There are a couple of economic, military and social factors to consider here. First is the immense size and diversity of the Arab world. While it isn't a perfect comparison, Pan-Arabism is really more similar to pan-Slavism than pan-Germanism, just because of the huge distances and cultural and economic gulf between the peoples it is trying to unite. Many outside the Arab world believe that Arabic, for example, is a single united language like Mandarin Chinese, and are only taught a particular form of Arabic when they study the language. In reality, the language's many local dialects are so diverse that Iraqis and Moroccans can hardly understand eachother.

In theory, Classical Arabic is the Lingua Franca of the Arab world, and Egyptian Arabic is the most popular dialect in entertainment and the media. However, even in lingua franca, the Arab world is not united. West African elites are well versed in French, while the rest of the Arab world's business elite communicate to counterparts in other Arab states using classical Arabic. I am painting with a broad brush here - obviously not all major Algerian corporations use French as their main procedural language, and not all international businesses based out of Egypt use Classical Arabic. However, I mention this just to highlight the huge cultural and linguistic differences within the Arab world.

The Arab world was also very divided economically and in terms of political systems. Syria and Lebanon were historically the most prosperous region, with Egypt not far behind. Iraq, since the Ottoman period, was somewhat of a backwater. The economies of West Africa, meanwhile, were tied to that of France. These economic differences were accentuated by differences in political organization, which created competing ideological blocs within the Arab world. Egypt, for example, ran its economy after the Nasserist takeover with a focus centrally planned heavy industry, and implemented radical land redistribution. Syria, its partner in the United Arab Republic, had a political elite that was tied to commercial interests. So, when Nasser implemented the Egyptian model in Syria, the Syrian elites that had invited him into the country turned on him, and eventually took back their country in a coup.

The gulf was even larger between the many nationalist regimes and traditional administrations. Saudi Arabia bankrolled a monarchist rear guard effort for years against Nasser, and funded Egypt's enemies during the Egyptian war in Yemen.

Finally, and I would argue most importantly, Egypt simply lacked the military power to be the unifier of Arabia. Popular support among the masses was never the problem of pan-Arabism, but military and economic power was. While Egypt achieved impressive growth in both areas under Nasser, it was still outclassed by its main rivals. Israel, while materially weaker than Egypt, was doctrinally superior, and at times had more advanced equipment. Egypt also had the problem in the Suez Crisis and the 1967 war of deploying across the Sinai and straining its supply lines. When the logistical situation was reversed in 1973, Egypt did well, but it did not capitalize on its success by reviving Arab nationalism. Rather, it made peace with Israel in the euphoria of victory and deprived Arab nationalism of its ideological leader.

However, even if Egypt and Syria had rolled over Israel completely - say, in a second war in the late 1970s - there was an infinitely more imposing country that would still have stopped them - Iran. Iran in the 1970s stood at the peak of its regional and economic prominence in the region. It achieved unprecedented growth rates and had an army that was able to deter even the Soviet Union, acquiring much new American hardware that even the US military hadn't purchased yet. Meanwhile, the early stages of the Iran-Iraq war, especially in the air, demonstrated the competence of the pre-revolutionary Iranian officer corps - or at least those that survived the purges. Iran was the most powerful antagonist to Arab unification, taking the Shatt al-Arab from Iraq, funding Kurdish movements, and even intervening to crush an Arab Nationalist revolt in Oman.

Post-revolutionary Iran was militarily weaker, but an even bigger threat to Arab unification since it exported its ideology and fractured the Arab world along sectarian lines. Even post-revolutionary Iran, under international arms embargo and with much of its officer corps purged, handily crushed an Iraqi invasion in 1981-82.

I mention all of this because the main barrier to territorial expansion is not popular support, but material force. Going back to the German example, Bismarck's famous quote, "The great questions of the day will not be settled by means of speeches and majority decisions but by iron and blood" is pertinent. The Germans wanted to be united, as the Arab majority largely did. In order to unite them, however, Prussia had to defeat Austria and France. Israel and Iran were the Middle East's Austria and France respectively, but the problem was that the Arab world had no Prussia capable of defeating them.

So, to unify the Arab world, Egypt had to 1) dispose of the old colonial powers, 2) delete Israel, and 3) defeat Iran. Nasser did 1 historically. 2 was feasible - Israel was always at a material disadvantage compared to the Arabs. The Egyptians in 1973 proved they were learning, and it is potentially possible that the doctrinal imbalance could have been solved during a second war in the late 70s, had Egypt not made peace (though this is far from certain). 3, however, was completely impossible. The Iraqi army at its prime was larger and more experienced than the Egyptian army ever was, and still fought most of the war on the defensive. Though Egypt was demographically a stronger country than Saddam's Iraq, the Iraqi invasion ended so badly that it's hard to believe reinforcements from Egypt would have created a victory - perhaps just a less humiliating defeat.

