Using Price, the ‘Babylonian’ mint is in apostrophes as it is not definite that Babylon was indeed the mint for the coins about to be discussed. Despite this, from the conquest of Alexander in 331 to 325 there is 10 different types of Macedonian tetradrachms attested to the ‘Babylonian’ mint, shown by the slight changes to marks. The major marks seen are ,Φ and M. These symbols move around the throne that Zeus is sat on as seen in Plate I. 2. However, in the two years from 325 until the death of Alexander in 323 there are 73 types of tetradrachms attested to the ‘Babylonian Mint’. There is no clear reason for this huge increase in the number of different types of tetradrachms, yet some assumptions can be made based on other evidence. The major theory that can be suggested is that this massive jump in types of tetradrachms can be part of the money needing to be paid to Macedonian troops returning from India. 325 BC is the date for the start of the voyage of Nearchus by sea. There is the suggestion within Arrian, using Aristobulus as his source, that the fleet made it to Babylon before Alexander did. Given that pay was promised to both Persian and Macedonian troops on their return to Babylon, this pay would have to be minted for the troops. It is not unreasonable to suggest that Babylon was informed of the intention of the return of Alexander.

This idea needs to be added with more evidence and this comes from coin numbers minted in between 330 – 290. Estimates suggest that 60 million tetradrachms were minted during this time. This number would suggest that roughly 1.395 million tetradrachms were minted a year on average over the 40 year period. This can be combined with Callataÿ’s suggested number of 20,000 coins per die to create rather pleasing results in relation to the growth in die marks. The number from Callataÿ for coins per die comes from an exploration of many figures for die outputs given throughout secondary sources through the years. Consequently using this suggestion of 20,000 coins per die along with 73 new mint marks in two years; it shows that ‘Babylon’ in these two years produce around half of the yearly output of Alexandrian tetradrachms between 325-323 BCE. These numbers are shown through the sheer amount of various marks and given the possible context of returning troops allows for the idea of one mint producing half of the empire’s coins seems plausible. Although, what needs to be considered is firstly and most importantly is that a die-link study has not been completed on the coins from ‘Babylon’ and thus the suggestion that the variation in marks are indeed from new dies it cannot be confirmed. Also the number given for yearly output is just an average and includes minting after the death of Alexander, and while we cannot be sure of the overall output per year it creates yet more problems when making this inference.

What these numbers can do, however, is help put into context one of the major issues facing Roman coins, and this being the difference in the sizes of the Roman and Hellenistic economic world.

One of the clearest examples of the economy sizes is the difference between the coins minted throughout Alexander’s empire until 290BCE and the size of the indemnities forced on Carthage. As seen above various modern scholars have given a number for the coins minted within Alexander’s empire in this time. This comes to 60 million tetradrachms, 66 million drachms and 12 million staters. The indemnities forced on Carthage at the end of the First Punic War in 241BCE numbered 3,200 talents. This number being spilt into a 1000 talents immediately and another 2,200 over the next 20 years. To put these numbers into perspective, some currency exchange is needed, luckily the ancient historian is provided some by Livy. In his discussion on the triumph of Flamininus after the Roman victory over Philip V in 198, Livy states that a tetradrachm was worth 3 Roman denarii. While this allows for some simple mathematics for the modern scholar one needs to be careful with the dating of Livy’s writing. Writing his histories towards the end of the Roman Republic and into the early Principate there is the real danger that Livy’s ‘exchange rate’ was affected by inflation or at least a change in worth to the Greek Coins. Inflation in the Republic is an unruly topic and one of the problems is the lack of evidence and the reliance on models such as the ‘Bullion Model’. This model based off the inflation in Spanish economy of the 16th and 17th centuries suggest any increase of bullion and increase coinage will lead to inflation. We see both with Rome. To avoid slipping into a separate debate the essay will carry on with this figure of Livy’s. Thus with this caution in place, by converting the amount of the Alexander’s minted coinage and the Carthaginian indemnities into denarii and the difference between the two economies is clear.

