The Duelfer Report (2004), on the Iraqi WMD programs, has a lot of interesting insights into Saddam's thinking, gleaned from interviewing many members of his administration. This particular part jumps out:

Despite Iraq’s heavy burden of debt after the war [with Iran], Saddam emerged with an experienced and expanded military force, poised to dominate the Gulf. Economic difficulties were Saddam’s main motive for the invasion of Kuwait, with irredentist grievances a secondary concern. Absorbing Kuwait as Iraq’s 19th province was viewed as having historical justification and being the key to revitalizing Iraq’s economy. Saddam had planned for an invasion of Kuwait for some weeks beforehand, but the timeframe in which to conduct the attack had not been formalized. The impulsive decision to invade in August 1990 was precipitated by what Saddam chose to perceive as Kuwait’s arrogance in negotiations over disputed oil drilling along the common border.

As in the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam’s ambition led him to miscalculate the impact of his actions. He was unprepared for the harsh reaction to the Kuwaiti invasion by the United States and the other permanent members of the UNSC, especially the Soviet Union, and surprised by the condemnation of fellow Arab leaders, many of whom he knew detested the Kuwaitis. In the face of this criticism, however, Saddam refused to back down, believing he could prevail, just as he did against Iran.

Which is to say: he appears to have not thought the West would care very much (elsewhere it says that he also underestimated the impact that sanctions would cause). It also emphasizes, throughout the report, that the decision to invade Kuwait was essentially Saddam's alone, and that his advisors who thought it was a bad idea had no influence over him (and feared being cast as dissidents, which would be fatal).

One can say: well, of course his advisors would blame it all on Saddam, after they've been captured by Coalition forces. But presumably the CIA, etc., took that into consideration.