So in summary:

• The Arab world was far more divided culturally and economically than Germany or Italy
• No Arab country had the military power to defeat the main non-Arab powers trying to preserve the status quo

Sources:

Ali, Abdel. Globalization and Inequality in the Arab Region.

Kurun, Ismail. Arab Nationalism from a Historical Perspective: A Gradual Demise?

Kramer, Martin. Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity

Myhill, John. The Islamization of Arab Nationalism

Al-Lihaibi, Maedh. An Analysis of the Iran-Iraq War: Military Strategy and Political Objectives.

Glazer, Thomas. The 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War: An Analysis Using the Principles of War.

I'd actually like to hear from some of our historians the extent to which pan-germanism can be considered successful, both historically and in the post WW2 era.

Could Hitler's annexation of Austria, occupation of Czechoslovakia, and occupation of Poland be considered an attempt at pan-german nationalism which ultimately failed?

I am not a scholar and this is somewhat covered by /u/Interpine's response but I wrote a paper in college a while back that addressed this exact question in a political context as well as a general history of pan-Arabism. I've pasted the applicable section below.

Egypt, particularly under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, played a major role in attempts to turn pan-Arabist thought into real state policy. However, it was the failure of the union between two of the larger Arab countries (Egypt and Syria), coupled with Israel’s victory in the 1967 and 1973 wars that resulted in the Egypt-Israeli peace agreement, which led to the decline of the movement’s popularity.

The roots of pan-Arabism lie in pre-WWII intellectual thought, which could be most readily applied to the thinking of Zaki al-Arsuzi and Michel Aflaq. Not surprisingly, they were both integral in the establishment of the Ba’ath Party, which exuded strong nationalistic ideas combined with an Arab brand of socialism that differed in some ways from European communism. Eventually, the ruling governments of both Syria and Iraq would be Ba’athist, although the direction the party took in each country would end up being quite different.

The true upsurge of pan-Arabism’s popularity began with the decline of colonialism in the Arab world. As the states became independent of the European powers, there were a growing number of nationalists that proposed the idea that the Arab countries should be brought together on a level of cooperation that would promote self-determination free from foreign influence. In its most extreme forms, it was believed that all Arab countries should be unified into a single state. More moderate proposals called for a level of cooperation that would assist the states in acting as a single block, similar to the modern-day European Union. One could say that the latter began with the establishment of the Arab League in 1945, which was intended help member countries coordinate policy and safeguard against foreign influence on their sovereignty.

At the time, Egypt was the most populous, culturally and economically developed, and militarily powerful country in the Arab world. However, prior to the coup d’état that overthrew the monarchy of King Farouk, Egypt was internally nationalistic but not quite an active proponent of pan-Arabism. It rose to its prominent role as the main driving force of Arab unity when its second president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, came to power in 1956. As a regional power, it set the tone by which other Arab countries sought to follow suit.

Nasser became a hero in the Arab world following the Suez Crisis that occurred in the first year of his presidency. In a move to continue to counteract the US and Britain’s interests, he recognized the People’s Republic of China and continued to solidify relations with the Soviet Union and other communist regimes. As Egypt’s relationship with western powers continued to deteriorate, the US withdrew its planned funding of the Aswan Dam project, which prompted Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal. Three months later Britain, France, and Israel went to war with Egypt because of his continuing anti-imperialist and communist-leaning policies. The war ended up being a success for Nasser because mounting international pressure on his opponents allowed him to keep control of the canal. This brought him to the forefront of pan-Arabist thought; many believed that he would be the leader that could bring it from ideology to state policy.

Despite being on the losing side of the 1948 Israeli war, Egypt and its allies were spurred along even more to work together. The creation of the state of Israel and its successful defense of its territory was a testament, in their opinion, to the need of Arab countries to coordinate. Thus, two years after Nasser became president, a union was made between Syria and Egypt to form a single country. This country was called the United Arab Republic, and with its capital as Cairo and Nasser as its president, it was clear that Egypt was the centerpiece of the partnership. However, although it was supposed to be a direct application of pan-Arabist ideology, Nasser had other, more compelling motives to make this union.

