These types of arguments are examples of nationalistic bias. The United States isn’t immune to it, some Australian historians also exaggerate the role that the Australians played during the war. Those historians tend to be what we call popular historians and they write books that people want to buy because it makes the reader feel proud of their country. Journalists also aren’t immune to this, writing articles such as the one you posted helps to sell copies of the publication.

The United States, while playing a not inconsequential role in Germany’s defeat, did not play the decisive part. That position falls to the British Naval Blockade which starved Germany of critical material for war production, the collapse of Germany’s allies and the British and French offensives (supported by the newly arrived Americans) of 1918.

What the United States did do upon entering the war was ensure that the Allies war effort could continue into 1919 if necessary. Your article is correct where it states that the British and French were in dire straits regarding manpower and the possibility of the war continuing into 1919 was a very serious issue. The United States’ declaration of war brought with it the promise of an enormous manpower pool. Had the war continued into 1919, the United States would very likely have taken on the lion’s share of offensive actions.

That was not the case however. By 1917, the Germans were already feeling the pressure that the British Naval Blockade placed on the country. Germany relied on imported material such as fertilisers, foodstuffs, machine goods and livestock. Of particular importance was machine lubricants which Germany needed to maintain their production of war material. Without these imports, Germans suffered both at home and on the front lines. I once saw a figure that estimated the death toll inflicted by the blockade being in excess of 700,000. I doubt that includes front line soldiers whose deaths were caused by shortages or defective weapons and ammunition. This doesn’t even take into account the impact such shortages had on morale.

The German Spring Offensive, while initially devastating in regards to the amount of ground taken by the Germans, lacked an overall objective and ran out of steam as advancing infantry outran both their artillery and supply lines (not to mention the amount of looting and drunkenness that occurred as the Germans overran Allied supply dumps). While the Americans were involved in countering the offensive, the majority of the fighting was conducted by the British and French with the Americans (newly arrived and as yet untested in battle) filled gaps in the line left by redeployed French units.

The Americans were involved in blunting the German attack in the Marne but it has to be said that the French knew about the attack through observation and captured German troops. While the Germans had some successes, the French, with some American support, quite thoroughly stopped the attack in its tracks before launching their own massive offensive with the support of the Americans. The Americans had an outstanding success at Saint-Mihiel where they thoroughly crushed the German occupied salient, though again it should be noted that the Germans were in the process of withdrawing from the salient in order to shorten their line and were caught by surprise. That however, in no way diminishes the American success but perhaps does not best reflect the American fighting ability.

A better demonstration is the Meuse-Argonne Offensive which saw a staggering 1.2 million American and French soldiers advance on German lines. This attack was of great significance in the final days of the war but was not the metaphorical straw that broke the German Empire’s back. Furthermore, the novice status of the American Expeditionary Force was fully displayed during the battle as outdated tactics and the inexperience of the units deployed led to high American casualties. At the same time, further north, the Australia Corps was going into action alongside two American divisions at the St Quentin Canal. The canal formed part of the Hindenburg Line, the last major German defends network on the Western Front and the major objective of the Allies. The Hindenburg Line was breached at the Battle of Bellicourt Tunnel by the Australians and the Americans with major support from British units. This achievement, more then any other, cemented the Allied dominance on the Western strong and signalled the inevitable defeat that forced Germany to sign the armistice.

As u/TheWellSpokenMan points out, this appears to be a work of popular history with a strong nationalist bias. Though I'm somewhat dismayed that he actually appears to be a professor of history.

Some of the claims made in the article are worth dissecting.

the Doughboys and Marines went into action at Château-Thierry and Belleau Wood and stopped the German onslaught on the Marne.

The Second Battle of the Marne was primarily a French battle, involving 44 French Divisions, supported by 8 American, 4 British and 2 Italian Divisions. This was a massive effort and the two relatively small actions at Château-Thierry and Belleau Wood were not the deciding factors.

