Also late commers to existing as unified countries at all (along with Japan kind off). All of these countries only became fully established with Central governments around the 1870s. As a bonus question could THIS have anything to do with the rise of Fasicsm/ Nazism?

The idea that Italy (I'll talk of the one I know something about) had been denied her legitimate aspirations by the greedy putocratic powers (France, GB and then the US) was a key element of the Fascist propaganda during the 1930s. In this picture, the Adriatic question, the unfair treatment in Versailles, the Italian "natural" Mediterranean foreign policy; all those merged together in a somewhar conscious design of the Western powers to prevent the Italian growth and return to its greatness of old.

It was in this context that the themes of colonialism and especially of the African and Middle Eastern partitions during late XIX early XX centuries gained a new significance in the context of the interpretation of Fascism. But one may say, more than that, in the context of the actual relations with Fascism - that, as of the 1930s-1940s, one could actually look not only at colonialism as an ongoing and legitimate political choice, but at the colonialist policies of Fascist Italy from the point of view of contemporary dimplomatic relations rather than historiography.

That was the background of a few works of famous historian of diplomatic relations R. Albrecht-Carrie; for instance: The present significance of the Treaty of London of 1915 [1939], Italy and her allies, June, 1919 [1941], Italian colonial policy 1914-18 [1946]. It is obvious that at the time, there was a larger attention to colonial themes - and the belief that a more substantial "colonial satisfaction" of the Italian interests may have prevented the alignment of Italy with Nazi Germany. This view, that saw in the inability of the French and British to accomodate the Italian interests (for instance during the Ethiopia crisis of 1935, with the failed Laval-Hoare agreements) a prosecution of a more or less deliberate choice begun around the time of the crisis of Tunis in 1881 and continued with the secret Sykes-Picot agreement, has enjoyed some lasting popularity and is usually present in the context of historiography of Italian Fascism.

It's certainly something that is worth mentioning; mostly for its large prominence within contemporary Fascist historiography. But it has since then lost most of its attention - not only as a result of the fact that supporting colonialist policies as a manner to solve internal issues is no longer seen as a viable or reasonable political option. But more so since the colonialistic tendencies present in Italy since a few years after the unification have been progressively and rather uniformely characterized by historiography (Vivarelli, Toniolo, Candeloro, etc.) as misguided and political expressions closely tied to those protectionistic choices of 1878 and especially 1887 that a large part of the liberal establishment highlights as the one crucial mistake of post unitary Italy.

From this point of view, despite the fact that colonial themes and aspirations existed within Italy throughout the 1870-1940 period, their character of genuine national aspirations is at least questionable. And thus, their potential role in the rise of Fascism has been since the 1930s largely reduced, so that most recent historiography (but actually most historiography since the 1950s) focuses more on other aspects of internal politics, society, and economical development, where the colonial desires are often reduced to the marginal role they had in the historical development of the Italian nation. And even in the context of the search of parallels between the Italian and German examples (as per /u/Th3DeathDog 's question) they gain a far smaller attention than those many other factors. Incidentally, that of the late unification on the other hand, is considered a central theme since it affected directly and indirectly economical development, public right, institutions and military organization, social formations and public parties, etc. - the colnialist experience as well.

In short, if one of the two is probably marginal enough that it can be overlooked entirely in a cursory observation, the other is that kind of historical element that affects everything ever since and is therefore generally included in any analysis of anything that followed. Which means that - of course - one can draw a parallel in that regard, but for a substantial one, you need a deep knowledge of both the national histories of Italy and Germany, of their societies and institutions from the XIX century to mid XX century.

That doesn't mean that one can't gain some more insight from the analysis of the colonialist themes within Fascist Italy. In fact, with soem degree of coherence, those choices that have been viewed so negatively by the liberal establishment (and already at the time) were framed by young fascist historian M. Toscano and true expression of the natural foreign policy of the Italian nation. So that the Mediterranean aspirations of Italy constituted the ideological backbone of the Treaty of London and the eventual "betrayal" of the Italian aspirations in Versailles. According to Toscano, the foreign policy of a nation was

within its fundamental lines, dictated by its geographical position, its historical tradition and the economical interests of the state. […] A perfect foreign policy therefore is one that coincides with the geographical and economical interests of the state. And, as it is easy to understand, both the geographical position of a state and the substantial elements of its economical interests are constants, hence a consequent continuity of its lines of foreign policy.

[…] The rather hard task of the Foreign Ministry is to balance [the contingent needs] with the fundamental needs [of the state] without ever letting the former taking primacy over the latter. […] More so the Foreign Ministry also needs to establish a synthesis of the events within the general frame of the issues, without being polarized over a single point, regardless of its importance. Something similar to what happened in Paris to hon. Orlando who, fixated on the Adriatic, prevented Italy from making a world and Mediterranean policy worth of a great power.

The natural Italian foreign policy was therefore not one of strategical consolidation in the Adriatic but ultimately a Mediterranean one.

It's worth noting how from these premises, the Italian foreign policy coherently developed in its general lines from 1870 until the break out of the word war. [...]

Due to a historical turn of fate, a tragic one regrettably, the decisive moment of the territorial annexations within the Mediterranean, returned to its prominence of old with the opening of the Suez Canal, took place during a time (from 1875 to 1885) when the new Kingdom, fallen into a major internal crisis of economical and political adjustment, could not counteract adequately the ambitions of the great European Powers uniformly aimed at the coasts of North Africa. Nonetheless, in addition to this diminished efficiency, one is forced to observe a fatal inactivity of the politicians of the time. […] No concrete steps were taken […] While the other powers agreed more or less openly for their future annexations, Italy was left completely aside.

As you can see, Fascism did view (and quite obviously in the 1930s) those policies inspired to protectionism and expansionism in the Mediterranean as the right ones. And the inability to pursue them effectively as one of the first damning mistakes of the liberal system.

But this is a view that is largely discredited nowadays. And those moments have been framed in the entirely opposite ways, not as causes of the positive Fascist reaction to an unfair refusal, but as symptoms of pre-exisitng authoritarian tendencies within the Italian society.