I recently listened to a pair of episodes from the podcast "1001 Heroes, Legends, Histories, Mysteries" about Operation Market Garden. (I wouldn't recommend them to be honest) In it, the host and a historian he interviewed made some claims that I hadn't heard before, and I was curious about their veracity. First, they make the claim that XXX Corps stopping for 18 hours on the Nijmegen bridge was totally unnecessary. According to them, a stubborn tank commander buttoned up in his tank overnight to wait for orders from his superiors after American officers of increasing rank came forward to push them forward, and a particularly colorful altercation with an American Sargent pulling his Tommy Gun on him. They claim that had XXX Corps (or 2 companies from it) were to have made the push to Arnhem, the Operation would have been successful because there was no additional resistance from the Germans between Nijmegen and Arnhem.
They even go so far as to claim that this overnight halt, 82nd Airborne and the British 1st landing in useless areas, the Polish landing several days too late were all due to a Dutch double-agent and a compromised British commander who had been pushing Monty to do this. The intent of all of this was to delay the Allies long enough to allow Nazi commanders to send wealth to Brazil.
I had a feeling that this was all pretty fantastical, but I was wondering how much truth there might be in any of these claims, or, how absolutely wrong they are about any part of this. (I love hearing you all rip apart bad podcasts)
XXX Corps stopping for 18 hours on the Nijmegen bridge
XXX Corps were halted on Nijmegen bridge because Gavin's airborne had failed to seize the bridge, thus requiring the corps' leading troops to make an assault across it in cooperation with 82nd Airborne, an action which also required assault boats, which were not available immediately. This delay was compounded by the need to rush infantry units forward to assist the tank forces in capturing the German defensive positions lying across their path, because the armour was incapable of taking it alone. The Wessex division thus had to be rushed up the congested single main roadway to support Horrocks' push, whilst other XXX Corps units were busy trying to expand the narrow corridor the spearhead had established. All of these factors combined to essentially sacrifice a day of the operation to trying to shore up XXX Corps' position to allow them to make a thrust from Nijmegen towards Arnhem.
If there was 'no additional resistance' between Nijmegen and Arnhem, nobody told XXX Corps, who had to fight for every almost every major junction and key point.
the Polish landing several days too late were all due to a Dutch double-agent and a compromised British commander who had been pushing Monty to do this.
This is really dumb. They are either arguing that the Polish 1st I.P.B. making their first landings on the 18th was "several days too late" (Market Garden began on the 17th), or they're saying that these spies somehow control the weather. The rest of the 1st I.P.B. didn't drop until the 21st due to the poor conditions.