Though perhaps you're underselling the Qing navy a bit – it lacked blue-water capabilities but, in the eighteenth century at least, was fully capable of carrying out its main purpose, which was pirate suppression – the Manchus certainly had no capacity to reach Batavia. The "punitive measures" that the Beijing government pondered on were trade restrictions.

Beijing first received the news in 1741, in memorials from Tsereng and Wang Jun, the Governor-General of the provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang and the provincial commander of Fujian respectively. Their immediate reaction is:

The Dutch imagine that China could not punish so distant a country and so they carried out this outrage... Any toleration of this atrocity will cause Chinese traders more trouble. Thus, the court should follow precedent and sever commercial ties with Batavia until those barbarians heartily repent and apologize for their crimes.

Tsereng may have known that trade with China and the presence of the Chinese diaspora was an important source of revenue for the Dutch East India Company.

Over the next year or so, there was some discussion about whether trade should or should not be banned. The Governor-Generals of all other provinces of the South Chinese coast, which would be affected by any ban on trade, were opposed to anything more than a selective ban on trade in Dutch-ruled ports alone. But as Depei, Governor-General of Jiangnan, pointed out, a ban on trade with Batavia alone would be meaningless since the Dutch traded in many ports they did not control politically, and a ban on trade with all Southeast Asian countries would clearly not be diplomatically acceptable.

Qingfu, Governor-General of Liangguang (among China's most maritime-oriented provinces), argued that a ban on trade with Southeast Asia would be disastrous for his province by cutting off demand for manufactured goods and restricting the quantity of money in the province; he anticipated a great increase in unemployment and social unrest. Qingfu also pointed out that much of southern China relied on Southeast Asian rice to relieve its grain shortages.

Ultimately, after conferring with the relevant Governor-Generals and the Deliberative Council of Princes and High Officials, the Qianlong Emperor decided not to restrict trade with Southeast Asia.

The best source on this is still Jennifer Cushman's 1978 paper "Duke Ch'ing-fu Deliberates: A Mid-Eighteenth Century Reassessment of Sino-Nanyang Commercial Relations."

While /u/PangeranDipanagara has rightly pointed out that the Qing response was not going to be an immediate turn to war, I think OP is heavily underselling Qing perceptions of naval power. Whist in objective terms the Qing navy was not particularly powerful, the last times that Chinese fleets had fought European ones they were generally successful – Zheng Zhilong against the Dutch at Liaoluo Bay in 1633; Koxinga against the Dutch in Taiwan in 1661-2. As of yet there was no clear indication that a Chinese fleet, despite known technological inadequacies, could not deal with a European one.

To add a more relevant bit about restriction of trade, even on the eve of the First Opium War many in the Qing government did genuinely believe they could hold Western countries hostage through embargoes. Lin Zexu, for example, believed that the cutting of tea and rhubarb exports to Britain would lead to mass fatal constipation and insinuated as much in his open letter to Queen Victoria in 1839.