By the start of WWII, the U.S. Army had been segregated since the Civil War, nearly 75 yeard ago. The Army had fought and won the Civil War, the Plains Wars, the Spanish-American War, the Philippine Insurrection, and WWI as a segregated force. From the Army's point of view, segregationist policies hadn't been an obstacle to victory in 1865, 1876, 1898, or 1918, so why change in 1941? Granted, that attitude would start to change by 1945.

Now, the Army saw black manpower as highly useful in wartime, but often utilized black soldiers in non-combat roles. During World War I, the vast majority of the 367,410 blacks drafted were used as manual laborers or sent to service units. In WWII, much the same thing happened. Of the 922,965 black soldiers in WWII, most spent the war working in segregated rear-area service units. The all-black 2nd Cavalry Division was sent to North Africa and Italy, only to be broken up and used to provide troops for labor units or replacements for an all-black infantry division. The 555th Parachute Infantry Regiment wasn't ever sent to fight the Japanese, instead they spent the war as smokejumpers fighting forest fires in the Pacific Northwest. The U.S. Army had a huge need for laborers and support personnel to move supplies, build airfields, and do other vital work in rear areas. Although there was unquestionably a racial tint to the Army's choice, there was a certain half-sense to it - many black soldiers were undereducated and it would have been difficult to train them for other roles.

Some Army officers believed there were racial differences between whites and blacks that justified, nay, demanded, segregation. This attitude, perhaps unsurprisingly, was prevalent amongst southern-born officers. Now, the U.S. Army deliberately assigned white officers from Southern states to command segregated black units. The theory was that Southern officers would have more experience dealing with blacks and would know how to handle them.

This lead to some ... issues.

Take Virginian Ned Almond, for example. As a Brigadier General, Almond was made the assistant divisional commander of the all-black 93rd Infantry Division.* His divisional commander, Mississippi native Major General Charles P. Hall, was assigned to the unit for similar reasons. Later, Almond was promoted and given command of the 92nd Infantry Division, the "Buffalo Soldiers Division" before it was sent into combat in Italy.

Although Almond had excellent paper qualifications, he was a terrible choice for the job. Almond was virulently racist (during the Korean War he called Chinese soldiers "laundrymen") and loathed his assignment. He went so far as to say:

"No white man wants to be accused of leaving the battle line. The Negro doesn't care .... people think being from the South we don't like Negroes. Not at all, but we understand his capabilities. And we don't want to sit at the table with them."

Many of Almond's white officers felt the same way. Being assigned to an all-black division was seen as a career-killer. Turnover rates were high, as some white officers schemed ways to get out of black units. Training and readiness suffered, especially since many black soldiers from Jim Crow areas could barely read or write. When the 92nd went into combat in Italy, it's combat debut went badly. Badly-lead and badly-trained soldiers failed to take objectives and took heavy casualties. Many black soldiers deserted or broke down. In fact, desertion became a chronic problem for the unit. Despite the fact he was partly to blame, Almond blamed his black soldiers and cursed his hard luck at getting the assignment.

Interestingly enough, the combat failures of segregated units like the 92nd Infantry Division in WWII and the 24th Infantry Regiment in the Korean War spurred integration efforts in the late 1940s and 1950. Limited experience with integration in WWII had suggested mixed-race units did better in combat than segregated ones.

During WWII, there had been some experiments with partial integration. Between June and January 1945, the Army had lost 430,000 troops in Europe. In January 1945, the Army desperately needed more troops. Lieutenant General John C.H. Lee suggested the Army send more black troops into combat. Lee was the Service of Supply (SOS) commander in the ETO, so he'd had extensive, often positive experiences working with all-black service units.

