As is often the case in these situations, a number of small factors compounded into an astonishing result. Therefore, I need to note that the order in which I discuss them does not necessarily reflect their order of importance.

First of all, it needs to be said that the Israelis worked very hard for their success. Preparations for Operation Moked, which was its Hebrew name, were conducted over many years, essentially since the Suez Crisis in 1956 as even then Israel had been aware that in the case of an all-out war of aggression waged against the Jewish state, only a pre-emptive debilitating strike on the enemy air forces could pave a way to Israel’s victory. The result of these plans was what Tom Cooper describes as ‘a massive and concentrated aerial campaign of sustained attacks on enemy air bases, right from the start of any war.’ Mock-ups of enemy bases were erected at the Negev desert so as to give pilots as realistic a training environment as possible.

The training also involved ground crews, so that the aircraft could be refueled and rearmed, and sent back into the air at a record pace. Some Israeli aircraft flew as many as eight sorties on the first day of the war. This is known as force multiplication and to an extent it took the Arabs by surprise: they were not expecting the IAF as a whole to be able to fly so many missions in one day and send wave after wave over Arab bases.

Moreover, as the 1960s progressed, Israel collected more and more detailed intelligence regarding the location and importance of potential targets. As a result, the strike was well coordinated and more often than not strike priority was assigned to the most important bases: those which housed Egyptian bombers and the most modern fighters. And since pretty much every strike package was led by an experienced pilot with substantial skills in the field of navigation, this theory was brought to life in practice. Even if a formation was delayed in its take-off (as it happened to the four-ship led by the famous Ran Ronen-Pekker), the flight leader was able to make speed adjustments in order to appear in the designated place at the designated moment.

On the other hand, Arab intelligence was far from efficient. The Egyptians didn’t even have a full list of IAF air bases. They knew about most of them, of course, but not all, and they were also convinced that some airfields which had long been defunct were still operational. As a result, it was much harder for them to gauge the actual combat potential of the IAF.

Now, one could argue that successful strikes against Arab air forces in one day a victory in a war do not constitute. Sure, except in this case, they did. The fact that the air forces were caught off guard precipitated a domino effect which—as was hoped by the Israelis—shattered the Egyptian will to fight (Egypt was the de facto leader of the Arab coalition). And where there was will, there was no ability, because a large proportion of the tools for waging war, the aircraft themselves, was left as burning wrecks on the ground, never having scrambled.

There were many small details in the plan of Operation Moked which increased its chances of success. For example, the time at which the strike occurred was carefully chosen to be later than the Egyptians expected. After all, the Egyptians weren’t stupid, they knew war might come and sooner rather than later. They kept fighters above bases to intercept the Israeli strike packages as they arrived, but the fighters had to land eventually. That’s when the attack happened: after the Egyptians had landed and before they were able to take off again.

There was also some luck in play. Egyptian Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer was on a plane, flying between two air bases, when Operation Moked began. Thus, he was unable to command his forces in those crucial first minutes. In fact, he was also almost, not also, shot down himself.

While Israel learned a lot from the Suez Crisis of 1956, the Egyptians learned very little and failed to update their philosophy regarding combat aviation (by this time they had already locked in to the Soviet philosophy). There were also political issues which prevented efficient communication between the armed forces of Arab states and Egyptian president Nasser himself did not want to believe that an Israeli attack was coming.

You will often see comments disparaging the Arab air forces and dismissing them as bumbling and incompetent. While some Arab leaders do fall into that category (looking at you, Marshal Amer), it’s thoroughly unfair to see the entire officer corps in this light. They were simply outplayed by the skill and determination of their enemy. Operation Moked was a marvel of war planning, it was simple and beautiful in this simplicity. And what would become known as the Six-Day War was essentially the Twelve-Hour War. Fighting would continue, but when the sun was settin on June 5, anyone familiar with the situation on both sides of the conflict would have easily understood how the entire affair would end.

Sources

I’m currently writing a book about the Israeli Air Force and what you see above is, to a large extent, a summary of the relevant chapter. However, if you’re interested in further reading, my main sources here were:

Tom Cooper, David Nicolle et al., Arab MiGs Volume 3: The June 1967 War, Harpia Publishing 2012.

Merav Halperin, Aharon Lapidot, G-suit: Pages from the Log Book of the Israel Air Force, Sphere 1990.

Lon O. Nordeen, David Nicolle, Phoenix over the Nile: A History of Egyptian Air Power, 1932-1994, Smithsonian 1996.

Edit: added a passage about the political aspect.