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The Greeks were the only one who possess a substantial modern navy in the Balkan League. Their navy were comprised of the prided and feared modern armoured cruiser Georgios Averof, sixteen destroyers, nineteen torpedo boats, and a submarine. In comparison, the Ottoman Navy comprised of six armored ships, two armored cruisers, eleven torpedo destroyers, and thirty torpedo ships with the heart of the navy being the battleships Turgut Reis and Barbaros Hayreddin and the armoured cruisers Mecidiye and Hamidiye. While in paper the Ottoman fleet looked stronger, they were mostly comprised of old ships built in the 1900s (For example Barbaros Hayreddin was modernized in 1903, and Hamidiye was built in the same year) and in a state of disrepair. Most of the Greek navy ships meanwhile were built in the 1910s (For example Averof were built in 1910, and eight of the destroyers were built in 1912) and in a capable state. It was the possession of these well-manned new ships that ensured maritime supremacy in the Aegean Sea, as it will be proven that the modern ships could quickly outmaneuvered Ottoman battleships and caused serious damages. One example that demonstrated both Ottoman inferiority in ships and its manning is during the clash of December 16, where in attempt to break the Greek blockade an Ottoman battle fleet sent to the Aegean to engage the approaching Greek fleet consisted of Averof, Spetsai, Hydra, and Psara. At 0940hrs the Ottoman warships opened fire, but at 0945hrs Averof quickly crosses the bows of the fleet and the Ottoman battleships were soon fired upon from both sides. The Ottoman commander had no choice but to break off and retreat. Ottoman destroyers missed the chance to engage the Greek cruiser, now separated from the enemy fleet. The Greeks also failed to send their destroyers to chase upon the Ottoman fleet. At 0950hrs the battleship Barbaros Hayreddin begins the turning maneuver, but it was poorly executed and degenerates into chaos. At 0955hrs Barbaros Hayreddin received a hit on the afterdeck, and shortly afterwards the after turret is hit and jammed out of action. Shrapnel pierces its unarmoured hull, damaging a number of boilers and starting a bunker fire. Turgut Reis and Mesudiye received hits, but only suffered light damages. Firing ceases at 1017hrs and the Ottoman fleet reached their bases at 1200hrs and 1300hrs. Later at 1545hrs Ottoman destroyers engaged Greek destroyers, but both sides doesn’t do much damage and finally separates. However while the Greek Navy dominated the Aegean Sea, the Ottoman navy maintained superiority in the inland Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea. This maritime superiority enabled the Ottoman Navy to come close inshore and to carry out shore bombardments in support for their army like in the Battle of Çatalca. Historian like Richard Hall claimed that if the Ottomans utilized their fleet better and aggressively they could seriously damage Greek blockade and disrupted the movement of men and material in the northern Aegean, and even maintained contacts with the Western Ottoman army.

It is true that the Greek blockade seriously hampered the established (and rather flawed) Ottoman battleplans. First, the Ottomans had to find troops to guard the now-vulnerable Gallipoli Peninsula. This resulted in the loss of the XV Corps to the Eastern Army during the crucial opening battles in Thrace. Moreover, the Eastern Army’s IV Corps was gutted to provide troops to guard the XV Corps’s now-unguarded sector meaning two complete armies were removed from Eastern Army’s order of battle. Second, the reinforcements bound from Syria and Palestine to complete the Eastern Army were hampered and had to be transported by the slower land routes, and a third corps was thus not available for the opening battles. In effect, the Greek blockade eliminated a significant portion of the Ottoman Army in the important opening round of the war. Third, the Greek blockade also denied the Ottomans VII Corps, which were scheduled to reinforce the Western Army in Macedonia and Albania. This additional army corps might very well tipped the tactical balance in the struggle for Salonika. Reinforcements never arrived, and by April 1913 the battered Western Army was a mere shell of its former self. Other reinforcements, munitions, and logistical supplies, which would have come to the Western Army by sea, likewise never arrived.

Bibliography:

Defeat in Detail : The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912- 1913 by Edward Erickson

The Ottoman Steam Navy, 1828–1923 by Ahmet Güleryüz and Bend Langensiepen

The Balkan Wars, 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War by Richard C. Hall