PART 1

Sorry for the delay in responding, its not am easy question to answer and I have been very busy drinking beer.

One of the main problems with answering such a question is that the historiography of cavalry on the western front is plagued an almost pathological Anglophone disparagement of cavalry. Cavalry has so come to epitomise the popular narrative of stupidity/futility/Blackadder/donkeys etc. that even recent works by respected historians, who have staged an admirable fightback against the popular narrative, tend still to be dismissive or contemptuous of cavalry.

One of the most striking examples of this is a recent post on the National Army Museum’s website. It makes much of the disastrous cavalry charge on the 24th August 1914, but makes no mention of the successful British charge of the 12th lancers on the 27th August 1914. It makes note of the failure to commit the cavalry on the 15th July 1916, but makes no mention of the successful action by the Secunderabad Brigade on the previous day.

It’s a real problem when studying British cavalry on the western front. Perhaps slightly understandable in a war dominated by artillery but still very frustrating.

As an overview, Peter Jones gives a good overview of the BEF in 1914 in this lecture which is definitely worth watching.

With regards to your questions:

The purchase system was abolished after the Crimean war in the mid 19th Century. It worked pretty well up till then as the rapid turn-over of officers as casualties mitigated the worst of its effects. Note that although the price of a commission was supposedly fixed, an unofficial black market was in operation, meaning that a commission in a desirable regiment like the Household Cavalry or Foot Guards could cost a great deal more than the headline price.

And of course cavalry were more desirable than infantry in general because riding on a horse > walking. Its worth reflecting that the entire British regimental system is inherently built in such a way that pride in your “cap badge” is paramount. Every regiment revels in its traditions and battle honours to foster a unique identity and an espirit de corps which is why the arcane system still persists.

But even after the abolishment of the purchase system, certain regiments could exclude undesirable subalterns by various means. Notably by making their uniforms and mess bills so expensive that one would need an income several times greater than actual salary to afford to live in such a style. See Richard Holmes’ Tommy and Redcoat for more detail.

One of the questions I can’t properly address is what effect the vast expansion and attrition the army endured had on officer recruitment. For the army as a whole, the limited pool of public school educated candidates was burned through rapidly, so grammar school alumni were next, and by the time the war really gets going for the British, you’re seeing NCO’s getting commissioned very regularly. Obviously the cavalry was a bit different as it didn’t go through expansion on anything like the same scale as the other arms.

Another question I cannot properly address but is worth considering is the status of officers in the Indian cavalry regiment

You did not need to have prior experience with horses to enlist in the ranks of a cavalry regiment, and of course most officers would have experience of hunting and riding on horseback from a young age.

A good reference point here is Sir William Robertson, a working class lad who enlisted in the cavalry as a trooper with no experience of riding. He gained promotion to commissioned rank on merit, and was able to survive on his salary by being posted to India (where pay was higher and costs lower), by becoming a teetotal non-smoker, getting his parents to sew his uniforms, and taking up extra-curricular jobs. Robertson would go on to attain the rank of Field Marshall, and become the professional head of the British Army for much of the war.

With regards to tactics – the major change occurred after the second Anglo-Boer war as a result of lessons learned and part of the general modernisation program the army went through.

In 1904, the War Office published Cavalry Training. Compiled by and largely written by Haig, this document set out British cavalry doctrine as it would apply to the Great War. More than anything, this was Haig setting his stamp on the arme blanche debate.

For decades prior it had been observed that the theoretical increase in infantry firepower due to rifles etc. would render cavalry obsolete, and that what was needed was Mounted Infantry – mounted soldiers trained to fight as infantry but able to move as cavalry. The contrary point of view was that an arme blanch charge was still a battle winning attribute on account of its devastating psychological impact, and that to do away with the shock of cold steel would neuter a decisive arm.

Experience in the Boer war cemented Haig’s already quite developed opinion on the matter.

Firepower was not simply the cavalry’s greatest enemy, it was also its greatest friend. From an early stage, Haig was enamoured by the concept of independent cavalry, with its own fire support, able to use its mobility and psychological shock value to greatest effect.

Experience had shown that “rifle charges” by mounted Boers and British M.I. were usually unsuccessful, while arme blanche charges British cavalry would have such a psychological impact on the enemy that the theoretical stoichiometry of firepower simply collapsed and ran away screaming.

Further undermining the concept of M.I. was that just plonking a soldier on a horse did not a horseman make. With the already harsh conditions in South Africa, a scarcity of fodder, and unacclimatised horses, the M.I. had an unfortunate tendency to ride their horse, literally, to death. This was a major problem give that a shortage of horses was a major strategic limitation in the war. Indeed, part of the lessons learned in South Africa was the need for troopers to take much better care of their mounts, meaning British cavalry mounts were usually in much better condition that those of other armies.