How many soviets soldiers died to order 227 and was this order effective or a waste of manpower

by jewrewr

Order 227 was directly ordered by Stalin and stated that not one step should be taken back and that anybody that retreated would be killed. I am wondering more about this order for example how many soldiers died do to this order. Also what happened to the soldiers that carried out the order, did they experience ptsd and high suicide rate, and how did they get assigned to this role. How widespread was the order and how often was it done, was it universal or only done during important offensives or during everyday combat. Was this overalls an effective order and what did the generals think.

Alexs220

First of all, your view of the order 227 seems a bit twisted. I will firstly post a snippet from the order.

"1. Military councils of the fronts and first of all front commanders should: a) Unconditionally eliminate retreat moods in the troops and with a firm hand bar propaganda that we can and should retreat further east, and that such retreat will cause no harm; b) Unconditionally remove from their posts and send to the High Command for court-martial those army commanders who have allowed unauthorized troop withdrawals from occupied positions, without the order of the Front command. c) Form within each Front from one up to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 persons) where commanders and high commanders and appropriate commissars of all service arms who have been guilty of a breach of discipline due to cowardice or bewilderment will be sent, and put them on more difficult sectors of the front to give them an opportunity to redeem by blood their crimes against the Motherland. 2. Military councils of armies and first of all army commanders should; a) Unconditionally remove from their offices, corps and army commanders and commissars who have accepted troop withdrawals from occupied positions without the order of the army command, and route them to the military councils of the fronts for court-martial; b) Form within the limits of each army 3 to 5 well-armed defensive squads (up to 200 persons in each), and put them directly behind unstable divisions and require them in case of panic and scattered withdrawals of elements of the divisions to shoot in place panic-mongers and cowards and thus help the honest soldiers of the division execute their duty to the Motherland; c) Form within the limits of each army up to ten (depending on the situation) penal companies (from 150 to 200 persons in each) where ordinary soldiers and low ranking commanders who have been guilty of a breach of discipline due to cowardice or bewilderment will be routed, and put them at difficult sectors of the army to give them an opportunity to redeem by blood their crimes against the Motherland. 3. Commanders and commissars of corps and divisions should; a) Unconditionally remove from their posts commanders and commissars of regiments and battalions who have accepted unwarranted withdrawal of their troops without the order of the corps or division commander, take from them their orders and medals and route them to military councils of fronts for court martial; b) Render all help and support to the defensive squads of the army in their business of strengthening order and discipline in the units."

So the most common practise in the army was to send soldiers who ran or panicked to penal batallions, so they would be able to redeem themselves. Usually it took about 6 months.

994 300 recieved a court verdict, 436 600 of them were sent to prison. 427 910 went through the penal batallions. Not included in the statistics are 212,400 deserters who fled from positions and were not found, or were sent by barrier detachments directly to the duty station.

AS FOR THOSE WHO WERE SHOT, it is estimated that throughout the war 158 000 Soviet soldiers were shot. However this number not only includes those killed for deserting, but also rapists, looters, war criminals, ect.

Sources: G. I. Krivosheev. Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses. pp 91-92 Greenhill, 1997.

Г.Ф.Кривошеев и др. Россия и СССР  в войнах XX века. Потери вооруженных сил. Статистическое исследование. Олма-Пресс. Москва. 2001г.