Technological during innovation World War Two is an example of how technologies are adapted to meet strategic directives and operational requirements. There are numerous examples of measure and counter-measure being developed by the warring parties to meet these requirements. A good example being the German airborne interception radar system, and the development of the counter measure 'Window' chaff system by the allies. The Axis and the Allies had different strategies for victory, resulting in different technological development paths.

The development of the Hypervelocity Electromagnetic Launchers dates back to the late 1800's, with test models and developments being keenly pursued by French and Norwegian scientists during and after World War One. Russians, Americans and Japanese had operational test rail guns prior to World War Two. Notable among these are the 1901 Birkeland Gun and the 1936 Northrup Coil Gun. During World War Two, Joachim Hänsler is credited with "the most intense effort to date" to create a working railgun and managed to launch a 10-g projectile to velocities up to 1,200 m/s with his model. Considerable research had been undertaken, and patents filed by other scientists, before Hänsler published "A Contribution to the Problem of the Electrical Cannon and Test Reports" in 1944. The development of a German Electrical Cannon was not radically more innovative than existing designs and only contributed to existing railgun research, and not the outcome of the war. Railguns of this era were subject to limitations of a suitable power source.

The Ho-229, or Horten H.IX, was a design iteration of tail-less aircraft design that extended back before the advent of powered flight. The design of the Ho-229 was not objectively to meet a requirement for a low observability. Its main design advantages lay in proven flight characteristics, (it was based on existing glider designs) low cost materials, and low drag properties. The Horten 229's supposed low radar visibility stems from interviews with Reimar Horten in the 1980's, in which he states "...adding coal to glue to reduce radar cross-section, "camouflaged" the radar cross-section of 90% of the IX". In a 2014, a frankly amazing study conducted by the American Institute for the Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works about the long term conservation of the Smithsonian Horten Ho 229 V3, was undertaken. The researchers took the opportunity to study the composition of the plywood material, noting that most of the plywood was prefabricated and unremarkable, but: "We characterized a material within the plywood adhesive that shares many commonalities with charcoal, but is not clearly and definitively charcoal." They also concluded " Although the presence of charcoal as a stealth ingredient appears unlikely, the opportunity to investigate the adhesive matrix revealed a microcosm of additives and inclusions, which can be seen as an artefact of materials availability of the time" In the US, Jack Northrop had been developing flying wing aircraft in the US since the 1930's and, in general, the design was a response to eliminating drag and reducing weight, rather than evading airborne radar detection equipment.

Very late in the war the Germans did develop anti radar materials, in the form of a two ply rubber 'Alberich' coating placed on the hull of late war submarines, in an attempt to avoid radar systems, and mask sound. However, this required several thousand hours to attach to the submarine and relied on scare synthetic rubber materials. It also lacked durability. This is an example of a passive technology response an active threat, which had been developed by the allies.

The use of turbo-jets in military aviation during the war was not a defining factor for the outcome of the war. The British, the Germans and the US were all developing turbo jets prior to and during the war. The allies developed both Centrifugal types and Co-axial Flow types. Germany settled on the Co-axial type and the German Jet industry overtook the British due to greater funding and industry support. In the article 'The Development of the Turbo Jet Engine in Britain and Germany'; the author states:" Both countries’ turbojets were the culmination of design concessions for the sake of deployment; some key differences in finished quality result from the fact that Britain’s engines were designed from the beginning with a sense of expedient technical compromise, while German engineers realized only later in the war that they would not have the time they expected to perfect their designs, or even the materials they had taken for granted." Both the Jumo 004 and BMW 003 had many issues, with vibration and compressor stalls as well as reliance on strategic materials which were in short supply. In the article "The Development of the Turbojet Engine in Britain and Germany as a Lens for Future Developments" the author states: "Historians have often commented on the over-exuberance of German policy on multiple topics, including technical development; the jet engine was no exception to this pattern."