The Army accepted Lee's suggestion. To help fill the manpower demands, the Army sought out volunteers from all-black units. Initially, the Army only took 2,000 men (the maximum number that could be simultaneously trained at the Ground Forces Reinforcement Center (GFRC) in northern France). The spots were quickly filled with volunteers, many of them long-serving NCOs willing to be reduced in rank for a chance to fight in the rank. The Army now had enough manpower for 53 all-black rifle platoons. By March 1945, 37 platoons were ready. Some were formed into all-black company-sized units and attached to the 12th and 14th Armored divisions. Others were attached to all-white infantry companies to form a 5th rifle platoon (usually, rifle companies had three rifle platoons and a heavy weapons platoon).

White officers were generally assigned to lead these new all-black platoons while they were in training at the GFRC. Some resented the job. Others, like combat veteran First Lieutenant Richard Ralston were more sanguine. He recalled:

"There was a learning process on both sides ... They were pretty ginger about me because I was white, but once they were convinced that I was talking serious stuff and wasn’t racially prejudiced, they got down in the dirt and did what they had to do. They knew then I was talking survival."

"We kept training in earnest ... I exaggerated considerably about how many of them were going to die to try and scare them out of the unit. I only wanted the best and bravest. But nobody quit. They were pretty darned good."

Ralston's 5th Platoon was assigned to K Company, 394th Regiment, 99th Infantry Division. They were thrown into combat in March 1945. In the fighting around the Remagen bridgehead, the platoon took its first losses. It spent the rest of the war in the advance into the Rhineland. Another black platoon in the 393rd Infantry Regiment, 99th Infantry Division did so well it was regarded as one of the best platoons in the regiment

Other all-black platoons did similarly well. Brigadier General Edwin F. Parker, the 78th Infantry Division's commander, asked for more black platoons after the fighting around Remagen.

The 104th Infantry Division reported:

"Morale: Excellent. Manner of performance: Superior. Men are very eager to close with the enemy and to destroy him. Strict attention to duty, aggressiveness, common sense and judgment under fire has won the admiration of all the men in the country."

The 1st Infantry Division observed:

"White platoons like to fight beside them because they laid a large volume of fire on the enemy positions."

Post-war interviews revealed more. In mid-1945, the Army interviewed 250 officers and 1,700 enlisted men who had fought with or near the black soldiers. The results were promising. 84 percent of the officers said the black soldiers did "very well" in combat. The other 12 percent said the black riflemen had done "fairly well." A mere 5 percent of officers thought black troops were inferior infantrymen to white soldiers. Race relations had also been better than expected. 73 percent of officers and 60 percent of NCOs thought black soldiers and white soldiers got along well with each other.

It is important to consider that the black soldiers in many of the 5th Platoons weren't representative of the average black soldier or the average Army infantryman in 1945. They were relatively older, longer-serving, and all were volunteers. That doesn't in any way diminish their combat performance or their service. It's just important context to consider when we evaluate their performance.

One company commander reported:

"They were the best platoon in the regiment. I wish I could get a presidential citation for them. They are very aggressive as fighters — really good in woods and at close-quarters work."

Another officer had only one complaint:

"The only trouble is getting them to stop; they just keep pushing."

After the war, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) dissolved the black platoons and most of the men were forced to return to their original units. However, the experiment had been instructive to the Army. It had certainly given civil rights leaders lobbying for integration in the Army.

In July 1948, Truman signed Executive Order 9981, which read:

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale.

This integrated the U.S. Armed forces, although it would take years before the effort was complete. The need for troops, any troops, to provide casualty replacements in the Korean War really shoved forward integration.

*The 93rd was nicknamed the "Blue Helmet Division" and had a blue French Adrian helmet on its shoulder patch. Partly for racial reasons, it hadn't fought under direct control of the U.S. Army, but had been attached to the French army. The blue helmet was a token of this history.

Sources:

"The 93rd Infantry Division: The Only African-American Division in the Pacific Theater" by Stephen D. Lutz

"Bring on the Buffalo" by Michael Lynch

The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Ital y, 1943-1944 by Rick Atkinson

"African American Platoons in World War II" by David P. Colley