There's conflicting information between Anarchist and Communist sources on this (the Communist push to integrate Anarchist militias in a unified Popular Army was one of the factors that precipitated the May Days of 1937), so I don't really know what to believe in.
My guess is that it was a compromise between Anarchist ideology and military discipline, but what exactly was the equilibrium between the two? And while I know for a fact that Communists point to a bad performance on the field by Anarchist militias and blame Anarchist organization, how true is that observation?
It seems like a unique example in military history, and few talk about it. I would really like to read about this subject from a neutral academic perspective.
That’s a fun question! There’s quite a few layers to it, so I’ll do my best to give an overview of the role of militias in the conflict and how they were (or, sometimes, weren’t) organised, before moving onto the specific question of democracy.
It’s worth noting from the outset that the popular image of the (often anarchist) militias occupies a disproportionate place in the mythology of the Spanish Civil War. Thanks to their prominence in early propaganda – including some amazing (albeit heavily staged) photographs of both men and women under arms or at the barricades – they are overrepresented among visual representations of the conflict. Accounts such as Orwell’s Homage to Cataloniadid even more to cement their romantic image. Yet the sad reality was that the militia ‘phase’ of the war was relatively short. Militarisation, or the conversion of Republican forces into something resembling a traditional army, was ongoing from autumn 1936 as it became clear that serious changes were needed, although this took months to complete (many units were still being converted by spring 1937). As James Matthews notes, while the militias were useful in the confused urban clashes that characterised the first weeks of the war, they simply couldn’t stand up to regular soldiers in pitched battles, especially once the professional soldiers of the Army of Africa reached the mainland. There are some vivid accounts of just how difficult it was to lead forces made up from these militias. Matthews quotes a loyalist colonel, Mariano Salafranca, whose troops had abandoned key positions guarding the road to Madrid without a fight in September 1936.
The militiamen generally look to blame their retreats on the lack of commanders without any justification at all. Their retreats are the result of the militia's military structure and the heterogeneity of their units. These are a disorganized mix of men of noble spirits, brave and impassioned defenders of the cause, and men who are the complete opposite. This amorphous mass includes those who, according to the circumstances, will decide to follow one or other leader, and who do not have a conscience of their own; those who in a difficult and dangerous situation will egotistically seek the easiest path to protect their own lives and who forget their duties as militiamen and Republicans.
It’s worth noting at this point that despite their reputation, many of these militia columns weren’t formed of anarchists – most leftist political organisations sought to mobilise their followers to fight as best they could. And while we need to treat criticism like the above quote somewhat skeptically, as each group had an incentive to disparage the performance of their opponents, it soon becomes apparent that none of the groups were particularly effective. Even the supposedly elite communist ‘Fifth Regiment’, which nominally embraced both discipline and military hierarchy, did little better in those days. Following reverses in November 1936, the unit’s own commander criticised them for much the same flaws as listed above, including ‘abandonment of the lines’, ‘leaving the front without authorization’, insubordination’, and resisting ‘the orders of the command and discussion of these orders.’ Other observers noted further flaws – the inability to stand up to air attack, an unwillingness to dig trenches and a tendency to treat soldiering like a job that only lasted during normal working hours. How general these tendencies were is difficult to say, but there’s no doubt that amid a great deal of undoubted bravery, there was also a great deal of naivety about how a modern war would be fought. The unclear command structure – did militia units take orders from their party or the government? – added to their woes.
Aside from their failings in combat, there also simply weren’t that many of them, certainly not enough to fight a war on the scale that emerged. The number of volunteers for these militias was relatively small, perhaps tens of thousands overall, covering a front about 2,000 kilometres long. Madrid, a city of about 1.5 million inhabitants, provided just 10,000 volunteers during the entire conflict. This was not a sustainable system, although it had served its purpose in ensuring the Republic survived the confused early weeks of the war. The militarisation of the militias was therefore widely understood to be necessary, although it was indeed a policy championed by the Spanish Communist Party. Even then, it’s important not to exaggerate the differences in approaches. Even in October 1936, the following set of rules about discipline was put forward by the anarchist CNT:
1 Everybody must obey the battalion committees and elected delegates.
2 The militiaman cannot do what he wants but must go where he is ordered.
3 Men who disobey will be punished.
4 Serious offences include desertion, abandoning one’s post, pillage and making demoralising comments.
5 Although enrolment was voluntary, militiamen are soldiers of the revolution and must obey orders.
As Michael Alpert points out, nothing in these points would have been out of place in a communist-led unit.
(continued below)
As a kind of add-on question, there were also anarchist militia groups active in Ukraine during the Russian Civil War. Were they organized very differently from the other armed groups during the war?