Had these actions been fought a run-of-the-mill French units, they would likely have passed into history almost unremarked.

With Haig facing defeat in Flanders, actually warning London in April 1918 that the British had their “backs to the wall,” American troops— the manpower equivalent of over 100 French or British divisions—permitted Foch to shift otherwise irreplaceable French troops to the British sector, where a dazed Tommy, sniffing the tang of the sea air over the stink of the battlefield and apprised that Haig had spoken of British backs to the wall, replied, with a glance at the English Channel, “what bloody wall?”

Where to even start with this one?

Although there were 430,000 American troops in France in April 1918, there is a big difference between simply having men in country, and actually having a trained and proficient army in the line.

At the time in question, there were 5 American Divisions active. These were either put into reserve attached to the French, or took over quiet sectors enabling the French to give some assistance to the BEF.

Between March and April, approximately 3,000 US troops were in action across the Somme and Lys.

The claim that the US freed up the equivalent of 100 divisions is somewhat hard to reconcile with reality.

Moving on, Haig was not "warning London" about anything. He was issuing a rallying cry to his troops, and no British troops fought within sight or sniffing distance of the Channel.

As the quote is unsourced, it would be wise to dismiss it as a fabrication.

The American battle in the Meuse-Argonne, from September 26 to November 11, 1918, pierced the most redoubtable section of the Hindenburg Line, reached Sedan on both banks of the Meuse (etc.)

As before, having a large number of men in country, and having an effective army are two different things.

Britain and the US shared a common problem in that they both had small armies when they went to war, and had to rapidly expand them. The US had the advantage of coalition partners it could learn from, but Pershing viewed his partners as weakened by years of trench warfare and was reluctant to learn from them.

According to Pershing, it was the infantryman with his rifle and aggressive spirit that would "drive the enemy from his trenches, and by the same tactics, defeat him in the open".

In the words of Liddel-Hart "He thought he was spreading a new gospel of faith, when in fact it was an old faith exploded"

The men of the AEF would pay a high price for their tactical naivety. One German source remarked "The American infantry is very unskillful in the attack. It attacks in thick columns in numerous waves echeloned in depth, preceded by tanks. This sort of attack offer excellent objectives for the fire of our artillery, infantry, and machine guns."

Far from being a 'matador thrust' the offensive bogged down quickly with the French making much faster progress than the AEF. Cooke, in Pershing and His Generals, contradicts Wawro stating that the AEF was "dangerously close to played out" by the armistice.

Muese-Argonne can be seen as the American's Somme. The first large scale offensive by a green army that had yet to learn its craft and would pay the price in blood. The AEF was making elementary mistakes like failing to mop up after an advance, and finding they were receiving fire from their rear. This is exactly the kind of mistakes the BEF learned to avoid during the Somme, and as with the BEF and the Somme, had the war gone on another year, the AEF would have shouldered the brunt of the offensive action, just as the BEF did in 1917.

Muese-Argonne was a significant part of the 100 days offensive, but it was not the decisive battle, being one amongst many.

The October, the Belgians had renewed their offensive and were making steady progress. The BEF's 4th Army was over the Selle, and 2nd Army was over the Lys, with 5th and 3rd Armies also making progress.

On the 4th of November, the 17 British and 11 French Divisions smashed through the Germans at the Sambre effectively denying the Germans the chance to re-form a new defensive line on the Meuse, after which they would advance rapidly by up to 5 miles a day.

TL;DR - The direct American military contribution, while not insignificant, was not the decisive factor in ending the war. The chief American contribution to victory being in morale and materiel rather than military factors.

Edit - its worth pointing out by way of comparison, the number of prisoners and guns the entente took in the 100 days offensive.

• BEF - 188,700 prisoners and 2,840 guns

• AEF - 43,000 prisoners and 1,421 guns

• French & Belgians - 153,700 and 2,349 guns

I think those stats speak for themselves.