The US developed both the Allison J33 and the General Electric J31 centrifugal types, as well as the Westinghouse Co-axial types. The US jet aircraft types that flew during the war were running both centrifugal engines and co-axial. The overall fighter strategy held by the US was one of long range and mass production. Jets of the time were fuel hungry and could not meet the long range fighter escort requirements. Both the US and Britain had developed both co-axial flow and centrifugal flow jet engines and the airframes to house them, but they did not have the operational requirement to field them in order to win the war, and so their development path was not fully realised until after the war.

The Germans were no more technically advanced than the Allies, who maintained significant technological innovation during the war. The Germans chose to fund and prioritise numerous specific projects to meet their strategic and operational requirements, which differed from those of the Allies. Technological advances and adaptations made during the war need to be placed into their strategic context and weighed against their operational requirements.

Sources:

DEVELOPMENT OF HYPERVELOCITY ELECTROMAGNETIC LAUNCHERS: William F. Weldon

EM Launch Competitors’ Guide. Chapter 1: Milestones in Cannon Launch to Space by Phillip Putnam.

Capacitor-Driven Railgun: Magnetic Fields Doing Work by Kirk T. McDonald

Flying Wings and Tailless Aircraft by Bill Rose.

Walter and Reimar Horten Interviews. National Air and Space Museum Archives. by Beth Lee.

TECHNICAL STUDY OF THE BAT WING SHIP (THE HORTEN HO 229 V3) by LAUREN HORELICK, MALCOLM COLLUM, PETER McELHINNEY, ANNA WEISS, RUSSELL LEE, ODILE MADDEN. (The American Institute for the Conservation of Historic and Artistic Works)

Performance Analysis of the Horten Flying Wing. By Dezso Gyorgyfalvy.

The Development of the Turbojet Engine in Britain and Germany as a Lens for Future Developments. By Ethan Zachariah Cansler

The Cutting Edge: A Half-Century of U.S. Fighter R&D by Mark Lorell and Hugh Levaux.

The German Jet Program 1939-1945 by Sterling Michael Pavelec

Lost Patrols: Submarine Wrecks of the English Channel By Innes McCartney

U-1105 in the US Navy 1945 to 1949 by Derek Waller.

To be clear, the Ho 229 was not built as a stealth aircraft, even if popular documentaries have said otherwise...

The flying wing design used by Reimar Horten was chosen because it was a low-drag design that could fulfill (or at least come close to fulfilling) Goering's "3x1000" specification for a bomber that could carry 1,000 kg of bombs for 1,000 km at a top speed of 1,000 km/h. Putting the engines in the wing roots and getting rid of the tail helped the Horten design get close to that design goal.

The popular stealth myth come from Reimar Horten's postwar claim he put charcoal in the Ho 229's paint to diffuse radar waves. Analysis of the sole surviving Ho 229 has found zero evidence to support this claim.

Now, the Germans did use some radar-absorbing materials during WWII. Later-war German u-boats had their snorkels and periscopes treated with rubber-graphite mixes called Sumpf and Schornsteinfeger to absorb the radar waves used by Allied sun-hunting aircraft,

As for other technology, it really depends of what "ahead of everyone else" means.

Yes, the Germans made great leaps in some areas. For example, German research into swept wings and leading edge devices were used in American's post-war F-86 Sabre/FJ Fury. The late-war Type XXI submarines, had very hydrodynamic hulls and an emphasis on submerged operations (previously, submarines spent most of their time on the surface). This concept would strongly influence post-war submarine design, although it's worth nothing the Allies were already heading in a similar direction anyways.

However, the Germans also lagged in key areas. No atom bomb. Not even a serious atom bomb program or a viable bomb design. No VT proximity-detonating artillery or anti-aircraft shells (the Germans cancelled the program at Hitler's orders, since the program was 6+ months away from making a viable design). No microwave radar or advanced vacuum tubes (both cancelled for similar reasons).

We also have to ask if having a technical lead in some areas even helped the Germans. Were the Germans ahead in rocket technology? Yes. Was the V-2 a colossal waste of money, man hours, and precious resources? Yes. In fact, I think there's a very solid case to be made the V-2 hurt the Germans more than it ever hurt the Allies. The Germans wasted a lot of time and resources fucking around with scattered, go-nowhere research projects and pointless prototyping (I'm looking at you, Maus tank).