You often here about Thatcher having smashed the Unions. But I'm unsure of how she did it?
We often hear about mineworkers union but are there any other unions she effectively destroyed?
Thanks.
Hello there! I'll try and answer the how the unions were defeated, and I'll then proceed to discuss other unions.
In short, they directly correlate to one another - public opinion had turned against the Unions in the 1970s. It was public here say that the Unions could bring a parliamentary government down using striking tactics - something they intended to repeat in the early 1980s.
Striking actions eroded public and miner sympathy for the Unions, giving Thatcher the support she needed to enforce reform. She was aided in this greatly by the manager of the (public owned) National Coal Board, Ian MacGregor.
After Thatcher's winning of the 1984 election, Arthur Scargill (President of the National Union of Mineworkers/NUM) openly declared he would not "accept that we are landed for the next four years with this government".
In 1972, during a nationwide strike which shut down coal production during the Ted Heath Conservative government, he had lead a mass picket that forced the closure of Saltley Coke Depot - essentially, where the government had coal that was keeping power stations temporarily running. This was led by Arthur Scargill, who was later elected as president of the NUM in 1981. Back to the Heath era, this forced a general election that brought down the Ted Heath government.
On the 21st of October 1983, the NUM voted to ban optional overtime in protest that the board members had 'only' been offered a 5.2% pay rise and at prospective pit closures for pits that were unprofitable and couldn't be made economical.
These closures were necessary on economic grounds - they simply were not producing a profit. The previous Labour government between 1974 and 1979 acknowledged this and closed 32 pits. (Fun fact, Thatcher actually only closed 1/10th of what previous Labour governments had had to close). Scargill denied that uneconomic pits even existed - they just needed more investment (which was something that was disproven during the Callaghan democratic socialism years, and which he accepted in his resignation speech). When replying to a Select Committee question, Scargill responded "As far as I am concerned, the loss (needed to deem a pit closable) is without limit (I. E. If a pit was costing the tax payer near infinite money due to its unlrofitability, the government should keep it open). This almost ideological adherence to policy made conflict inevitable.
The NUM board doubted they could not get 55% of union members (I. E. The miners) to back the board on enforcing a general strike - so they found a loophole. Under rule 41 of their constitution, if every regional areas could the pushed into action individually, it wouldn't count as a general strike, yet could have the same effect. Any area that didn't wish to strike could be sent 'intimidation' pickets. Out of the 83 pits striking on the first hour of the first day, 10 of these were entirely due to heavy picketing - the NUM board had begun 'fly picketing'. They also planned to use such tactics to stop any regional voting against striking, denying them a voice in the matter. The police were initially too widespread to stop this intimidating tactic.
Shortly after this, the regional ballot votes came in - Nottinghamshire, the first to vote, showed 73% of NUM members were against the strike. This majority pattern was followed in the Midlands, North East, and North West coal regions. Of the 70,000 who had voted, 50,000 were against any strike action. This was not binding in the constitution of the NUM.
The following month, the NUM board voted to change the majority threshold for a general strike from 55% to 50%. The blocking of the transportation of coal became an unspoken objective - though it failed at stopping lorry movements of coal due to the 'bravery of the drivers'.
From here on, for the rest of the strike, the Thatcher government won via endurance. They had stockpiled coal and oil prior to the strikes, expecting a breakdown in negotiations.
The next biggest role was played by the Nations Coal Board. The boards of the NUM and NCB met in April to discuss the strikes - with Scargill delivering a monologue, he asked the NCB board to leave the room whilst the NUM board supposedly discussed terms.
The NCB President, Ian MacGregor (gettit? How I started this post with 'Hello There'?) accepted his request. Arthur Scargill promptly left after them and persuaded the media that the NCB had got up and walked out of the negotiations.
In May, Public support for the NUM was damaged even further when 5000 picketers attacked the police at Orgreave Coke Works, who were pelted with bricks and darts. 69 policemen and civilians were injured. The NUM were subsequently joined by the TGWU (Dock Union) who called a strike on grounds that the British Steel Corporation later found to be unjust - the TGWU board were attempting to show solidarity with the NUM board, to little practical effect - again, mainly due to the efforts of lorry drivers.
In September, NACODS (Union for colliery workers) voted to strike in solidarity with the NUM. The NACODS board next month voted to call off the strike as moderates had convinced the hardliners to not join in Mr. Scargill's actions. This was the beginning of the end.
The Civil Law process began to tear into the striking NUM. A high court case ruled in favour of 2 Yorkshire miners who had been blocked from going back to work, stating that the 'strike' could not be deemed as 'official'. The NUM ignored this ruling, and surprisingly the courts delivered Mr Scargill a writ on the floor at the Scottish Party Conference! He was fined £1000 and the NUM was fined £200, 000 for contempt of court. The NUM refused to pay, and the High Court began seizing its assets, limiting their ability to organise fly pickets.
The nail in the coffin of public support came when the Sunday Times exposed that the NUM had been directly meeting with Colonel Gadaffi, dictator of Libya, and the Communist trade union in France. The former donated an estimated £150,000 to the NUM. A further sum came from the so called 'trade unions' of the USSR - who had given them funding on the orders of Moscow (Cold War context).
The NCB took the initiative, and promised a bonus to any miner who stopped striking after November the 19th. 2203 returned in the first week. This continued, yet intimidation continued. For example, a 3 foot concrete post was thrown by militants from a motorway bridge onto a taxi that was carrying a miner going back to work. The driver of the taxi was killed.
By January 1985, 75000 NUM members were back to work. It was inevitable the strike would be called off. By February, more than half of all NUM members were back to work. In March, the NUM annual conference voted to return to work against Mr Scargill's wishes.
Overall, the year long strike was purely a political one, as the idea that uneconomic pits can continue is rediculous. The strike forever damaged British coal sales, and the industry has never recovered.
Tldr, the strike failed due to Thatcher's preparations for the strike, and the vast lack of public support within and outside of the unions. The failures of the unions, and their abuse of powers to undermine worker's interest, provided the template to not only denationalise most of British industry in an attempt to increase competitiveness, but also to remove a large amount of power from the unions.
Sources: (will add the rest later)