How did Fascist Italy go from 1933 when they saw Zionism and Jews as potential partners in the middle east to undermine British influence to 1938 when they introduced racial laws against the Jews ? Where those anti-semitic laws popular among the population or they were considered too extreme ?

by RutilantBoss

In the specific, Fascists were sympathetic to revisionist Zionism, they were against Social Zionism (AKA the kind of Zionism supported by David Ben-Gurion, the founding father of modern Israel)

ghostofherzl

The largely unpopular Revisionist Zionist movement and the Fascists in Italy had a very short, ill-fated tryst of sorts. It's an interesting and understudied (in my view) connection, as is the effect of the Holocaust on Italian Jews, but that's another story I also think is understudied (or if not, at least not nearly as well-known).

The tryst began in 1922, with the Revisionist Zionist leader (Vladimir Jabotinsky) being sent by the World Zionist Organization to try and court Mussolini to the Zionist cause. This was not out of some special role for Jabotinsky or Mussolini; Zionist representatives were sent off in various directions to try and woo European leaders, particularly those heading what were considered rising powers like Italy. Jabotinsky, it is worth noting, would eventually leave the WZO over differences of opinion on Zionism, again illustrating that he was not very central in ideology to Zionism on the whole (which is even further reflected in Israel's history, but that too is another story). At any rate, the meeting with Mussolini didn't happen, so Jabotinsky sent a letter, where he tried to explain why Mussolini should support Zionism, and where he acknowledged that Mussolini was opposed to Zionism but should not be. So began a courtship that, as I said, lasted a fairly short time.

Mussolini was, as far as I can tell, a believer that the Arabs were natural allies of Italy, and therefore not supportive of Zionism. This shifted by the 1930s, and Zionism was increasingly viewed with favor. Mussolini was foreign minister in 1933, in addition to running Italy, and began to circulate propaganda that supported a Jewish state. This was not because of Jabotinsky. Jabotinsky never managed to actually meet Mussolini, despite his best efforts. By contrast, Mussolini did meet with some of the Labour Zionist leadership (like Chaim Weizmann), who went on to found Israel. Even so, Mussolini remained apparently suspicious of Labour Zionists, and more sympathetic to Revisionist Zionism, because of the Revisionist hostility to Britain. While he met with Labour Zionists, he undertook a policy that favored Revisionists in action, allowing them to study in Italy's Maritime School, though he refused more conventional Zionists.

All of this was not because Mussolini was "swayed" after all by Jabotinsky or anyone else. Instead, it appears to have been a nakedly political calculation. Jabotinsky evidently hoped that he could use Revisionist Zionists against Labour Zionism and against the British, and also felt that it would enhance his international standing to take a stand in the question of Zionism and to meet with Labour Zionist leaders. All of this never dulled his suspicions of Zionists, with his views of "dual loyalty" still being quite clear.

The tryst of sorts, which never resulted in any concrete Italian support and which was more of Mussolini's strategic musing than anything else, ended when Mussolini made the decision to ally with the Nazis. The transition was quickly made, with internal propaganda organs first launching broadsides against the loyalties of Zionist Jews, and seamlessly transitioning from there to attacks on Jews overall. Mussolini appears to have never been forced into this position by the Nazis; it was not a condition of an alliance, for example. However, he appears to have figured that Zionism would not serve him nearly so well as an alliance with the Nazis, and judged that racial laws would help (along with cutting British and French ties) show how seriously he wanted that alliance.

There were a couple of other reasons why Mussolini met with Weizmann, and not with Jabotinsky. One was that Weizmann was a chemist who had helped Britain's chemical processes during WWI, and was sought-after by Mussolini to help Italy's chemical industries. His development of acetone processes in WWI was crucial to Britain's war industry, by most accounts, and Mussolini sought his friendship. Weizmann had no real interest in this, and made very clear by 1934 that he was keeping his distance from Mussolini and anyone who appeared even the slightest bit sympathetic to the Nazis. Weizmann, one of the Labour Zionist movement's most prominent leaders, said quite clearly in December 1934 that:

I have never either directly or indirectly offered or mentioned anything to the Italian Government about it [the Palestine mandate] and would certainly not do it, whether our own Government [Britain] is interested or not! There is every reason not to deal with the Italians in a matter of this kind.’

This is part of why Mussolini's subsequent actions, like those involving allowing the Revisionists to study in Italy, were targeted as they were to favor Revisionism.

Another reason for the eventual shift towards antisemitism, besides the Nazi alliance, is worth mentioning. The Ethiopian crisis of 1935-36 is mentioned by Vincenzo Pinto in "Between imago and res: The Revisionist-Zionist Movement's Relationship with Fascist Italy, 1922–1938" as a particularly formative moment in the relationship. By September 1935, the Revisionists had separated from the World Zionist Organization and started their own, much less popular "New Zionist Organization" (NZO). At the time, most Jews of prominence were quite opposed to Italian actions in Ethiopia, and were supportive of sanctions on Italy. Jabotinsky attempted to distinguish the NZO, saying he believed Italy must win, and to highlight the anti-British bent of the NZO. Thus when Jabotinsky met with the head of the Ethiopian office in Italy he was able to get a recommendation sent to Mussolini that Italy should support the Revisionist movement. Despite some softening in his views, Mussolini still would not meet with Jabotinsky, and NZO outreach to Italy continued. However, as opposition to the Italian actions and support among Jews for sanctions grew more cemented, Mussolini found it harder to separate amongst the movements. This, coupled with the Nazi outreach, made it harder and harder to envision supporting the NZO. There was little to be gained from responding to the NZO's courting at this point, and Italy continued to drift in the manner I mentioned above.

I mainly source this from The Jewish Radical Right by Eran Kaplan and The Italians and the Holocaust by Susan Zuccotti, along with the aforementioned article. Let me know if you have questions!

Also happy cake day to me I guess? Didn't realize!