Talleyrand is a very slippery figure for historians to deal with. For one thing, he aroused very strong emotions among his contemporaries due to his clear avarice and aesthete lifestyle. Talleyrand was a major diplomatic figure of the Republic, Consulate, Empire, and Restoration. His ability to serve so many different governments underscores the charge that Talleyrand only served himself. Napoleon certainly made this charge and it has carried over into defenders of Napoleon like Andrew Roberts. The latter's biography often has Talleyrand's quips against Napoleon's character as epigrams to show how Napoleon possessed greater talents than the Bishop of Auton thought. Conversely, anti-Napoleonic scholars like Paul Schroeder portray Talleyrand in a more positive light, trying to "save Napoleon from himself" (Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics) and create a functional balance of power. While both of these extreme views of Talleyrand have evidence backing them up, they do not do the historical Talleyrand much justice.

Talleyrand did present himself as what latter generations of diplomats would term a Reakpolitiker, i.e. someone that approaches diplomacy on the basis of realistic goals and aspirations. One of the central planks of Talleyrand's diplomacy was crafting a balance of power that favored France. War for Talleyrand was a dangerous variable in these schemes and he tended to propose diplomatic alliances backed up by the threat of war. Napoleon's approach to diplomacy tended towards the reverse of Talleyrand's with a successful war creating the preconditions for negotiations from a position of strength. The two men thus became increasingly at loggerheads over the direction of French foreign policy.

Talleyrand increasingly formed a nexus of what might be termed a loyal opposition within France as his star fell within the Empire's government. This opposition dipped into what was technically light treason in 1809 when he was involved in a plot to replace Napoleon if he had died in Spain. Some of this plotting was a contingency had the war in Spain went badly; there was no real news from Napoleon as he was chasing Moore in a remote area of the Iberian peninsula and there were rumblings of a renewed war with Austria. But there was evidence that Talleyrand saw these worst-case scenarios as a pretext for a more manageable form of Bonapartist government. Talleyrand likewise had the year prior formed a stumbling block for the meeting between Napoleon and the Russian Emperor Alexander I at Erfurt. Talleyrand though did not move into formal opposition to Napoleon, and to Napoleon's credit, the Emperor did not restrict Talleyrand's social life or ability to navigate France's high culture.

Here is where the charge of laziness gets somewhat hazy. Talleyrand was most comfortable in the salon culture of diplomacy in which social contacts became the staging ground for later diplomacy. The salon played to Talleyrand's strengths; he was schooled in the charms of the ancien regime, could be quite witty, and did by many accounts throw decent parties. This sort of informal diplomacy was a part of statecraft, even as diplomatic corps were growing more professional. But when combined with the oppositional nature of Talleyrand's diplomatic stances, such informal diplomacy increasingly looked like backroom dealing from the perspective of Napoleon and his partisans.

In fairness to Napoleon, much of Talleyrand's balance of power schemes were not all that much more practical than Napoleon's very loosely-defined vision of a French-dominated Europe. But Talleyrand had a diplomatic skill Napoleon lacked: flexibility. As Bismarck once said of diplomacy, one cannot make a wave, one can only ride it. Talleyrand on some level understood this later maxim and knew how to adjust to circumstances. Napoleon's personal diplomacy, especially after the Russian debacle, was often too slow to recognize the changed geopolitical realities. A more tractable and realistic view of France's strategic position on the part of Napoleon could have preserved his throne, but he fell back into the habit of trying to use military victories to create a stronger negotiating position.

The fact that Talleyrand came out on top of Napoleon and later the Restoration Bourbons did not really do wonders for assessments of his character. While some diplomatic historians might praise his vision of a balance of powers, such praise seldom extended to his personal qualities as a man. Talleyrand was quite open with his vices. Talleyrand would likely not take offense at Roberts's description, but in true salon fashion have added a sarcastic quip to upstage Napoleon the Great's portrait. Talleyrand was well-known for his tart comebacks to insults against his character. But such vices were an integral part of his brand of diplomacy.

Sources

Dwyer, Philip G. Talleyrand. London: Routledge, 2013.

Schroeder, Paul W. The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Whitcomb, Edward A. Napoleon's Diplomatic Service. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979.