According to Malcolm Kerr, in his publication The Arab Cold War, the United Arab Republic was a product more from the rivalry and conflicting ideologies between Iraq and Egypt. The Cold War has long been thought of as a type of worldwide chess game that was engaged in between the United States and Soviet Union involving counteracting one another’s influence, supporting friendly regimes abroad, and strategic threats. However, a similar rivalry occurred between the pro-Soviet Egypt, the pro-Western Iraq, and their respective allies.

Syria was the prize in this struggle which both countries sought to make a union with. Egypt, although quasi-Socialist, was able to broker a union with Syria based on the assumption that Nasser would squash the increasingly powerful Syrian Communist Party in support of mounting public pressure to merge. This was done because although Nasser had good relations with the Soviet Union and had been receiving aid, the Hashemite monarchies of Iraq and Jordan were viewed as little more than puppet regimes of the western powers. To allow them to get stronger through a merger with Syria would have been a direct strengthening of western influence in the region. Thus, there is a strong argument that the union was made more for these reasons than purely pan-Arabism. This is further supported by the way Nasser structured the joint government, with all Syrian political parties required to disband and most prominent positions taken by Egyptian leaders. Eventually, many former members of the Ba’ath party and officers in the Syrian army grew increasingly dissatisfied with Egypt’s dominance over the unified state. Nasser, unable or simply unwilling to adjust the government and spread out control fueled this sentiment. Consequently, in 1961 Syrian officers staged a coup to claim Syria’s independence. Immediately after, they remained open to renegotiating the merger with Egypt on terms that would put Syria on a closer level regarding representation and control. Nasser was unwilling to compromise to this, and the union fell apart. So, the most tangible reality of a pan-Arab state came to an end, not from foreign intervention or influence, but from the member states’ conflicting interests.

A further blow to the credibility and plausibility of a pan-Arab state came when Israel decisively won the Six Day war in 1967. Mounting tensions between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria came to a head when Egypt proclaimed the Straits of Tiran closed for Israeli shipping. This prompted a response from Israel, who had previously stated that any closing of the Straits would constitute as an act of war. In this conflict, Israel demonstrated that it was ready and powerful enough to strategically impose itself against the largest states in the region. Thus, pan-Arabism continued its decline as a real possibility in the region.

Moreover, the event that really came to “put the nail in the coffin” of pan-Arabism is the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when a coalition of Arab states, headed by Egypt and Syria attempted to reclaim territories lost in the Six Day War, including the Golan Heights, Sinai Peninsula, and the Gaza Strip. At this time, Abdel Nasser had died and Egypt’s new president, Anwar Sadat, was believed to be an easily-manipulated follower of Nasserist ideas. This would be disproved soon after the war concluded. Although Israel recovered from an Egyptian surprise attack and was able to encircle their forces, Egypt proved itself as a much more credible military threat than previously thought post-1967 and Sadat was celebrated as a hero in the Arab world.

To facilitate a peace between the two countries, then-US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger engaged in intensive mediation between the opponents known as shuttle diplomacy. This culminated in the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979 following the Camp David Accords where President Jimmy Carter assisted negotiations. The treaty became a landmark document, with Egypt and Israel putting a stop to all hostilities that had plagued relations between them since the 1948 war. Additionally, Egypt became the first Arab country to fully recognize Israel and agreed that the Suez Canal and Straits of Tiran would become open to Israeli shipping while Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula. Sadat was lauded by both the international community, but his decision ended up being extremely unpopular in the Arab world, which saw it as a betrayal of pan-Arabism and more specifically, the ideas of his predecessor. His decision was rightfully seen as putting Egyptian interests above collective Arab nationalism. The treaty also bolstered his new friendship with the US, (effectively realigning Egypt from the Soviet Union to the US in the Cold War) who had helped him come to the conclusion that peace with Israel would be the best solution to the conflict. The Arab League ended up revoking Egypt’s membership for 10 years. As a result of the way this conflict ended, pan-Arabism remained popular with the Arab public but would never be close to a reality as it had been with Nasser. In the end the national interests of Egypt, the main driving force of pan-Arabism in the first place, trumped the region’s quest for Arab unity and gave way to the rise of political Islam in more recent years (which you could debate, took its place to a certain extent).

Citations:

Kerr, Malcolm- The Arab Cold War

Ajami, Fouad. "The End of Pan Arabism." Foreign Affairs (Winter 1978-1979)

Telhami, Shibley- Power and Leadership

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On the question on Pan-Germanism, is there a good book that covers von Bismarck’s master stroke in 1870?

Just wanted to add that this question was actually asked before if you would like to see some answers, with a particularly informative one by /u/CptBuck:

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/4vs5ab/why_has_nationalism_failed_to_become_a_primary/