Can someone explain the "storm of war feeling" amongst pre-WWII intellectuals?

by TanktopSamurai

In Conservatism and Chaos: Martin Heidegger and the Decline of the West p. 11, there are refences to "a storm of war feeling", to a feeling of needing war in mystical terms. I am not very familliar with the pre-WWI attitude of intellectuals towards war. Could someone give me a run-down of the attitudes? What did it actually mean? How did it come to be?

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Edit: I made a mistake in the title. It should be "... pre-WWI intellectuals".

Klesk_vs_Xaero

That's from R. Griffin's Modernism and Fascism if I am not mistaken. As Griffin himself explains in the introduction:

The leitmotif of the book is that a key element in the genesis, psychology, ideology, policies, and praxis of fascism was played by the "sense of a beginning", the mood of standing on the threshold of a new world. It is a mood of heady expectancy which is the dialectical twin of the obsession with the closing of an era

Palingenesis is the fancy word for it: that something may be given birth anew. And in order for this to happen; for a general renovation to take place, the old must be broken first. And the new system may choose then what to keep or discard, according to its own nature, to the intrinsic driving forces behind it.

But those forces weren't those of rational thought, derivations of the age of enlightenment which had bred the monsters of materialism and communism; nor even those of Hegel's formal idealism. There was a realization, an instinctive understanding that the true motors of history were immeasurable, unrestrainable powers, not subject to the mastery of reason.

Wrote in 1903 Italian sociologist and psychologist Scipio Sighele, in his La psicologia delle folle - “The psychology of crowds” - that:

It is the grandiose collective voice of the crowd that drives our world [...] It has by now become clear that the true protagonist of history [...] has been the people, that is the nameless crowd on which the individualities of the great men worked as if on a brute matter to build the architectures of their power [...] and which was in turn, the dark immense cave whence those greats drew unconsciously their ideas and the means to put them into action... [One can't ignore] this new mighty and irresistible collective factor of social life which, thanks to political freedom, has awaken from its unconsciousness and finds itself free at last to act in the light of public speeches, press, elections and strikes.

And there was nothing wrong with the realization that impulses and instincts, often irrational, drove not only the action of the masses but their political action and that of their leaders – if not by directing that action, at least by making the great man of history (as Mussolini would argue) only successful in so far as he understood and anticipated the spirit of his times. This irrationality had to be taken into account, and actually could become the one true instrument of renovation.

One can confidently quote G. Sorel on this point. [Reflections on violence 1908, English translation, Cambridge University Press 2004]

[In the context of social conflict and preparation of the proletarian strike] the groups that are struggling against each other must be shown to be as separate as possible [...] Ordinary language could not produce these results in any very certain manner; appeal must be made to collections of images which, taken together and through intuition alone, [...] are capable of evoking the mass of sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken by socialism against modern society. The syndicalists solve this problem perfectly by concentrating the whole of socialism in the drama of the general strike; there is thus no longer any place for the reconciliation of opposites through the nonsense of official thinkers; everything is clearly mapped out, so that only one interpretation of socialism is possible. This method has all the advantages that integral knowledge has over analysis, according to the doctrine of Bergson. [...] We are unable to act without leaving the present, without considering the future, which seems forever condemned to escape our reason. Experience shows that the framing of the future in some indeterminate time may [...] be very effective and have few inconveniences; this happens when it is a question of myths, in which are found all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a party or of a class, inclinations which recur to the mind with the insistence of instincts in all the circumstances of life, and which give an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action upon which the reform of the will is founded. [...] A knowledge of what the myths contain in the way of details which will actually form part of the history of the future is then of small importance; they are not astrological almanacs; it is even possible that nothing which they contain will come to pass. [...] Myths must be judged as a means of acting on the present; all discussion of the method of applying them as future history is devoid of sense. It is the myth in its entirety which is alone important: its parts are only of interest in so far as they bring out the main idea. No useful purpose is served, therefore, in arguing about the incidents which may occur...

The appeal to an undetermined future, to a renovation, imminent or far away into the future, was therefore one moment of the creation of a revolutionary action – the necessary precondition for the breaking of the contemporary world. But it was also a genuine feeling. A discomfort, perhaps stronger in those nations whose belated unification had created larger and more violent expectations of growth, not only economical but social and moral as well; nations where the democratic values and ideas of social progress through concerted reforms were neither widespread nor solidly rooted, where the institutions of representative parliamentarism appeared to have failed the large, overabundant aspirations. In 1914, the old patriot and Italian academic Pasquale Villari, in one of his last public speeches had thought fitting to remind his contemporaries that:

To the World little mattered whether there was one Italy or not; it mattered much to know what Italy had came to do, how, how much it would and would be able to support the wealth, the civilization, the overall morality of the World […] The Century of nationalities […] was transforming before the people's eyes in that of an international civilization, more global and human, which could be accomplished only by perfecting more and more the National State, on the way of its highest fates.

But for this, as we mentioned before, things had to change. Wrote Giovanni Amendola – a liberal politician and future victim of Fascism - [L'ordine italiano in L'azione May 17^th 1914] that:

The most urgent matter for the new Italy [was] the creation of a new order, moral, social, administrative; of an order within which at last the unitary life of Italy could find its adequate expression [...] The landscape of the Italian political life would have revealed itself time by time to a new generation of political leaders. The task of this new generation was twofold: the creation of an Italian order within and the creation of an Italian action outside.

But others had an entirely different view of the national state. The Nationalist leader and jurist Alfredo Rocco, explained in 1914, with reference to the system of power that had controlled the Italian political scene since the beginning of the century, under the leadership of Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti [In piena pratica rivoluzionaria in Il dovere nazionale July 11^th 1914]

Parliamentarism is dead and Giolittismo which followed it is the proof it is gone for good. And with it, a whole world of arcadic sensibilities has passed away, which one can't look back at without a measure of nostalgia, because it had its beauty and its poetic tone: the cult of reason, the value of liberty, faith in justice [...] The parliamentary system, that is the political primacy of assemblies of delegates elected by the people, of intermediaries without authority and responsibility, which had affirmed itself, under special circumstances, within England and then spread to Europe under the predominance of rational philosophy and idealism [...] We believe parliamentarism to have by now run its course; what will follow? No one can say. Giolittismo is just a moment in the great evolution that will lead to the political regime of tomorrow.