The Japanese had two air arms during World War Two, the Japanese Army Air Force (Dai-Nippon Teikoku Rikugun Kōkūbutai) and the Japanese Naval Air Service (Dai-Nippon Teikoku Kaigun Kōkū-tai), each was assigned its own Strategic Doctrine, within the context of the overall war aims of Japan. The doctrines were based on a National Policy to expand the sphere of conquest, and then defend and maintain control of said sphere. Both air services were to have a key role in these war aims.

In the overall doctrine, the Japanese Army Air Force was to provide support for ground troops, and perform counter air-force tasks. This would include the use of fighters, bombers, reconnaissance planes, transports and ground-based anti-aircraft units.

The Navy Air Service strategic doctrine was designed around naval amphibious warfare doctrine, as well the Japanese Naval doctrine of a Mahanian style war winning 'Decisive Battle'. The Naval Air Doctrine focused on long-range strike and surprise attack, using light manoeuvrable aircraft such as fighters and light attack bombers, in support of amphibious ground troops or naval operations. There was an important focus on swift surprise attacks to destroy enemy aircraft on the ground in the support of amphibious landings, or light attack bomber strikes, including anti-shipping torpedo attack. Naval air forces operated from both carriers and land bases, with some units operating permanently from land bases. The reduction of the Japanese Naval Carrier fleet and aircraft, limited the scope of the offensive capability of these forces from 1942 onwards.

Both Air Services shared some air tactics, but these were also sometimes specific to operations and equipment. From late 1942 the expansion of the Japanese perimeter was more or less complete, and the air units were disposed to defend the perimeter. More units were deployed to the Pacific perimeter as the threat from Russia and China faded. This diminished over time, however, as units were reduced by enemy action, and were withdrawn to bases further into the areas of occupation. The 'Facilities in Depth' of bases within the Japanese areas of occupation allowed a high degree of tactical deployment for air units to meet threats to the perimeter, dependent however, on supply.

The Naval Doctrine, inclusive of the Naval Air Doctrine, was vacillated over between a defensive 'Fleet in Being' approach and an offensive 'Decisive Battle' approach. The later was the doctrine that was finally settled on as late as April 1942, as a result of the Doolittle Raid. Broadly, the doctrine was developed to reduce the likelihood of an attritional war. The Naval Doctrine was broken down into Operational Tactics, to meet the overall objective. These Operational Tactics could be described in two important categories: 'Surprise' and 'Outranging', these defined the Japanese Operational Approach during offensives.

'Surprise' also featured two categories: 'Secrecy' and 'Deception'. These elements were key to the almost every operational plan developed by the Japanese. 'Outranging' manifested in the development of a small force of 'unsinkable', large battleships and battlecruisers with long range guns which 'outrange' and outgun the enemy, examples would include the Yamato Class. There was also a focus on night fighting for Naval units. 'Outranging' also manifested in the very long range Type 91 'long lance' torpedo, long range submarines and submarine deployable midget-submarines and aircraft.

'Outranging' was also key in the development of the Naval Air Services, with a distinct focus on the operational range for naval carrier aircraft, to extend the overall carrier fleets operational effectiveness, and performance of the 'Surprise' Operational Tactic. Japanese Naval aircraft design excelled at meeting this requirement, at the expense of other operational elements, such as armour, to which some types were upgraded with as the war progressed. The Japanese developed three types of self-sealing fuel tanks for different aircraft types and operational needs. These were: leak absorbing, leak proofing and self sealing. Armour plate was also installed on some types, mostly land based Army types. Early Naval types, however, lacked these protections in order to maximise the effect of the Operational Tactics.

Air tactics developed over time to meet the changing landscape of the war, with a more defensive role being prominent later in the war as well as the offensive/defensive Special Units. In 1944 the US presumed that the overall Strategic Doctrine of the Japanese Air Services, was the defence of the the Home Islands and the Inner Zone of Occupation.

You could argue that the original Japanese Air Doctrines were in use up until the end of the war, as broad mission statements continued to be relevant, but only where units were still operational. The strategic goals of the Allies against the Japanese, however, were broadly to reduce the Japanese sphere of influence and draw them into the protracted attritional war, which the Japanese were trying to avoid. This acts as an opposing doctrine of attrition, against the Japanese Doctrine of decisive battle.

Interestingly, some the tactics used by the Japanese Air Services came to resemble those of the US air forces, as the efficacy of these tactics developed. If you are interested in the Japanese air tactics observed by the Americans, I can recommend the Handbook on Japanese Military Forces 1944, (pages 55-61) which covers observations on both the Strategic Doctrine and the air tactics used by the Japanese.

Sources:

Handbook on Japanese Military Forces 1944: US War Department.

Air warfare and air base defense, 1914-1973 (1988): John F Kreis.

Japanese Operational Plans in World War 2: Shortfalls in Critical Elements. Thomas Culora USN.

Naval Classical Thinkers and Operational Art. USN War College. Dr. Milan Vego