It gave consideration. That consideration was never very serious, at least not to the idea that Israel would keep the entire Sinai. Some argue that Israel reserved for itself the right to keep some part of it, but never planned to keep it all.

Following the war, even the Israelis were stunned with the level of victory. Within 6 days, they were left in control of the Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. That had never been the original plan, but it certainly left Israel in a strange position.

Jerusalem was always something that Israeli leaders, once they gained it, intended to keep. On this point, there was little dispute. However, the question on how to handle Gaza, the Golan Heights, the Sinai, and the West Bank remained. Each had its own rationales for debate, from strategic depth (the idea of a "buffer" in case of invasion, as the Sinai might serve to be if an invasion occurred, preventing Egypt from quickly reaching Israel's main population centers, for example) to religious/historical relevance, like in the case of the West Bank as the land of biblical events. However, the Sinai and the Golan were the two parts that Israel was most ready to part with in exchange for peace with Egypt and Syria. On June 19, the Israeli Cabinet apparently decided that this would be acceptable, though it passed this by only a single vote on the motion (which also included the annexation and integration of Gaza). There are serious debates as to the seriousness of this offer, and whether it was ever transmitted to the Arab states at all (though even those who believe it was never a real offer made also argue that Egypt's leadership wouldn't have been willing to negotiate even if that had been offered). The transcript of that meeting was declassified years ago. The original resolutions, available in Hebrew, reinforce that Israel said it was willing to agree to giving up the Sinai for peace.

For those wondering, the breakdown of the votes on that front were not surprising, with one exception in my view. Menachem Begin, the first Israeli right wing leader to ever gain power in Israel as Prime Minister (from 1949-1977, there was never a right-winger in power in Israel), favored giving up the Sinai for peace. This isn't surprising today; he eventually did exactly that in 1979's treaty with Egypt as Prime Minister. It seems wholly out of character for Begin based on his personal history prior to that point. The transcripts show that most of the other ministers agreed with his position on the Golan and Sinai, but they had different opinions on how to handle them. Some wanted to keep the Sinai temporarily, build houses in it for Gazan refugees to fill, and then reassess. Others favored waiting to see what would happen, like Moshe Dayan (largely the "hero" of the war), to see if more favorable-to-peace Arab leaders would arise and negotiate peace. There was a clarity that giving up the Sinai would require conditions, like free passage for Israeli ships through the Straits, demilitarization, and many of the other conditions that eventually were put into place in the treaty that resulted in 1979.

Some argue that the resolution's vague use of "international borders" with Egypt as the phrase of choice was a sign that Israel wouldn't give up the entire Sinai. However, that is a question unclear in the actual transcript and resolution. Even so, almost no one has claimed that Israel planned, or even seriously considered, keeping the entire Sinai and annexing it. At best, it sought to divide off part of it for itself, but otherwise give back the rest.