It is indeed a a difficult task comparing the sets of pitfalls regarding the ability of the intelligence services of each nation during WWII. The significant set of factors would have begun with the Nazi purges of the high ranking core of the army in 1938, particularly during the Blomberg–Fritsch affair, which led to the removal of Werner von Fritsch as Army commander and Werner von Blomberg as War Minister, as consolidation of Nazi ideology permeated to that of the army.^(1) A restructuring of an institution along ideological lines was then enforced by Nazi high command, abolishing the War Ministry and establishing the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht.^(2) This blunted the spear of experience with that of the purge and the ingraining of Nazi doctrine towards operations, with required readings along topics such as, "Hitler's World Historical Mission", "The Battle for German Living Space", "Hands off Danzig!", and "The Final Solution of the Jewish Question in the Third Reich"^(3.) This along with severe pitfalls of code breaking under Turing^(4) , dissent among intelligence officials opposed to Hitlers military direction along with a tactical disadvantage of being ravaged from multiple angles by opposing factions, compounded with that of weaker allies. ^(5) Hitler's realignment of the structure of military affairs played into these elements further, bogging down effective cross communication of departments, along with factors of bureaucratic stagnation and propagandized fervour to be present within all areas of the armed forces.^(6)

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This mismanagement of tactical organisation, particularly on the eastern front, led to a myriad of problems for the effectiveness of the combat operations of the Wehrmacht, Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. Prime examples being that of the untethered arm of the SS, who would conduct operations removed from the jurisdiction of the Wehrmacht generals. This would ensure an ineffective model for formulating both a secure and properly structured military capacity.^(7) This hindered capability was further diluted by a veil of ineffective reconnaissance, most notably the lack of intelligence on the output of the munitions factories located beyond the Ural mountains. ^(8) Propaganda played a large part in what you could consider a military blunder, such as at Stalingrad, or at Kursk. This drive for victory at all costs for the protection of the Fatherland, was maintained by high command to ensure victory, Pyrrhic or otherwise. ^(9) This can be highlighted in the recorded conversations between Hitler and Mannerheim after the Winter war, in which he discusses his surprise at the sheer scale of Soviet Armament, in particular tank numbers. ^(10) The numbers however should be taken with a grain of salt, yet what we do know is that tank production was so high that they were being rolled out out factories straight into battle without marking decals being completed. Even more so reflective of the blinded vigor of determination spurned on by fanatical belief in propaganda and lack of intelligence is the figure purported, at 30,000, when the reality was at the time it would have been around 50,000. ^(11.)

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Once again propaganda plays a huge roll in furthering our veil of understanding or lack thereof , as blunders were regularly hushed as to not dampen morale at home or on the front. ^(12) Rudolph Hess' manic dash for peace reconciliation to Scotland and eventual capture, ensured an upper hand of information to which the British could use to their advantage going forward in the war. ^(13) Another factor for consideration is war time purges of the officer and general class, which were increasingly common due to the dissatisfaction of the effectiveness of high command of Hitler. ^(14) The July 20th blunder resulted in the deaths of one of the most skilled generals the Wehrmacht had under their wing, Erwin Rommel. These purges serve to dampen overall effectiveness of the military even further, as morale, skill and faith in high command continued to falter. ^(15)

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1. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis, p. 369

2. Kallis, Aristotle Fascist Ideology, p. 89.

3. Förster, Jürgen, "Complicity or Entanglement? The Wehrmacht, the War and the Holocaust", In Berenbaum, Michael; Peck, Abraham. The Holocaust and History The Known, the Unknown, the Disputed and the Reexamiend. Bloomington: Indian University Press. p. 266–283.

4. Winterbotham, F. W. , The Ultra secret: the inside story of Operation Ultra, Bletchley Park and Enigma, p. 16

5. Siedentopf, Monika, Unternehmen Seelöwe, p.28

6. MacDonald, John. Great Battles of World War II, p. 245

7. Weinberg, Gerhard, A World In Arms, p.826

8. Hughes, Matthew, and Mann, Chris, T-34 Russian Battle Tank, p. 47

9. Khrushchev, Nikita, Khrushchev Remembers, p.195

10. Hitler and Mannerheim recording https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CORQJlX-mLs

11. Hughes, Mann, p. 74

12. Sweeney, Michael , Secrets of Victory: The Office of Censorship and The American Press and Radio in World War II Intelligence in Recent Public Literature, p. 55

13. Shirer, William L., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p.835

14. Zentner, Christian, Bedürftig, Friedemann, The Encyclopedia of the Third Reich, p. 47

15. Fraser, David, Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, p. 637

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