When Hitler was appointed by Hindenburg, the Nazis were a minority in both the cabinet and the Reichstag. Is it a historical misconception that Hitler was elected?
You really have to do mental gymnastics to arrive at that conclusion to be honest. The NSDAP received 33% of the vote in November 1932 elections and were the strongest faction. This is crucial, as the Weimar systems (and all systems like it) are designed in a way that the leader of the strongest party gets to be head of government, notwithstanding extraordinary circumstances, i.e. a smaller faction allying with a yet smaller faction to form a political coalition.
If no party gains a majority through coalition forming, then the system still wants and needs a minority government, again giving de facto precedence to the leader of the party with the most seats - the Nazis in this case.
Hindenburg had burnt through Von Papen and then Von Schleicher as well before conceding the fight and turning to Hitler. Although he became a willing tool in Nazi power ploys in 1933 and early 1934, it does not seem to be likely that he was particularly stoked to see Hitler as chancellor in January of 1933. Nevertheless, the constitution was not designed in a way that allowed even the most ardent antifascist to see a space for Hindenburg to just forego naming a Chancellor for the sake of not naming Hitler. That's not what the role of the President was under the Weimar system.
You could argue that Hindenburg should have snubbed Hitler and named SPD leader Wels as Chancellor instead. Perhaps you might have a moral case against Hindenburg, too, who was a deeply conservative man even for the time - however, it should be pointed out that the often-made assertion that he asked the dethroned Emperor Wilhelm II before accepting the candidacy in 1925 is a historical myth. It must also be pointed out that the social democrats would not have been able to find political allies in the center sufficient to outweigh the extremist faction. And due to the Sozialfaschismus doctrine prescribed by Moscow's Comintern, they couldn't hope for even passive support by the communists either. Hindenburg had no reason to believe an SPD government wouldn't have ended a total failure. Furthermore, Hindenburg had no reason to believe that Hitler's attempt at the chancellorship would go be any less flawed than the Präsidialkabinette of Brüning, Von Papen and Von Schleicher. It was absolutely reasonable for him to expect Hitler to fail like the armchair autocrats before him had.
I have heard the idea that Hindenburg was to blame rather than the German people several times, and it has so far failed to convince me. The German electorate brought this destiny upon itself. Hindenburg was by no means an active or helpful assistant of Hitler's rise to power, even if he did become a willing sockpuppet after said rise was concluded.
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