in May 1881, the Japanese submitted a proposal for commercial treaty to Şakir Pasha in which it suggested starting negotiations in a location the Ottomans would prefer and that disagreements in terms to be worked out by the Grand Vezir and his Japanese equivalent, with a final approval by the Sultan. However, problems arose when the proposal assumed that the Japanese will be granted "The most favoured nation" status. Grand Vizier Said Pasha felt that it would not be an obstacle commercially, but legally it would be a disadvantage to the Ottomans as Japanese citizens residing in Ottoman Empire will be fall under Consular Court jurisdiction due to established Capitulatory practice, the few Ottoman citizens resident in Japan would fall under local Japanese jurisdiction. He suggested an amendment to the proposal stipulating that international law would govern Japanese citizens in Ottoman territories. However, negotiations bogged down as the Japanese, themselves still in the process of renegotiating their own Unequal Treaties with the European Powers, intended to present themselves as a power deserving the same concessions. They did not appear to consider the Ottomans as equals, but as a lesser Asian country, on par with China, which had already accepted a political-commercial agreement that granted Japan favored-nation status. The Ottomans who were also in process of abolishing capitulatory practices of course refused to concede, and negotiations broke down. Over the next several years, exchanges of imperial medals and other gifts were the only signs of contact between the two powers, to increase "friendly relations" including during the visit of a member of the Japanese royal family to Constantinople in 1887.
Sources:
Ottomans Imagining Japan by Renee Worringer