Approaching Alexander’s coins first, this number translates to 229.5 million denarii in just silver coinage (tetradrachms and drachms). The Carthaginian indemnities come to 14.4 million denarii. When it comes to large figures of money in the ancient world writers tend to use talents. However, the measure of a talent is a weight measure not a measure of currency. This made it easier for states to pay debts and deal with larger interactions and this causes a problem when comparing Alexander’s mints and the Carthaginian payments to Rome. Polybius gives the Carthaginian indemnities in talents, suggesting that the Romans received uncoined silver bullion. The number given by Callataÿ and Thonemann for Alexander, are of silver coins. This causes a divide in the uses of both sources of silver in Harris ‘War and Imperialism’, he makes mention that the talents of Carthaginian silver along with other payments from successful wars right down until 133 went some way into the development of Roman civic works. The interaction therefore with this silver is on a ‘state’ level rather than an individual level as will be shown with the use and interaction with minted coins. Taking this into account the other problem is uncoined silver doesn’t assist the numismatist in understanding the development of Roman coinage. This is because there is not an interaction between Roman hands and foreign coinage, which will addressed as being a very real possibility for many Hellenistic coins.

For the discussion on large ‘imports’ of coin Flamininus’ triumph is illuminating. Not only does Livy provide the reader with an apparent ‘exchange rate’ for tetradrachms, but he also describes the triumph itself. One of the more noteworthy inclusions is that of coins brought back by Flaminius. Livy gives this number as 84,000 Athenian tetradrachms and 14,514 gold coins, undoubtedly staters. Using the ‘exchange rate’ the tetradrachms would have boosted Roman reserves by a quarter of a million denarii, adding staters to this number brings the overall worth of coinage to 469,000 denarii. A drop in the ocean compared to the minted coins of Alexander, yet still a large boost to an economy in which the influence of ‘booty’ has never truly been settled upon. Also within the peace treaty with Philip was the stipulation that talents would be paid to Rome. The talents, would have provided a boost to the Roman economy and however likely with little work to make into coinage. Compare this then to that of the Greek coins brought over by Flamininus. These coins would need to be either overstruck or melted down and recast meaning the imagery and symbolism of the Hellenistic coins would have been seen by those who had authority and means to make Roman coinage. However, despite the contact to Hellenistic imagery that these minters would have had, there is the problem of time. The triumph of Flaminius took place in 198 however as will be shown in Section II the first major variation on Roman coinage since that time was not until 132. This 60 year gap is significant in showing that Roman coinage did not pick Hellenistic imagery immediately. This is due to the lack of a need to adopt these images until much later as will be shown below.

To be critical of the argument on the differing sizes of the Roman and Hellenistic economy in the early to mid-2nd century. The figures given are arguably selective figures. The indemnities paid by Carthage where indeed large, a context given by Thonemann is that the Parthenon cost Athens 500 talents to construct. Rome did eventually overshadow the economy of the East using Spanish silver mines, loot from Greece. A particular example that is used by Harris and repeated here is that the richest man in Greece, Alexander the Isian had a wealth of 200 talents, whereas the consul of 131, P. Licinius Crassus had over 20 times the amount of wealth. Thus it is not hard to imagine the validity of the claim made by Harris that payments from the empire went into Roman civic projects. However, it is clear that these indemnities payments of Carthage were nowhere near to the size of the output of the Alexandrian mints, thus the Roman economy grew in size with more conquest.

Given this more rounded albeit limited discussion on the economic power of both the Eastern and western Mediterranean it would go to stand that any incursions by Rome in the eastern Mediterranean would greatly enhance their economic power, however as already seen in the brief discussion on Philip V and the coins seized for Flamininus’ triumph this is not always the case. The peace treaty signed with Philip V was indeed smaller than that of the Carthaginian at 1000 talents.